“The enemy of yesterday is the friend of today...it was a real war, but those brothers are free men now.” By these words, presidential scion Saif al-Islam al-Qaddafi referred to the leadership of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) in a press conference on March 23, 2010 attended by Western ambassadors and guests. The public proceedings of this event started last March by an invitation to a group of Western scholars, including the author of this article, to mark the release of LIFG leaders and discuss the major transformation of Libya’s largest Jihadist movement.

Established in 1990, the LIFG was modelled along the lines of the Egyptian al-Jihad organization: secretive, elitist, exclusively paramilitary, and aiming for a decisive action to topple the regime. However, the movement was discovered by the Libyan authorities and therefore it had to declare its existence for the first time on 18 October 1995. A brutal crackdown followed and the LIFG led a three-year insurgency mainly based in eastern Libya, including three attempts to assassinate Colonel Muammar Qaddafi in 1995 and 1996.  The confrontations left 165 Libyan officials dead, including high-ranks in the security and intelligence apparatuses, and 159 injured. The LIFG lost 177 members, including its top military commander in Libya and four of its Consultative Council members in the country. By 1998, the Consultative Council of the LIFG decided to impose a three-year ceasefire in Libya that was to have been reviewed in 2001, but the September 11 terrorist attacks that year changed all calculations.

According to the LIFG leaders and members I interviewed in Tripoli, the dialogue with the Libyan regime started in 2005. In 2006, six members from the Consultative Council, including the Emir of the LIFG, were involved in such talks. The breakthrough occurred when Saif al-Islam, the main sponsor of the de-radicalization and reconciliation process, invited former senior LIFG commander Noman Benotman to visit Libya secretly in January 2007 and consult with the imprisoned leadership. “It was very risky but I really trusted Saif...still this process was by no means an easy one,” Benotman said. Tensions between LIFG members and wary Libyan officials were still evident during the meetings in Libya; the head of the Libyan Internal Security, for example, referred to the process as “repentance from heresy” as opposed to reconciliation.
As opposed to the Saudi approach of rehabilitating selected individuals mainly at the grassroots level, the Libyan authorities targeted for de-radicalization well-known figures in the jihadist world. The released commanders included LIFG Emir Abd al-Hakim Belhajj (Abu Abdullah al-Sadiq), principal ideologue Sami al-Sa‘idi (Abu al-Munzir), and commander of the military apparatus Khalid al-Sharif (Abu Hazim). When I asked Belhajj about the current status of the LIFG, he replied that it had been dismantled; followers will be released and reintegrated as individuals, not as members of an organization.

The Libyan de-radicalization process followed a pattern seen before in Egypt and Algeria. Officials employed state repression, winning over charismatic leaders, encouraging interactions with the non-jihadists, and selective inducements. To a large degree, the LIFG was undermined militarily by the end of the 1990s. The military losses and the interactions with non-jihadists forced the LIFG leadership to update its worldviews, rethink strategically, and ultimately abandon political violence. Moderate Islamist figures, notably Sheikh Ali al-Sallabi, apparently played a crucial role in interacting with jihadist leaders, to the extent that Saif al-Islam thanked him publically in the press conference. Ex-jihadist leaders then had to interact with followers to convince them that armed action was illegitimate, an extremely difficult process in every de-radicalization case I examined. Finally, the Libyan authorities bolstered the process by offering selective inducements, starting with the release from prisons and ending with reintegration into Libyan society.  

As for the future, Saif al-Islam called on all Libyan fighters in the mountains of Algeria and Afghanistan, the deserts of Mali and Niger, and the valleys of Iraq to return home. The reintegration policies directed at the LIFG and other released prisoners will be crucial in providing credibility and support for this call. The lack of reintegration programs for the returnees from Afghanistan in the 1980s and early 1990s was one of the causes for radicalizing and internationalizing their activities.

Among the more remarkable features of the March 23 press conference was Saif al-Islam’s brief reference to the June 1996 massacre at Abu Selim of hundreds of political prisoners, which is still a taboo in Libya. It was the Libyan equivalent of Syrian President Bashar al-Asad opening the file of the Hama massacre of 1982 or Jamal Mubarak of Egypt acknowledging mass torture leading to deaths at the al-Wadi al-Jadid or al-‘Aqrab prisons in the 1990s.

Many questions remain unanswered in the Libyan de-radicalization case, most importantly the future of this process and whether it will lead to any real political reform in Libya. On the last issue, there is no question that the March releases were a significant step, not only towards innovative security policies but also towards a more mature, conciliatory approach towards opposition. This is a rare approach in the Arab world, where the elite generally perceives political conflicts as zero-sum games and adopts a “kill or be killed” approach. But it is also entirely possible—as has been the case in Egypt, Algeria, and Saudi Arabia—for a government to take a conciliatory approach to jihadists in order to end the security threat they present while ignoring their reintegration and still maintaining repressive policies toward non-violent political opposition. These policies may make both jihadist de-radicalization and national reconciliation a short-lived phenomena.  

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Jean-Pierre Filiu, a leading expert on jihadism, former French diplomat, now a professor at Sciences-Po Paris (who also blogged for a bit on Jihadica) has just published a book which looks at the future of Al Qaeda.

In his most recent book: The Nine Lives of Al Qaeda (in French "Les Neuf Vies d'Al-Qaïda"), he explains that after twenty years of existence, the organisation has never been closer to disappearing.

His central argument is that the election of Obama is the worst thing that has happened to Bin Laden. AQ had planned on a Republican victory with John McCain. But when Obama was elected, they had no plan B. "That's the weakness of Al Qaeda," he says "despite its mobility on the field its ideology is very rigid". With Obama as president Al Qaeda had to improvise: the racist hatred came first, calling him a house slave and then accusing him of betraying his Muslim roots.

Filiu explains that the desire to demonize Obama stems from the lack of directions for Al Qaeda to attack the US. Similarly, Al Qaeda's old propaganda favourites (the war in Iraq, Guantanamo) had vanished in the first months of the Obama administration.

Today Al Qaeda is fighting for its ninth life in Pakistan, in the same zones along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border where the organisation was born 21 years ago, back in 1988 when its militants were fighting against the Red Army in Afghanistan.

With a very thorough analysis Filiu identifies 9 crucial moments in the history of the organisation:

1.    The Great Work : 1988-1991 (Abdallah Azzam, Osama Bin Laden and Ayman Zahawiri support the Afghan resistance in Peshawar)
2.    The Sudanese Exile : 1991-1996 (thanks to Hassan Abdullah al-Turabi)
3.    The Challenges to America : 1996-1998 (bombing against the US embassy in Nairobi which killed 213 in August 1998)
4.    The Afghan Jihadistan : 1998-2001 (with Mollah Omar and the Afghan talibans)
5.    The Collapse of the Sanctuary : 2001-2003 (the September 11 attacks and the American invasion in Afghanistan)
6.    The Campaign of Arabia : 2003-2004 (attempted Jihad in Bin Laden's natal country)
7.    The Blood of Iraq : 2004-2006 (attempt to take advantage of the American and allies' hodgepodge there)
8.    The Caliphate of Shadows : 2006-2007 (development of AQ in Maghreb and Pakistan)
9.    The Headlong Rush : 2007-2009 ( AQ setbacks in Iraq and its other "mission territories")

The apogee of AQ on 9/11 was also the beginning of its decline, he says "the attack generated a feeling of disgust and reject throughout the Arab world, even the most radicals Sheikhs did not support these actions."

The War in Iraq is another missed opportunity for AQ who lost the fight against the Arabic and Sunni guerrillas. While venturing for the first time on Arab land, AQ suffered its most patent failure and has now lost most of its impact in the Arab world.

In a final spurt of effort Al Qaeda has recently tried to generate support in Maghreb (Algeria) and Sub-Saharan Africa, namely Somalia. But AQIM failed to recruit outside Algeria and Al Shabaab's (Somalia) allegiance to Bin Laden was more of a dare to their direct rivals Hizbul Islam than an utter celebration of Al Qaeda's leadership in Islamic jihad.

The story of AQ, as told by Jean-Pierre Filiu, is one of lucky accidents, gross mistakes made by its enemies and rivalry. That does not mean that people will not be fighting in Jihad anymore, but that the type of Jihad that AQ created, the global Jihad, the cult of Jihad for Jihad will soon cease to exist.

 

For those of you who understand French, Rue89 has a podcast of an interview with Jean-Pierre Filiu. Listen here.

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Last month, Hala Mustafa (picture), editor-in-chief of the quarterly Al-Demoqratiya (Democracy) magazine, made the headlines in Egypt and other parts of the Arab world.

The reason: Hala had conducted a meeting with the Israeli ambassador to Egypt in her office at the headquarters of the Al-Ahram Centre in Cairo.

This prompted the Egyptian Journalists Union to investigate her for breaching the organisation's bylaws, which prohibit any contact with Israelis.The incident may not be significant in the bigger scheme of things, but it sums up the attitude towards peace in the region.

For the Egyptian Journalists Union and other professional associations, full 'normalization' can only happen after a comprehensive peace settlement – including Israel's withdrawal from all Arab territories occupied since 1967 – has been achieved.

The argument is that any engagement with Israelis before a full settlement would only provide Israel with an opportunity to legitimise the status quo.

In its own twisted way, there is a logic to the argument.

What really doesn't make sense, however, is the response of the Egyptian government. The regime has had a peace treaty with Israel for nearly three decades, and the meeting between Hala and Cohen took place on the premises of a government-sponsored centre.
Yet high-ranking officials have supported the Union's boycott: they publicly reprimanded Hala for the meeting and expressed their support for the Union's (and other organisations') anti-normalisation policies.

To me, this is evidence – if any more was needed – of how some of the undemocratic governments in the region try to have it both ways:

On the one hand, they are using the idea of peace with Israel as a way of 'buying' support and legitimacy by the West.

On the other hand, they are undermining the very essence of peace by embracing the 'anti-normalization' agenda, which – though popular with parts of the Arab street – prevents dialogue and reconciliation from happening in the first place.

In many parts of the Arab world, therefore, peace remains a crime – not, as one would hope, a way of achieving development and prosperity.

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There is a fantastic 5-part series in the New York Times by David Rhode about his experience being held captive by a Taliban commander of the Haqqani Network for seven months (so far they have published parts one, two and three).

Rhode offers a gripping story with some important observations. I am going to highlight a few of those observations here, but please read the articles for yourselves.

From part one:

Over those months, I came to a simple realization. After seven years of reporting in the region, I did not fully understand how extreme many of the Taliban had become. Before the kidnapping, I viewed the organization as a form of "Al Qaeda lite," a religiously motivated movement primarily focused on controlling Afghanistan.

Living side by side with the Haqqanis' followers, I learned that the goal of the hard-line Taliban was far more ambitious. Contact with foreign militants in the tribal areas appeared to have deeply affected many young Taliban fighters. They wanted to create a fundamentalist Islamic emirate with Al Qaeda that spanned the Muslim world.

I had written about the ties between Pakistan’s intelligence services and the Taliban while covering the region for The New York Times. I knew Pakistan turned a blind eye to many of their activities. But I was astonished by what I encountered firsthand: a Taliban mini-state that flourished openly and with impunity.

The Taliban government that had supposedly been eliminated by the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan was alive and thriving.

The Taliban are an interesting case study in how a group with local and regional goals can take on a global agenda through a mix of conflict and exposure to other Islamist networks.

Another scene from part two:

For the next several nights, a stream of Haqqani commanders overflowing with hatred for the United States and Israel visited us, unleashing blistering critiques that would continue throughout our captivity.

Some of their comments were factual. They said large numbers of civilians had been killed in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Palestinian territories in aerial bombings. Muslim prisoners had been physically abused and sexually humiliated in Iraq. Scores of men had been detained in Cuba and Afghanistan for up to seven years without charges.

To Americans, these episodes were aberrations. To my captors, they were proof that the United States was a hypocritical and duplicitous power that flouted international law.

...

Other accusations were paranoid and delusional. Seven years after 9/11, they continued to insist that the attacks were hatched by American and Israeli intelligence agencies to create a pretext for the United States to enslave the Muslim world. They said the United States was forcibly converting vast numbers of Muslims to Christianity. American and NATO soldiers, they believed, were making Afghan women work as prostitutes on military bases.

According to Rhodes, the Beatles might be the key to winning their hearts and minds. He recounts that his Taliban guards would ask him to sing Western songs:

The Beatles song "She Loves You," which popped into my head soon after I received my wife's letter from the Red Cross, was the most popular.

For reasons that baffled me, the guards relished singing it with me. I began by singing its first verse. My three Taliban guards, along with Tahir and Asad, then joined me in the chorus.

“She loves you — yeah, yeah, yeah,” we sang, with Kalashnikovs lying on the floor around us.

Must read.

Also, there is another story you should read (on a different part of the world) from The Guardian:

For the first time since Hamas won Palestinian parliamentary elections nearly four years ago, the group is trying to Islamise Gazan society. In public, Hamas leaders say they are merely encouraging a social moral code, and insist they are not trying to imitate the religious police who operate in some other rigid Islamic countries. But to many it feels like a new wave of enforcement in what is already a devoutly Muslim society.

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The recent visit of President Husni Mubarak of Egypt to Washington indicates a new "warmth" in the American-Egyptian relations after a short period of coldness during the second term of the Bush administration.

The latter understood that repressive autocrats produce violent theocrats who ultimately haunt America, the West and the rest.

The result was the Freedom Agenda and an underlying belief that democracy in the freedom-less region is in the long-term interest of the US (of course, the keyword here is "long-term"). In any case, the Bush administration pushed for democratization in a country ruled by emergency laws since 28 years.

The push was not welcomed by Mubarak, especially when leading liberal dissidents like Saad Eddin Ibrahim and Ayman Nour met with senior US officials, including the President. As a result, Mubarak, a frequent visitor to Washington, did not visit the US since 2004. His son, the groomed successor, did, however.

Now, the new administration is faced by an old dilemma: stability and friendly dictators for short-term gains or reform and democratization for long-term ones. Despite all the "hope and change" rhetoric, the Obama administration just turned back the clock on its Cairo policy. Mubarak can help in preventing a permanent Hamas state in Gaza, containing the Iranian influence in the region, and more pressure on other Arab dictators to "normalize" with Israel.  In exchange, freedom and democracy promotion for the 83 million Egyptians have to be put on hold for now.

The new administration has cut democracy aid for Egypt by more than half and cut aid to independent civil society organizations by more than two-thirds (although the administration increased its request for democracy funding in the Middle East overall).

The question now is with democratization on hold, weak civil society without much aid, continuous political and socioeconomic frustrations, will the radicalization patterns persist on individual and organizational levels or will the strong security apparatus be able to stifle those patterns for a while?

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Obama in Cairo Winning Hearts and Minds…Wildly Raising Hopes

In sharp contrast to the unwelcoming shoe hurled at President Bush in his last media conference in the Middle East, President Obama and his speech were very well-received in Egypt and the rest of the Muslim-majority world.

The audience in Cairo University interrupted the speech 23 times by waves of applause (that is just slightly above average by Middle Eastern standards, especially when the cheering crowd is hand-picked by the Egyptian State Security Investigations).

Outside of the university, reactions were also quite positive. Speaking to my apolitical mother and two of her friends in Cairo, the reaction was: “he is such a beautiful kid,” “we love him,” and “we are praying for God to protect him.”

There are several reasons for this Middle East Obama-mania. The crowd in Cairo has no recollection of Clinton’s eloquent speeches and did not care to hear Bush’s. In other words, they have few comparative references.

But much more important, this is the first time Arabs and Muslims are hearing a very eloquent, “politically correct” speech from a Black American President who has Muslim relatives. For many, that is revolutionary in content and rhetoric –if not necessarily in policies.

But let us not dance around this jarring disconnect: On a normal day in Cairo or al-Azhar Universities (the two institutions that sponsored the speech), there is little time and space for genuine, open-minded contemplation or debate.

Both universities are big intellectual prisons ruled by the State Security Services. State Security Generals decide which professor gets hired, which one gets promoted, which one gets fired, and which one gets detained.

If President Obama were to visit Cairo University on a normal day, he would find four trucks of Central Security Forces parked on the right side of the main entrance. They never go away – 24/7. Al-Azhar as an institution is not hospitable to political correctness or Egyptian democrats. It did establish itself, however, as a leading authority behind censorship of book and creative ideas. It is also the institution that constantly calls on punishing and harassing secular intellectuals, most notably Dr Nasr Abu Zeid.

Dr. Ayman al-Zawahri, al-Qaida’s second-in-command, and Dr. Omar Abd al-Rahman, the radical cleric imprisoned in the U.S. for the WTC bombing in 1993, were both radicalized in, and graduated from, Cairo and al-Azhar Universities. The constant cycles of repression that plagued the two universities between 1960s and the 2000s made them strongholds for radical groups.

Yet the core idea of repressive autocrats breeding violent theocrats was absent from the President’s speech.

What the Obama administration will probably understand from the outpouring of applause the President received is that Arabs and Muslims are yearning for democracy, not the Caliphate; and abhorring repression, not America.

The administration, however, should also understand that the Arab-majority world has known eloquent leaders before. Those leaders raised the hopes and the expectation of Arabs and Muslims but never delivered on their promises. Nasser comes to mind.
President Obama’a speech was historical.

It raised the hopes and the expectations of many Arabs and Muslims and they will look back to it and measure his policies against it. The hope now is that the President will not sacrifice America's core values of freedom and self-determination for short-term political expediency by supporting repressive autocrats.

Only then can the United States reclaim its moral force in the Arab- and Muslim-majority world.

 

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