I am taking a break from my series on Countering Violent Extremism (parts one, two, three, four, and five). I’ll get back to that next week.

Perhaps the most flawed area of study when it comes to modern Islamist terrorism is Islamist ideology. Nowhere is this more obvious than the literature and discourse on al-Qaeda’s understanding of jihad. It seems that everywhere I look, I see people claiming al-Qaeda’s jihad is not offensive; rather, it is defensive.  Time to bring some clarity to the issue (see my post on this from August).

Perhaps not surprisingly, this is where many academics get it wrong and practitioners get it right. I once attended a lecture where a respected academic provided an overview of al-Qaeda’s ideology for his audience, explaining that they believed in defensive – not offensive – jihad. I thought he had misspoken and raised my hand for a clarification, asking him if he said al-Qaeda sought to wage a defensive jihad rather than an offensive one. He confirmed his words as such and then pre-emptively berated us, waving a copy of a volume of Osama Bin Laden’s messages to the world, ‘To understand al-Qaeda, you simply must read what they say and write!’

My immediate thought was: ‘I couldn’t agree more, but have you done this?’

Then just today I was reading an otherwise excellent and thought-provoking article in the recent issue of Studies in Conflict & Terrorism by Alia Brahimi of LSE, ‘Crushed in the Shadows: Why Al Qaeda Will Lose the War of Ideas.’

Dr. Brahimi explains al-Qaeda’s jihad is defensive, citing statements by Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri where they explain they are fighting America because America is attacking the Muslims. In the words of Zawahiri right after the 2004 US presidential election, ‘We only care about purifying our country of the aggressors and resisting anyone who attacks us.’

(This raises the question of how al-Qaeda defines an aggressor and being attacked, but I don’t have the room to address this here. Luckily, Brahimi does briefly address that in her paper, so read it).

Indeed, in a 1997 interview with Peter Arnett, Bin Laden calls his jihad ‘defensive’ and explains it is meant to drive U.S. forces from the Arabian Peninsula and ‘desist from aggressive intervention against Muslims throughout the whole world.’

The volume that prints that interview (and that the academic waved in our faces), Bruce Lawrence’s Messages to the World, explains in a footnote: ‘Bin Laden always describes his jihad as “defensive.”’

So am I wrong?

Herein lays the root of confusion. Bin Laden, Zawahiri, and other AQ leaders certainly do frame their jihad in defensive terms in many of their public communiqués, but these ‘messages to the world’ must be understood in the context of their purpose. They are propaganda pieces. In this sense, I am not entirely fair to Brahimi as she writes Bin Laden ‘presents’ his jihad as defensive – and true, he often does present it that way when messaging to certain audiences. But a clarification must be made.

Let’s take Bin Laden’s statement before the 2004 presidential election, for example. It has widely been observed that the content and timing of the release was meant to influence the American voting public.  In words similar to Zawahiri, he said:

Your security is not in the hands of Kerry or Bush or al Qaeda. Your security is in your own hands. Any nation that does not attack us will not be attacked.

Rather than viewing this as an expression of ideology, Bin Laden was ‘framing’ the situation for the American people, painting his terrorist network as a threat only as long as the Americans attack the Muslim world (I previously addressed framing in this post on Fort Hood and Anwar al-Awlaki and will address it again in a post to follow this one). You can argue whether the release was meant to help Kerry or Bush (probably Bush, just b/c the very appearance of Osama at that moment may have made the more hawkish candidate seem like a better protector), but the concept holds.

This is not to say that Al Qaeda is disinterested in driving the ‘Zionist-Crusader forces’ from Muslim lands – they most certainly are – but looking to media interviews or propaganda pieces broadcasted either to the West or the Muslim ‘street’ they seek to mobilize is not the most effective way to understand and take accurate measure of their ideology.

Other sources reveal a more accurate picture. These include the longer ‘think pieces’ and books penned by al-Qaeda targeted at smaller audiences rather than propaganda and ‘influence pieces’ that are designed to ‘frame’ issues for current/potential recruits as well as opponents.

For example, in a letter Bin Laden wrote to Saudi intellectuals in the wake of 9/11 (which you can find in The Al Qaeda Reader), he argued:

[O]ur talks with the infidel West and our conflict with them ultimately revolve around one issue – one that demands our total support, with power and determination, with one voice – and it is: Does Islam, or does it not, force people by the power of the sword to submit to its authority corporeally if not spiritually? Yes. There are only three choices in Islam: either willing submission; or payment of the jizya, through physical though not spiritual, submission to the authority of Islam; or the sword – for it is not right to let him [an infidel] live. The matter is summed up for every person alive: Either submit, or live under the suzerainty of Islam, or die.

Bin Laden’s purpose in writing this letter was to refute a letter these intellectuals had written to the U.S. that he saw as ‘full of humility, entreaties, and prostration.’ He condemns their letter for ‘reputiad[ing] Offensive Jihad.’

He insists,

Offensive Jihad is an established and basic tenet of this religion. It is a religious duty rejected only by the most deluded. So how can they call off this religious obligation [Offensive Jihad], while imploring the West to understandings and talks ‘under the umbrella of justice, morality, and rights’?

It is fascinating how he condemns the quoted values of the letter he criticizes even though al Qaeda propaganda attempts to appeal to those same values when he ‘explains’ to the West and the Rest why al-Qaeda is at war. Could it be that AQ propaganda might not be an accurate representation of AQ ideology?

Coming up next, ideological justification for offensive jihad from a prominent jihadist ideologue.

In the meantime, your homework: read Milestones by Sayyid Qutb [pdf] and see what he has to say about offensive vs. defensive jihad. If your job is even remotely concerned with Islamist terrorism and you haven’t read this short volume yet, please remedy this immediately.

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Al Qaeda has been described as a being a part of a global Islamist insurgency. It is helpful to view the minaret ban with that in mind. It is thus unfortunate that the measure banning minarets in Switzerland has passed with 57% of the vote.

Insurgent/terrorist groups seek to provoke repression (violent or non-violent) of a constituency. For example, let’s use...I dunno, banning minarets as an example of repression. That constituency is then further alienated from the government/host society and support for the insurgent group increases.  

Writing about more traditional insurgencies, Bard O’Neill explains:

[T]he insurgents try to provoke arbitrary and indiscriminate government reprisals against the population, calculating that this will increase resentment and win the insurrectionary forces more support. The success of such an insurgent ploy is affected by the nature of the government response and by the social groups involved.

This was the infamous Irgun Strategy. This is why Hizballah and Hamas fire rockets from residential areas and schools. This is why the Taliban fire on ISAF troops from populated hamlets. The Viet Cong did the same thing. Al Qaeda uses the same dynamic in a much more psychological way. They have made many believe that the threat emanates from Muslim communities in the hopes that the West will turn on their Muslims with repression of some sort.

Now the Swiss have banned minarets and Islamists there and elsewhere will certainly capitalize on this.

This is one of the key means used by al Qaeda to draw in recruits and supporters – particularly in the West.  Leah Farrall has a decent piece on this over at All Things Counterterrorism:

To my mind the most telling thing is that this is yet another example of people failing to realise that terrorism’s efficacy stems from its ability to manufacture difference.  This is the true impact of terrorism. It doesn’t come from the immediate death and destruction caused by a terrorist act no matter how hideous and how truly awful it is for its victims.  The true power of terrorism  comes from reactions to terrorist violence by those watching.
…
These types of reactions start of [sic] vicious cycles of discrimination, feed alienation and only end up supporting and more importantly legitimizing the terrorist and extremist meta narrative of a clash of civilizations.

The banning of minarets in Switzerland – a country with only four minarets – feeds into one of the uglier Islamist propaganda pieces and makes a mockery of the practice of religious freedom, which is guaranteed by the Swiss Constitution. Al Qaeda and some other Islamist groups promote the narrative that the West is engaged in a War on Islam and that we are a bunch of lousy Zionist-Crusaders who hate Muslims simply because they are Muslims.  

They do not need to be right to successfully promote this narrative and foster false grievances, but it certainly helps them out when they can point to the reality of a Western country proscribing the religious practices of Muslims.

One of the authors of the bill claims that the minaret ‘is a political symbol against integration; a symbol more of segregation, and first of all, a symbol to try to introduce Sharia law parallel to Swiss rights.’  While there are various Islamist movements actively pursuing both grassroots and top-down strategies to institute aspects of Islamic law in the West, minarets on mosques have nothing to do with this. The ban will only serve as further hindrance to integration and strengthen the influence of the Islamist narrative, accomplishing the exact opposite of what it was intended for.

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I disagree with David Kilcullen on several matters, but I agree 100% with what he said recently at Georgetown, as reported by Bellum. Some highlights:

•    We've suffered from only incrementally increasing the number of troops over the years. The Taliban has proven itself capable of absorbing the impact from an additional 10-30 thousand troops. We need to either "overmatch" them with a substantially larger deployment  or not send any at all (or possibly draw down).
•    Whenever we send more troops, violence will spike almost by definition.
…
•    There is "not much point" to negotiating with the Taliban right now. This is because the Taliban believe they are winning and so have no reason to bargain. Our goal should be to fight first and hard, to convince them that they should talk.
…
•    Successful counterinsurgencies take 15-20 years. Unsuccessful ones take 9-11 years.

It is refreshing to have a president that is deliberative and doesn't just follow his 'gut', but this is getting a little ridiculous. It is decision time.

Mr. Gates said a central focus in Mr. Obama's deliberations was "how do we signal resolve, and at the same time signal to the Afghans, as well as the American people, that this is not an open-ended commitment?"

The latest clues about the president's thinking, as provided by Mr. Gates, came a day after it was disclosed that the United States ambassador to Afghanistan, who once served as the top American military commander there, has expressed in writing his reservations about deploying additional troops to the country.

The position of the ambassador, Karl W. Eikenberry, a retired lieutenant general, puts him in stark opposition to the current American and NATO commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, who has asked for 40,000 more troops.

General Eikenberry sent his reservations to Washington in a cable last week, three senior American officials said on Wednesday. In that same period, President Obama and his national security advisers have begun examining an option that would send relatively few troops to Afghanistan, about 10,000 to 15,000, with most designated as trainers for the Afghan security forces.

This low-end option was one of four alternatives under consideration by Mr. Obama and his war council at a meeting in the White House Situation Room on Wednesday afternoon. The other three options call for troop levels of around 20,000, 30,000 and 40,000, the three officials said.

    ...

A central focus of Mr. Obama's questions, officials said, was how long it would take to see results and be able to withdraw.

"He wants to know where the off-ramps are," one official said.

The president pushed for revisions in the options to clarify how — and when — American troops would turn over responsibility to the Afghan government. He raised questions, officials said, about the exit strategy for American troops and sought to make clear that the commitment by the Untied [sic] States would not be open-ended.

I am all for an exit strategy, but President Obama should understand that there is a whole spectrum between a timetabled exit strategy and an open ended commitment. The nature of fighting insurgencies is more art than science. Conditions on the ground are constantly changing and strategy needs to be constantly reassessed in concert with policymakers.  The outcome of these deliberations should be setting the best course – not a decision to pick up and leave if this isn't turned around within x number of years (x is likely to be 2 years or less, if we are to believe the leaks coming out of the White House and DoD).

As Kilcullen reminds us: that is not how these things we call insurgencies work.

I will also add these questions for you all to chew on:

Does the United States have a moral obligation to defeat the Taliban? Do we owe anything to the Afghan people, especially in the south and east of the country, who would have to live under continued Taliban governance if the so-called Biden strategy (minimal counterterrorism/special ops effort) is followed?

Speak up in the comments.

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I have been traveling around the UK the last few weeks. Two things appear to be atop everyone's concerns, the "rise of the right" and the fact that the British government may be using the "Prevent" counter-radicalization and counter-terrorism program to spy on Muslim communities. I plan on dealing with each in separate posts, but first on the "rise of the right".

For those who have missed it, the United Kingdom is finding it has an increasingly belligerent and noisy right-wing which is not only managing to make unpleasant speeches and protests, but are also able to win votes in elections. The far right British National Party has won a growing number of seats in first local elections, and most stunningly in the 2009 European Parliament elections it was able to secure two seats and a total of just under 1 million votes nationally.

This seeming acceptance of an openly xenophobic party into the mainstream of British politics received its crowning moment recently when BNP leader (and holocaust denier) Nick Griffin made an appearance on the BBC's flagship politics program Question Time.

In parallel to this seeming legitimization of racists by the ballot box, the UK has also recently seen the emergence of the English Defence League (EDL), a group claiming to be "demonstrating against the spread of radical Islam" for whom the infamous Luton protests against returning British soldiers in March of this year were the "final straw".

Their response was to stage a series parades up and down England in which overwhelmingly caucasian crowds of well-lubricated shaven-headed chaps protest against extreme Islamists (a full list of their demos shows a fixation with the latest incarnation of Omar Bakri Mohammed’s extremist group Al Muhajiroun). At core a blend of skin-heads and football hooligans (something most clearly borne out during the violence in Birmingham), the group is nevertheless able to rally a few hundred protesters at a go under the banner of "taking back England" from "jihadists".

Disturbingly, there has also been an increase in armed far-right terrorists, including one group who apparently had some 300 weapons, 80 bombs and links around the world, the two right-wing extremists who were convicted for "inciting racial hatred", and separate "lone wolves" Martyn Gilleard and Neil Lewington (who was picked up with incendiary devices in his bag after he got pissed on a train and took a leak in public while on his way to a date. Lucky girl).

Responding to this growing threat, one police commander said, "I fear that they will have a spectacular", suggesting that extremists might attempt some major action in order to stir up inter-ethnic hatred.

This last group can be addressed as a clear counter-terrorism issue, but what of the others and their impact which might be said to provide the ideological backdrop for the violent extremists?

The BNP may have managed to secure the veneer of respectability, but they have not found many friends in the European Parliament (something no doubt helped by Mr. Griffin’s charming comments about sinking boat-loads of migrants) – this is significant as it dilutes their power.

Furthermore, while they may have mustered just under a million votes, this should be seen against a backdrop of falling support nationally for the main parties, who cannot shake pay scandals and a bad economy. The BNP specialize in going into economically depressed parts of the country, where they capitalize on local grievances and a sense of abandonment from Westminster with a localized narrative which dresses up anger in anti-immigrant and "national identity" language.

This is enough to rally a core group of voters who actually show up on Election Day and give the BNP its success (it is worth highlighting that it was with a less-than-impressive 9.8% and 8% of the vote that they won in each EP seat).

Similarly, while the EDL appear able to get crowds after football matches, they are almost always matched by a larger counter-protest uniting a wide array of factions. BBC's Newsnight (part 1, part 2) called them a "drinking club with a website," estimating their numbers at some 300-500 members nationally.

One concern they have voiced, about the focus of current counter-extremism funding towards Muslim communities appears to also have some parallels amongst other communities, but they do not seem to have much of a plan of action beyond running around the streets and ejecting people like Anjem Choudhary from the country. This may win them some more drinking buddies, but is hardly the basis of an election manifesto.

For Muslims in the UK, it is the terrorist group that is most bothersome – if there is this growing menace of potential right-wing terrorism, then why isn’t there the same fixation on them that one sees with terrorists who instead choose an Islamist garb?

The answer is relatively simple (the right-wingers tend to be local nutters bereft of serious external connections, and their inability to carry out effective attacks reduces their news value) – but the bigger problem does exist of how these far-right groups (violent and non-) might be impacting cohesion between communities in the UK.

More radicalization amongst Britain’s right means more protests on the streets, and likely more violence. Maybe even to the level of the famous 2001 Northern City riots, in which localized social problems provided kindling which was set alight by a growing far-right presence. None of this is to exaggerate the threat (the numbers are still quite small in contrast to continental Europe which appears to have institutionalized racist parties long ago), but it would be dangerous to simply ignore the groups all together.

What does seem clear, however, is that there is a growing well-spring of disaffection amongst Britain's communities which is finding solace in extreme rhetoric – what is positive is that we are seeing a substantial grass-roots reaction against it, and the main political parties appear willing to stand up against it.

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The idea that the US would in any way provide assistance to a terrorist group affiliated with the Taliban and Al Qaeda must seem laughable to many. Yet this is exactly what the Iranian government and an array of international observers believe to be the case. In the wake of last week's revelation that Ahmed Wali Karzai is apparently on the CIA payroll, it's worth remembering the long history of covert US support for unpalatable characters and the resilience of 'the enemy of my enemy is my friend' thinking.

Let's not also forget that the 'global war on terror' is not the only focus of US strategic thinking, and there are bound to be times where its objectives conflict with other important strategic considerations – such as the ongoing US confrontation with Iran.

To be clear from the outset: the US emphatically denies providing any support to Jundallah, which rocketed back into the news recently with a dramatic suicide bombing in Sistan-Baluchistan that killed several dozen people, including high-level Revolutionary Guard officers. Formed in 2003, Jundallah is a extremist Sunni group (most closely affiliated with the Deobandi tradition) that engages in violence in support of a typical narrative of self-defence, in this case on behalf of the ethnically, religiously and linguistically distinct Baluchi people.

While Baluchi separatism remains a potent cause across the three states in which they are found – Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan – Jundallah specifically focuses on Iran's Shi'ite regime and claims to fight not for separatism but merely greater rights and equality. Based in Pakistani territory, it has carried out a number of attacks in Iran in the past few years, including car bombs, ambushes, mass abductions and suicide attacks. Jundallah has apparently strong links to Pakistani Taliban networks and alleged connections to Al Qaeda; it shares both organisations' vehement anti-Shi'a rhetoric and violence.

Like most militant groups, Jundallah requires a significant amount of funding whose sources are murky at best. There is little doubt that the group profits from the enormous flow of drugs traversing the Pakistan-Iran border in that region (by providing protection rackets rather than direct involvement in the trade itself). Beyond that, we are in the realm of allegations, suspicions and denials. Iran has accused not only the US but Pakistan and Saudi Arabia of supporting Jundallah.

There is, of course, a broad spectrum of activities that could fall under the rubric of 'support', from direct financial and military assistance to covert training to network development. Outside of the Iranian government, few seem to believe that the US is directly funding Jundallah or providing it with weapons or other military assistance.

A more likely scenario, as described in an ABC News report, is that the US has facilitated funding from other sources (such as the Saudis and expat Iranians) while also playing some kind of covert 'advisory' role. The aim would be to make use of Iran's indigenous opposition groups to destabilise and eventually bring down the current regime, a strategy that gained some currency during the Bush administration as a means of forestalling Iranian nuclear development without direct military intervention. But as a recent Foreign Policy article noted:

"[T]he Barack Obama administration might be tempted to use direct or indirect funding as a means of surrogate warfare to further pressure Iran's government. Violent anti-Iranian Sunni groups like Jundallah have not been placed on the U.S. State Department's terrorism list. And the Obama administration might feel that it's already being punished for the perception that it's funding the rebels and may as well try to reap some of the rewards.
But this would be shortsighted. The basic problem with any strategy to destabilize Iran via Sunni tribal rebellions is that Baluch nationalism spans three countries -- not just Iran, but also Afghanistan and Pakistan. Supporting a pan-Baluchistan movement would only worsen societal instability and national fragmentation in West Asia and South Asia."

The question of US support for Jundallah highlights a flaw in concepts like the 'global war on terror' and 'global insurgency'.  If we conceive of our worldwide struggle against terrorism and extremism as a unitary effort, this implies some level of consistency and ideological rigour – we will combat terrorism in any manifestation, in any location.

However, this kind of analytical framework does not always match real-world political and strategic considerations, in which the temptation to utilise terrorist groups as proxy armies against our adversaries must be fairly high.

Has the US given in to this temptation? In the absence of 'smoking gun' evidence, I remain agnostic on this question. If hard evidence of US support (indirect or otherwise) were to surface tomorrow, however, I would not be in the least surprised. Would you?

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Jean-Pierre Filiu, a leading expert on jihadism, former French diplomat, now a professor at Sciences-Po Paris (who also blogged for a bit on Jihadica) has just published a book which looks at the future of Al Qaeda.

In his most recent book: The Nine Lives of Al Qaeda (in French "Les Neuf Vies d'Al-Qaïda"), he explains that after twenty years of existence, the organisation has never been closer to disappearing.

His central argument is that the election of Obama is the worst thing that has happened to Bin Laden. AQ had planned on a Republican victory with John McCain. But when Obama was elected, they had no plan B. "That's the weakness of Al Qaeda," he says "despite its mobility on the field its ideology is very rigid". With Obama as president Al Qaeda had to improvise: the racist hatred came first, calling him a house slave and then accusing him of betraying his Muslim roots.

Filiu explains that the desire to demonize Obama stems from the lack of directions for Al Qaeda to attack the US. Similarly, Al Qaeda's old propaganda favourites (the war in Iraq, Guantanamo) had vanished in the first months of the Obama administration.

Today Al Qaeda is fighting for its ninth life in Pakistan, in the same zones along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border where the organisation was born 21 years ago, back in 1988 when its militants were fighting against the Red Army in Afghanistan.

With a very thorough analysis Filiu identifies 9 crucial moments in the history of the organisation:

1.    The Great Work : 1988-1991 (Abdallah Azzam, Osama Bin Laden and Ayman Zahawiri support the Afghan resistance in Peshawar)
2.    The Sudanese Exile : 1991-1996 (thanks to Hassan Abdullah al-Turabi)
3.    The Challenges to America : 1996-1998 (bombing against the US embassy in Nairobi which killed 213 in August 1998)
4.    The Afghan Jihadistan : 1998-2001 (with Mollah Omar and the Afghan talibans)
5.    The Collapse of the Sanctuary : 2001-2003 (the September 11 attacks and the American invasion in Afghanistan)
6.    The Campaign of Arabia : 2003-2004 (attempted Jihad in Bin Laden's natal country)
7.    The Blood of Iraq : 2004-2006 (attempt to take advantage of the American and allies' hodgepodge there)
8.    The Caliphate of Shadows : 2006-2007 (development of AQ in Maghreb and Pakistan)
9.    The Headlong Rush : 2007-2009 ( AQ setbacks in Iraq and its other "mission territories")

The apogee of AQ on 9/11 was also the beginning of its decline, he says "the attack generated a feeling of disgust and reject throughout the Arab world, even the most radicals Sheikhs did not support these actions."

The War in Iraq is another missed opportunity for AQ who lost the fight against the Arabic and Sunni guerrillas. While venturing for the first time on Arab land, AQ suffered its most patent failure and has now lost most of its impact in the Arab world.

In a final spurt of effort Al Qaeda has recently tried to generate support in Maghreb (Algeria) and Sub-Saharan Africa, namely Somalia. But AQIM failed to recruit outside Algeria and Al Shabaab's (Somalia) allegiance to Bin Laden was more of a dare to their direct rivals Hizbul Islam than an utter celebration of Al Qaeda's leadership in Islamic jihad.

The story of AQ, as told by Jean-Pierre Filiu, is one of lucky accidents, gross mistakes made by its enemies and rivalry. That does not mean that people will not be fighting in Jihad anymore, but that the type of Jihad that AQ created, the global Jihad, the cult of Jihad for Jihad will soon cease to exist.

 

For those of you who understand French, Rue89 has a podcast of an interview with Jean-Pierre Filiu. Listen here.

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Last month, Hala Mustafa (picture), editor-in-chief of the quarterly Al-Demoqratiya (Democracy) magazine, made the headlines in Egypt and other parts of the Arab world.

The reason: Hala had conducted a meeting with the Israeli ambassador to Egypt in her office at the headquarters of the Al-Ahram Centre in Cairo.

This prompted the Egyptian Journalists Union to investigate her for breaching the organisation's bylaws, which prohibit any contact with Israelis.The incident may not be significant in the bigger scheme of things, but it sums up the attitude towards peace in the region.

For the Egyptian Journalists Union and other professional associations, full 'normalization' can only happen after a comprehensive peace settlement – including Israel's withdrawal from all Arab territories occupied since 1967 – has been achieved.

The argument is that any engagement with Israelis before a full settlement would only provide Israel with an opportunity to legitimise the status quo.

In its own twisted way, there is a logic to the argument.

What really doesn't make sense, however, is the response of the Egyptian government. The regime has had a peace treaty with Israel for nearly three decades, and the meeting between Hala and Cohen took place on the premises of a government-sponsored centre.
Yet high-ranking officials have supported the Union's boycott: they publicly reprimanded Hala for the meeting and expressed their support for the Union's (and other organisations') anti-normalisation policies.

To me, this is evidence – if any more was needed – of how some of the undemocratic governments in the region try to have it both ways:

On the one hand, they are using the idea of peace with Israel as a way of 'buying' support and legitimacy by the West.

On the other hand, they are undermining the very essence of peace by embracing the 'anti-normalization' agenda, which – though popular with parts of the Arab street – prevents dialogue and reconciliation from happening in the first place.

In many parts of the Arab world, therefore, peace remains a crime – not, as one would hope, a way of achieving development and prosperity.

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The current surge in violence in center-east Tajikistan sheds some light on a precarious and dicey situation in the Central Asian country. Host of a five years ugly civil war, the likes of deceased Arab-Chechen warlord, Amir Khattab (Samer al-Suwailem) and the Head of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan's (IMU) Armed Wing, Jum'a al-Namanjani (Jumaboi Khojayev), the country is no stranger to jihadism and armed Islamism (yes, there is quite a difference...and no, not just another academic luxury….the distinction has an impact on both behaviour and policy). 

Very briefly, recent developments in Tajikistan included the return of a few "Afghan-2001" veterans (as opposed to Afghan-1979), the resurfacing of Mullah Abdullah, the strong militia leader who refused the 1997 peace agreement, and a few clashes. One of those resulted in the death of the former leading field-commander of the United Tajikistani Opposition (UTO), Mirzo "Jaga" Ziyoev. In the post-conflict agreement, the UTO, a combination of Islamists, democratic and nationalists forces (though clan, region and sect may explain the fault-lines better!), was supposed to be granted 30% share of the government.

In that regard, Ziyoev was handed the "Ministry of Emergency Situations;" a ministry that was created for him with no power and no clear mandate! Disenchanted with the political conditions in the country as well as with the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) (which he severed as one of its leading commanders but never joined it officially), Ziyoev chose to exit: rearm and hit the mountains.

He had few followers this time. Commander Ziyoev was more attractive for jihadist wannabes than Minister Ziyoev . What we do not know so far are the details of his plan, the scope of his contacts, and why did he chose to go down and negotiate with the government forces. What we do know is that he was killed during these negotiations.

The regime, armed opposition and even the IMU are denying responsibilities. More importantly, however, is that the conditions in Tajikistan are bad enough to make a former minister prefer the mountains to the office; the gun to the pen. Some Tajik analysts described post-2001 political environment as follows: "Iraq lost Saddam, we are about to get one!" In other words, Takrit and Dangra became synonymous. 

It is no coincidence that the IRP, a party that once led the armed opposition and now looks up to the Turkish AKP as a model, is losing grounds to Salafis, Hizb al-Tahrir as well as armed Islamism. In a recent meeting with Dr Muhiydin Kabiri, the head of the IRP, a Tajik youngman asked: "if you can't influence policy, constantly harassed and repressed, and suffering from election rigging, why are you in that game?!"

The current political environment is by no means rewarding moderation; if it is not punishing it. The potential for re-radicalization is quite high. In that repressive context, Mirzo Ziyoev might not be regarded anymore as a "sellout" but as a "martyr" whose steps in the Tavildara Mountains should be followed.

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Dalia Mogahed, President Obama's advisor on Muslim affairs, recently appeared on a London TV discussion show hosted by Ibtihal Bsis – an official from Hizb ut Tahrir. Hizb ut Tahrir is a global Islamist movement that calls for the overthrow of un-Islamic governments worldwide and revival of the Caliphate.

The Telegraph reports:

During the 45-minute discussion, on the Islam Channel programme Muslimah Dilemma earlier this week, the two members of the group made repeated attacks on secular "man-made law" and the West's "lethal cocktail of liberty and capitalism".

They called for Sharia Law to be "the source of legislation" and said that women should not be "permitted to hold a position of leadership in government".

Miss Mogahed made no challenge to these demands and said that "promiscuity" and the "breakdown of traditional values" were what Muslims admired least about the West.

She said: "I think the reason so many women support Sharia is because they have a very different understanding of sharia than the common perception in Western media.

"The majority of women around the world associate gender justice, or justice for women, with sharia compliance.

"The portrayal of Sharia has been oversimplified in many cases."

This story about the interview also graces Hizb ut Tahrir's website.  Dr. Mogahed, a member of the President’s Advisory Council on Faith-Based and Neighborhood Partnerships, is also the executive director of the Gallup Center for Muslim Studies and wrote a book with John Esposito, a well known scholar and apologist for Islamism.

The White House needs to send an unambiguous message that it is not acceptable for its advisors to appear on television with enemies of the United States and empower their message.

Dr. Mogahed missed a great opportunity to challenge Hizb ut Tahrir and engage in an informed debate with them about Islam, values, and the place of the United States in the world. Clearly she did not feel inclined to do so. This is a simple issue – hopefully one that will be resolved soon.

 I am not surprised to see Dr. Mogahed promoting Sharia. I believe in freedom of speech and she should be able to say whatever she wants (no matter how distasteful and dishonest), but not as a representative of the President of the United States.

Fire Dalia Mogahed.

 

UPDATE: The television segment can be viewed here

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Today Noordin Mohammad Top, often described as South East Asia most wanted terrorist was killed in a police shoot-out in Central Java. Some might say it has lifted a major security threat in the region but Rohan Gunaratna says the fight is not over yet.

ICSR:  Firstly, who was Noordin Mohammad Top?

Rohan Gunaratna: Noordin Mohammad Top was a Malaysian terrorist driven by al Qaeda's philosophy. He had been on the run since the devastating Bali bombing of October 2002 which was executed by Jemaah Islamiya and funded by al Qaeda.

In the years that followed, he emerged as the de-facto operational leader of Jemmah Islamiyah. He worked with multiple groups, clusters of cells and individuals, and built the most threatening network in the region.
 
After the J.W. Marriott and Ritz Carlton bombings in July 2009, the government intensified the hunt for Noordin Mohammad Top. It had been going on for eight years.

ICSR:  His death is a real success to them, then.

Rohan Gunaratna: Indeed, Detachment 88, Indonesia's elite Counter Terrorism Unit should be congratulated: they managed to hunt down and kill Southeast Asia's most wanted terrorist.

After capturing and interrogating his couriers, Rahmat Budi Prabowo alias Bejo and Supono alias Kedu of D88 tracked him down to Solo in Central Java, the nerve centre of Islamic radicalism in Indonesia.

The gun battle lasted eight hours starting at 11 p.m. on September 16. D88 strike team breached the safe house where Noordin Mohammad Top was hiding and killed him along with Aji, a master bomb maker, Urwah, a top recruiter and Susilo, a logistician.


ICSR:  International cooperation was crucial in this particular case. Which countries participated and how did they work together?
 
Rohan Gunaratna: There is extensive security and intelligence cooperation both within and outside the region.

Detachment 88 was created after the Bali bombing that killed 202 civilians including 88 Australians. Although Australia was reluctant to acknowledge it, without its initial and sustained assistance D88 would not have reached this level of competence.

Furthermore, the US, the UK, Singapore and other countries worked with D88 to build their specialist capabilities. Today, with extensive operational experience D88 trains other elite forces.
 
As intelligence is the spearhead of counter terrorism, there is excellent intelligence sharing between the countries affected by Jemaah Islamiyah. There is ongoing intelligence exchange between Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Australia. And because Jemaah Islamiyah's operational leader Hambali is in US custody, the US has also shared intelligence with all the regional partners.
 
Both operational and intelligence cooperation was central in neutralizing Noordin Mohammad Top: as long the threat is persistent this cooperation will continue.
 
ICSR:  What impact will Noordin Mohammad Top's death have on the terrorism network in the region?
 
Rohan Gunaratna: As Noordin Mohammad Top skillfully built and operated a network, he will be replaced by a multiplicity of leaders. None of them will have the skill and the experience of Noordin Mohammad Top but they will pose a long term strategic and national threat to Indonesia and the region.   

However Noordin Mohammad Top's death should not lull Indonesia into a state of complacency. Ideologues of hatred like Abu Bakar Bashir, the co founder of Jemaah Islamiyah and Abu Jibril, the leader of Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia (Mujahidin Council of Indonesia) are still active.

Unless Indonesia has the will and skill to dismantle the ideological and operational infrastructure of Jemmah Islamiya and other likeminded groups, Indonesia will continue to suffer from periodic terrorist attacks.

This means not only hunting and killing terrorists but building a legal framework that criminalizes terrorist propaganda, recruitment, fund raising and other support activities that enable and facilitates terrorism, and its parent, ideological extremism.


 

Rohan Gunaratna is the author of Inside al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror published by Columbia University Press. He debriefed detainees in several countries including in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, US and in Indonesia. He is the head of the International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore.

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