In early June I blogged about the sectarian attacks on two mosques in Lahore, in which over 70 people were murdered. The mosques belonged to the Ahmadiyya community, a Muslim minority group who have increasingly become a target for sectarian Islamist groups in Pakistan, who allege that the Ahmadiyya represent a deviant sect of Islam.

Partly because of official persecution in Pakistan, the Ahmadiyya moved their headquarters to the UK in the 1980s. But the presence of Ahmadiyyas in the UK goes back over a century and predates the waves of immigration from South Asia since the 1960s. It is a worrying development therefore that some of the sectarian animosity faced by the Ahmadiyya in South Asia seems to be gaining traction in the suburbs of Britain.

According to the Surrey Comet, a police investigation has recently been launched following a leaflet campaign calling on Muslims to murder ‘Qadiyans’, which is often used as a derogatory term for the Ahmadiyya. Thus far, the person or organisation behind the leaflet campaign is unknown, though it is – at the least – an attempt to stoke up tensions between Ahmadiyyas and other Muslims in Surrey.  The area is home to the Baitul Futuh mosque complex, a focal point for British Ahmadiyyas, and the leaflets reportedly make positive references to the mosque attacks in Lahore.  
This is a reminder of the sectarian dynamic at the core of some versions of extreme Islamist theology, which transcends culturally-specific contexts. While the Islamist narrative is often seen as an outpouring of political frustrations (over foreign policy, for example) or social dislocation, the hostility to this small community (and other minority religious sects) is an integral part of the ideology espoused by numerous organisations, from al-Qaeda to the Taliban.  

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The chaps over at the Center for Social Cohesion were kind enough to share with me a copy of their recent comprehensive text Islamist Terrorism: The British Connections. It got quite a bit of media attention at the time of publication, as it was basically the only substantial text to be published in time for the five year anniversary of the 2005 bombings on the London underground (this is not to forget the special edition of International Affairs that also came out at around the same time featuring a number of heavy hitters in the world of terrorism studies).

The report meticulously goes through all of the “Islamist related offences” committed in the UK between 1999-2009, though it looks as far back as 1993 for plots which have British links: some early fighters in Bosnia drawn from Azzam publications tapes, and Ramzi Youssef, the mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center plot, who was no doubt radicalized by his time in Oxford and Swansea.

In an attempt to bring some statistical analysis to bear on the information, they have culled background and biographical data to create pie charts and tables. Problematically, the dataset itself is not actually that big (they have included “120 Islamism-inspired terrorist convictions and attacks in the UK”), meaning that the figures are a little less than conclusive and rapidly impacted by subsequent prosecutions.

Nevertheless, one detail that does seem clear is that South Asian’s, and specifically Pakistani’s, are the largest single group to be drawn towards terrorism in the UK. This may seem unsurprising given the fact that they are the largest single community of Muslims in the UK, but the detailed figures are actually quite interesting. Even if one includes all of the individuals classified as of uncertain South Asian origin into the Pakistani total, the figure that is reached is 36.21%. This compares to 46.69% of Muslims drawing their identity from Pakistan in the general population (according to the 2001 census figures). Meaning that Pakistani’s are, proportionally speaking, substantially under-represented in the terrorist roster in the UK as drawn up by CSC.

But frankly, the most useful thing about the report is the fact that they have collected in one place a great deal of the information about the many individuals who have been convicted for Islamist terrorism related offences in the UK. For those who follow these things (and for those only interested in the topic in passing), this will become a very useful reference tool.

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The first discussion of the morning session brought together regional experts to discuss where the major terrorist threats are now emerging from, and what governments must do to counter them.  Moderated by ICSR Deputy Director John Bew, the panel participants were the former Prime Minister of Yemen, H.E. Abdulkarim Al-Eryani; Sabri Saidam, a senior advisor to Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas; Dr. Robert Rotberg of Harvard’s Belfer Centre; and Ali Jalali, the former Afghan Interior Minister.  The audience was also given a brief welcome by Carrie Lemack, co-founder of Families of September 11 and the Global Survivors Network.

Dr. Bew began by asking Jalali if al-Qaeda’s recent forays into Somalia and Yemen signaled that they were being defeated in Afghanistan.  He responded by saying that he believed al-Qaeda are still a major threat with significant influence over the Taliban, who have in turn gained a lot of operational and tactical knowledge from the terrorist network.

Discussing al-Qaeda’s gradually increasing presence in Yemen, Al-Eryani reminded the audience that the government there has been combating global terrorists since 2000. He estimated that al-Qaeda’s current numbers in the region are around 700, and noted that they are strengthened by tribal protection in the Eastern mountainous regions.  He also specifically mentioned Anwar al-Awlaki as one of the main al-Qaeda members currently under tribal protection, but perceived him to have no base or major following in the region, instead appealing more to Western Muslims via the internet.   Although al-Qaeda does have a presence in Yemen, Al-Eryani did not assess that they had any capability to topple the current government, and he saw much of their influence to be outside of Yemen.

When asked by Dr. Bew whether or not US intervention in Somalia is exacerbating the situation there, Dr. Rotberg said he believed that to some extent it was creating further problem.  Although he also stressed the importance of working with the Somali people, particularly in the North of the country, where there is a smaller presence of militant jihadist groups.  He added that the al-Qaeda connected militants were mainly in the South of Somalia.

Dr. Bew then shifted the discussion to the importance of stable government in resisting terror networks, and what role ideology played in inspiring these movements.  Ahmed Jalali placed much significance on both of these factors, saying that many terrorist groups were motivated primarily by their ideology, and that they thrive in ungoverned spaces.  It is crucial, he argued, to gain control of these spaces using a combination of military force and political negotiation if countries are to neutralise terrorist groups.  Dr. Rotberg was similar in his assessment, claiming that the main focus must be on improving governance in regions where global jihadist networks are currently thriving.  He also stated that in order to achieve this, negotiations with militant organisations and others who “we wouldn’t normally talk to” was crucial. Saidam echoed this idea but warned the audience that democracy and good governance cannot be “parachuted in” – it must be cultivated and supported from within.

After the initial discussion, an audience member asked Al-Eryani about his views on the strategic benefit of drone attacks, and whether or not they were a necessary tool.  He argued that, although al-Qaeda propaganda benefits from civilian casualties often caused by drones, there are certain circumstances where they must be used.

This signaled the end of the first discussion of the morning, after which the audience was treated to an in-depth analysis of the Northern Ireland peace process by Lord David Trimble (click here for a summary of his speech and pictures).

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The penultimate panel discussion of the conference, ‘Counter-terrorism Cooperation: Is It Working?’, addressed the important subject of international counter-terrorism cooperation and whether or not it has worked over the last few years.  Chaired by Dr. Peter Neumann, the panelists were Richard Barrett, head of the UN’s al-Qaeda and Taliban Monitoring Team; Ambassador Bill Paterson, Australian Ambassador for Counter-Terrorism; Eric Rosand, the Senior Adviser for Multilateral Engagement in the US State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism; and Dr. August Hanning, Germany’s former State Secretary for Counter-Terrorism.

Dr. Hanning began by explaining the importance of a good relationship among European intelligence agencies due to their countries' close borders, which allows for the relatively easy movement of terrorists.  Unsurprisingly, he also identified Afghanistan and Pakistan as “the biggest problem”, and claimed that around 150 Muslim Germans had received terrorist training in the region. The UN’s Richard Barrett followed up on this, claiming that his organisation played a “central role” in coordinating European counter-terrorism efforts, citing the 2006 UN Global Counter-Terrorism strategy as evidence of an ongoing commitment to this.  This approach was, according to Barrett, constantly evolving and becoming increasingly sophisticated as countries learn from each other’s experiences.

When discussing the main obstacles to cooperation, Ambassador Paterson argued that the most effective partnerships are not “government-government”, but rather “government-NGO”.  He cited his own government’s relationships with NGOs in East and South-East Asia as examples of very effective counter-terrorism partnerships.  All of the panelists agreed that one of the major obstacles was countries that did not abide by human rights laws in their treatment of terrorism suspects – they cannot be co-opted until they improved their practices.  Ambassador Paterson suggested that Western governments make more effort help stop the torture of suspects, and that this is the point where counter-terrorism crosses over to developing and assisting governments.  Rosand added that the US government refuses to train officials who they know are involved with human rights violations, and recognised that sending enemy combatants from the US to countries which may torture them is a “great challenge”, stating that often prisoners have not been extradited from the US for this very reason.   Dr. Hanning insisted that Germany would never participate in torture, and nor would they accept intelligence from other countries that they assess to have poor human rights records.  Barrett summed up this part of the discussion, strongly stating that observance of human rights must be an absolute, and this is one of the four pillars of the UN’s counter-terrorism strategy.

The panel then moved on to discuss the role of multi-lateral organisations in counter-terrorism coordination.  Ambassador Paterson began by describing how the Australian government works with the UN on police and prosecutors workshops in South Asia – bringing together lawyers and judges from Pakistan and India, and providing them with an opportunity to develop important relationships, thus allowing for cross-regional contact that may otherwise not have been possible.   Germany, explained Dr. Hanning, also has a very close relationship with the UN and he placed a lot of emphasis on the importance of multi-lateral organisations, which provide platforms through which different national security agencies could exchange information.

During the audience question and answer session,  the panel was asked about how they assessed the effectiveness of the internet as a tool for terrorist networks.  There was unanimous agreement that the internet was among the chief problems faced by the counter-terrorism community, more so even than radical preachers and recruiters.  They also agreed that, rather than attempting to censor or shut down jihadist sites – an almost impossible task – governments should harness its power and use it to counter extremist messages.

Following a short break, Professor Gary Lafree, Director of START and Dr. Neumann announced the launch of a joint ICSR-START report, Prisons and Terrorism: Radicalisation and De-radicalisation in 15 Countries.  To access the study, click here.

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This is the first in a series of blogs covering the panel discussions at our Peace and Security Summit in New York’s Waldorf Astoria hotel.

After morning and afternoon sessions of expert working groups (the findings of which will be posted later), the first panel discussion of the ICSR Peace and Security Summit took place.  Entitled ‘Nine Years After 9/11: Are We Safer?’, the panel brought together an

All four of our panelists: (from left to right) Arif Alikhan, Amb. Cofer Black, Steve Clemons and Fran Townsend

impressive mix of government officials and experts to discuss if the terror threat in the West has changed and if the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the billions of dollars invested in security, have had any real and positive effect.

Representing the Department of Homeland Security was Arif Alikhan, the Assistant Secretary for Policy Development.  He was joined by Ambassador Cofer Black, former Director of the CIA’s Counter-terrorism Center; Steve Clemons, Senior Fellow at the New America Foundation; and Fran Townsend, who was previously the Homeland Security Advisor to President George W. Bush.

Moderated by our very own Dr. Peter Neumann, the panelists discussed a range of crucial issues, beginning with the simple question of are we safer now than we were nine years ago?  Fran Townsend was optimistic but cautionary, pointing out that although America is now safer, they have become victims of their own success.  Expanding on this point, she noted that a lack of successful terror attacks on the US homeland since 9/11, which was down to successful counter-terrorism measures, meant that a sense of complacency was beginning to creep into the American psyche, whereby a lack of attacks has translated into a dangerous underestimation of the threat.  She also laid out her three main solutions to the threat: a re-strengthening of alliances with foreign intelligence agencies; an improvement of the relationship between central and local government; and encouraging a greater understanding among American citizens of the true extent of the terrorist threat, who without their active involvement and support the government would be unable to prevent future attacks.

Steve Clemons was far less optimistic in his assessment, claiming that the US was far less safe now than it was.  His main worry was that whereas before 9/11 the world perceived America as a dominant country with no bounds, the attacks engendered a global shift in this attitude, whereby the country is now seen as “beset by constraints” both militarily and economically.  In response, Clemons said that the US must now take steps to “reinstate its capacity to change global gravity” and “gain a capacity to sculpt the global system.”  

When the same question was posed to former CIA agent, Ambassador Cofer Black, he seemed to agree more with Townsend, noting that before 9/11 it was very difficult for the US to “accept and validate” the real threat of jihadist terrorism, and was struggling to make the transition from a Cold War mentality.  Crucially, the US military had not undertaken any sort of counter-terrorism training and was wholly unprepared for the emerging threat.  The attacks on New York awoke the government and its security agencies from their collective slumbers, and as a result, Ambassador Black said that the country is far better prepared to face the threat than it was almost a decade ago.  His message did come, however, with a warning: although tactically the US and its allies are now safer, the threat can “change quickly and dramatically”.

Finally, Arif Alikhan concurred that the US was now safer, but warned that threats are not static.  Comparing terrorists with the criminals he had dealt with in the past as a federal prosecutor in Los Angeles, he claimed that they will evolve and adapt over time.  In response, governments must anticipate future threats, and translate this into action.  Like Townsend, Alikhan also stressed the central importance of a strong relationship between central and local governments.

 

In discussion: Alikhan and Amb. Black

Dr. Neumann then shifted the discussion to specifically address the threat of ‘homegrown’ terrorism, asking the panelists if they thought that this represented a sudden change in terrorist tactics, or if indeed it was something that has been coming for some time.  None of the panelists believed that this was in any way a dramatic shift or change, and Townsend referred to two English speaking jihadist ideologues, Adam Gadahn and Anwar al-Awlaki, as evidence of a long term al-Qaeda strategy to appeal to young, Western Muslims.

Alikhan was also asked by Dr. Neumann if he, as the highest ranking Muslim in the Obama administration, believed that American Muslims were less vulnerable than their counterparts in other countries to becoming radicalised.  He began by stressing that there is in fact no ‘Muslim community’, and there are hundreds of different communities that are by no means a homogenous block.  He argued that it is not communities that are susceptible to extremism, but rather it is often isolated individuals who become terrorists and that communities are not the problem, but the solution.

In the closing minutes of the discussion, the floor was opened to the audience who asked a number of incisive and interesting questions.  Chief among them was a request that that each panelist give a short and sharp assessment of the how they saw the future threat.  Ambassador Black commented that an attack on the US homeland was an “actuarial certainty”, and Townsend agreed, also foreseeing that these attacks will likely have a low casualty count, involve a transport target and will emanate from either al-Qaeda or one of its regional affiliates, including the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).

Thus, this impressive and informative discussion was concluded, leaving the audience with much to take in and think about, and setting the tone for a successful conference.

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ICSR is launching a great paper today. It deals with Islam4UK, an off-shoot of the extremist Islamist group Al Muhajiroun, which was banned by the British government earlier this year.

Written by Zara Raymond, it provides an overview of the group and its activities – based on in-depth interviews with some of its leaders, including Anjem Choudary and Omar Bakri Mohammed.

Equally important, it looks at the government’s decision to ban the group. Very reasonably, it takes the position that the government had valid reasons for banning the group but that its decision to do so was undermined by the timing of its announcement.

Islam4UK was proscribed shortly after the group had announced their intention to stage a march through Wootton Basset – a town which regularly holds funeral processions for British soldiers killed in Afghanistan.

The group could have been banned earlier – given that Islam4UK was merely another name for a group that had already been banned under British law.

In waiting until the Wootton Bassett protest, the government unintentionally added plausibility to Anjem Choudary’s tirades against the double standards of Western liberal democracy and the limits of free speech.

Furthermore, the government seemed to act on short-term political considerations rather than long-term security imperatives, which won’t make counter-terrorism legislation more plausible or legitimate in the public’s eye.

All in all, the paper provides an excellent case study of how difficult it is for governments to deal with this kind of group. It also includes a number of valuable lessons that should be learned (and heeded) by governments everywhere.

The paper will be published on ICSR’s website later this afternoon (British time). A launch event with Zara Raymond will take place at King’s College London at 5pm.

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At the beginning of last month, I posted a story about London’s Metropolitan Police entering into a voluntary surveillance-and-reporting arrangement with internet cafe owners in North London, specifically the borough of Camden. There was a little uncertainty at the time about whether this was correct but the following poster was snapped at an internet cafe in Leather Lane, EC1:

 

Credit: Cory Doctorow (gruntzooki) on Flickr [image link]

This was not just any random blogger either, it was Cory Doctorow, science fiction author, copyright reform campaigner, and highly influential netizen. If the Met wanted advertising for this pilot project, they’ve certainly got it now―Doctorow posted this story at Boing Boing, the #7 most popular blog in the English-speaking world.

Because it’s election day here in Blighty, I won’t detain you any further but just in case the image should disappear or something, the text of the poster reads:

Police Notice

Internet Policy

The owners of these premises are working with the Metropolitan Police Service to prevent unlawful or offensive material being accessed on the internet.

All customers agree that while using our systems they will not access, upload, download any material, or author, transmit or store documents, including emails or attachments of a pornographic, violent, extremist, or otherwise offensive or inappropriate nature.

Breaching the above will result in the user’s internet access being terminated immediately and, where appropriate, the police being informed.

Downloading or accessing certain material could constitute a criminal offence.

Well, at least they’re telling us we’re being watched. Just like the Chinese. Congratulations.

 

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Inspired by a post over at Kings of War which looked at the three big party’s defense proposals in their manifestos, I decided to perform a similar operation of the big three counter-terrorism proposals. As it turned out this was a pretty easy endeavor, given the almost complete absence of major shifts or proposals in any of them. To look at their respective proposals in alphabetical order:

Conservative
- ban Hizb-ut-Tahrir and “close down organizations which attempt to fund terrorism from the UK”
- create a new National Resilience Team for Homeland Security
- (I have to confess that I could not find this in their manifesto, but the BBC seem to think it is) review “the controversial control orders system”

Labour
- “we will develop our PREVENT strategy to combat extremism.”

Liberal Democrats
- scrap control orders
- reduce pre-charge detention to 14 days
- allow intercepts in court, make greater use of post-charge questioning.

All three seem to suggest that the police should take the lead in counter-terrorism, and all condemn torture (the Libdems want to launch a “full judicial inquiry into allegations of British complicity in torture and state kidnapping”). Afghanistan features in all three as linking a foreign threat to a domestic threat, while Pakistan is of greatest apparent concern to Labour – though all are concerned with unstable states as a threat to domestic security. Al Qaeda is only mentioned specifically by Labour. Aside from Labour, none of the parties discuss the allegedly all-important Preventing Violent Extremism strategy (and even Labour merely refers to it as listed above, without giving any more detail). In the debates, the topic has come up even less, with it merely being referred to within the context of Afghanistan.

Now on the one hand, it is worth remembering that for the two parties not in power, they do not have access to all of the intel that the government does and thus are potentially preparing blind. But at the same time, it is surprising that in essence all of the main parties have failed to present in their party manifesto’s anything substantial to address the threat of terrorism.

There are, in my mind, two answers to this: they either think that it is not a problem (or agree with the current strategy approach aside from the small tweaks they offer) and have thus omitted it consciously, or they have no idea what to do. Either option, however, offers the conclusion that they have no fresh ideas about what can be done to address a problem that senior police officers, politicians and security agents believe will remain with us “for a generation” and for which the budget has trebled since Labour have been in power (according to their own figures cited in the manifesto).

Of course, there is the possible conclusion that it is my personal fixation on the topic which is exaggerating the importance of its absence. Maybe in fact this is all a conscious effort to tone down the centrality or importance of counter-terrorism within the government’s duties, and thus maybe defuse some of the mythology around it. Still, if this is the really the case, then you would expect some greater acknowledgement of the choice given the fact that the government has been moving in the opposite direction, spreading counter-terrorism across an ever expanding number of agencies and departments.

To look at the specific proposals, the Liberal Democrat proposals seem most progressive, but at the same time, I wonder if they will not find themselves of a different view when they are in power and can see what I imagine is the intelligence that is bringing around the control order regime. Still, there is some substantial logic behind the premise that the government should prosecute or lift control orders and that the ongoing situation is not sustainable in the extended long term. If they are able to force the discussion about how to conclude this situation, then this is excellent news. In contrast, I remain unsure about the proposal to proscribe Hizb ut Tahrir. If it is implemented, I have a feeling it will merely increase the power and mystique of the organization with little substantial counter-terror benefit.

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It’s difficult to know what to make of this new Metropolitan Police counterterrorism pilot scheme in north London, announced in the press last week:

Anti-Terror Police Seek Help from Internet Cafes, BBC News, 25 March 2010

Police battling the threat of terrorism have unveiled a new tactic - they are targeting internet cafes. As evidence suggests that several people convicted with terrorism acts have visited internet cafes while plotting their crimes, the Metropolitan Police are trialling a new initiative in which owners agree to monitor what customers are looking at, and report any suspect activity to police.

The visit by two policemen and a community support officer is unannounced - but this is not a raid. Instead they are here at an internet cafe in Camden in London as part of a new programme in the government's £140m Prevent strategy to help counterterrorism.

The new initiative involves getting internet cafe owners to monitor the websites their customers view and to pass on any worries over suspicious activity to the police.

Critics claim this is ‘another step in the direction of creating a society of total surveillance’. Given the recent Community and Local Government Committee report on problems with Prevent, this project will look to many like another attempt to monitor Muslims’ behaviour.  The BBC goes on to quote more from the author of these concerns, Arun Kundnani of the Institute of Race Relations:

 

What is dangerous about this initiative is that it does not just focus on preventing access to illegal material but also material that is defined as 'extremist' without offering an objective definition of what that is. It thus potentially criminalises people for accessing material that is legal but which expresses religious and political opinions that police officers find unacceptable.

This is a good point but it is not constables in the front line of this endeavour but internet cafe owners and users.  This is another delegation of state responsibilities to the populace, which sounds like an attractive proposition but is precisely the opposite.  I find it difficult to see why this is significantly different to reporting someone for reading a ‘seditious’-looking book on the Underground.  

The police say that ‘the internet cafe programme is not about arresting people, but more to determine if their users need what they term as "support"’.  This is distinctly problematic.  What this says to the casual observer is not that this is a law enforcement issue but a social engineering one.  If the intention is to shape people towards the norms engendered by the last ten years of counterterrorism legislation as regards what we are allowed to access on the internet, we should perhaps wonder about the legitimacy of such measures when another parliamentary committee last week called for a ‘thorough going, evidence-based review of the necessity for and proportionality of all the counter-terrorism legislation’ passed since 9/11.

When I lived in Egypt, a country famous for its political pluralism, I had frequent cause to use internet cafes.  I vividly remember the first one I used in downtown Cairo in about 2004.  Pinned to each wall behind the monitors were laminated posters which said, ‘Patrons are asked to refrain from accessing material which deals with sex, religion, or politics’.  Whilst the UK has a very long way to go before it is even remotely as bad as Egypt with respect to communication rights, the new Met scheme will use posters and screensavers to ‘tell people that what they’re doing is not on’.  Not illegal, just ‘not on’.  Be careful: this time, somebody actually is watching you.

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Up North at Manchester Crown Court, brothers Abbas and Ilyas Iqbal have been found guilty this week of charges relating to their the dissemination of material useful to terrorists and preparation of acts of terrorism. A third man, a white Muslim convert, was cleared of charges against him.

The men became dubbed the "Blackburn Resistance" after a video was uncovered on a mobile SIM card in Abbas Iqbal’s luggage as he tried to board a plane at Manchester airport. The clip showed the men running around a park in Blackburn in camouflage and seemingly imitating command training with As Sahab-type music in the background. At the beginning of the video the words the "Blackburn Resistance" featured prominently, and a voice intoned "They are fighting against oppression, they are The Blackburn Resistance."

Alongside this footage and a wide array of other photos of the men brandishing or trying weapons out, a variety of knives, BB guns, an air rifle and pistol, crossbows and live ammunition were found with the men. Two documents entitled “attack planning” and “urban combat” were also found bearing the brothers fingerprints.

But while some of the pictures of the group are quite dramatic looking, the reality is that it is very hard to imagine this group as a cell of hardened terrorists. Cognizant of this, the prosecution was very careful to not paint the men in too heavy a light, recognizing that "some aspects of the material may at first blush seem almost comical in [their] amateurishness." Nonetheless, they saw the group as "intoxicated by the evil of terrorism," and actively preparing to disseminate recruiting material abroad.

The men ultimately received relatively light sentences, Abbas Iqbal, 24, was sentenced to two years in prison for the dissemination of terrorist publications, while his younger brother Ilyas, 23, was incarcerated for 18 months for possessing a document likely to be useful to a terrorist. Given he has spent almost that amount of time already on remand, Ilyas was released, while his older brother will still serve another three to four months. Their co-defendant was cleared on all charges having spent 387 days in custody. A fourth man picked up with them at the airport is still on trial in a separate case.

But it is hard to judge exactly how much of a victory this really is for counter-terrorists. This is not a cell of global travelers with contacts to Al Qaeda core, but rather a group of young men who through the internet and home computers were able to create an imitation set of videos and pictures of themselves dressing up as terrorists. That they may have later gone on to do something is of course perfectly possible, but as the prosecutor pointed out: "at the stage when they were stopped by police, they had not got very far."

It is easy to see how this could play badly in the court of public opinion, where what even the prosecution described as "larking around in a park in Blackburn," was painted as potential terrorist training. The fact they seem not to have been receiving much coverage in the press is a good thing, and probably the product of the fact that very few editors would have taken the group very seriously.

A final point I would add about these chaps, however, is how lucky they are to have been caught doing these acts in the UK – had they been nabbed for similar things in the U.S., they would probably be looking at very long stints inside.

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The UK is often seen at both the forefront of the violent Islamist threat and also the legislation that is being crafted in the West to counter it. Consequently, it was very interesting to see the Home Office publish a paper by DSTL (which I always thought was a more tech-based lab) that provides an overview and analysis of the current research that has been undertaken in the UK looking at counter-terrorism legislation and its impact on public opinion and opinion forming.

The conclusions are pretty bleak for those actually seeking to obtain useful information from the sea of research that has been produced on the topic (as someone in HMG put it to me late last year, much of what has been pumped out under the aegis of research on countering terrorism is "dross."), but I suppose are quite positive for those who are in fact planning to produce more of this research: the report concludes highlighting "the need for further research".

This would I suppose discount reams of speculative articles essentially re-treading what are believed to be public perceptions based on reading the press or Comment is Free (one can only hope that previous pieces I have done do not fall into this category, apologies if they do).

Here are a few quick points I took away from the DSTL paper:

Perceptions are at the heart of what this paper is trying to probe and government is clearly trying to understand: the very title "What perceptions do the UK public have concerning the impact of counter-terrorism legislation implemented since 2000?" shows this, but at the same time, the report highlights how this is something that has not been analyzed or measured effectively at all. In part this is a problem since more generally the report concludes this is a topic that is hard to measure.

But with regards terrorism legislation, it is an even harder thing to measure practically when we consider the low number of actual terrorist attacks (though this is a good problem to have), and thus measuring reactions to legislation which can appear to be targeting individuals who, in practical point of fact, have failed yet to carry out their murderous plans.

A big tangible take-away is that people don't like stop and search and think that it is targeting groups unfairly, etc. In fact, according to the paper stop and search is the only demonstrable policy which can conclusively said to be unpopular in implementation (conclusions about reactions to other policies are mostly anecdotal). Hardly a surprising conclusion to reach, and one that increasingly makes me feel as though I need to see some conclusive evidence that it actually helps or does anything if we are to continue it – under certain circumstances maybe it is necessary, but blanket stop and search for terrorism issues cannot have stopped or disrupted many terrorist plots.

In a way connected to this, it seems as though the public has absolutely no faith in the government on terrorist matters, though this likely is exacerbated by my earlier point about perceptions. While apparently if something has a judicial stamp on it, it is seen in a more positive light, I have a feeling people are in fact equally skeptical about that if pushed.

I recall giving a presentation in which I highlighted that in fact police had to present a suspect before a judge every 7 days while he was being held in a pre-charge state on terrorism charges to present their case for keeping him longer, I was met with a wave of skeptical hems and haws about the fairness of this.

Two statistical details highlighted which I rather enjoyed: it turns out we really don’t like the government getting their hands on our DNA unless we have done something very naughty. An understandably high degree of paranoia I would have thought, but good to see in numbers. Secondly, and less amusing, apparently 45% of people think that denying people a trial for terrorism charges is a "price worth paying." Admittedly the date the poll was taken is relatively soon after 7/7, but it seems to me that this is a fundamental thing that we need to hold on to if we are planning on marking long-term success in this conflict.

We will only do this if we fight it on terms that we have laid out before we step on to the battlefield, not making it up as we go along. We may have to build some flexibility into this in the long-term, but nonetheless there are certain key elements we have to establish agreement on before we proceed too far.

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A recently released high-level report reveals the UK intelligence services' assessment of the threat posed by Islamist terrorists in the form of 'electronic attack', or what are increasingly referred to as 'cyber attacks'.

The Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) is the statutory body with oversight of the Security Service (MI5), Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), and Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ).  Since it was set up in 1994, its remit has expanded to include the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), and the Intelligence, Security and Resilience Group (ISRG).  Every year, it presents a report to the Prime Minister, which also includes the results of its consultations with other bodies, including the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS).  In short, its job is to tell Number 10 how well the UK's intelligence agencies are doing, and what problems exist.

The new report [pdf] was presented to the PM on 16 December last year and was eventually published last week [press release, PDF]. The section of interest to us is on page nine:

The Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) told the Committee:
...
Electronic attack is also used by Islamist terrorists who have the capability to launch limited forms of attack over the internet. Technical capability varies greatly, and it appears that their intentions are the defacement or denial of service of specific websites. These attempts are often ***. There are, however, indications that awareness and use of electronic attack is on the increase and ***.

Note the redacted sections, which I'll leave to you to fill as you see fit. It is clear from this document that CPNI regards the two principal vectors of cyber attack to be foreign intelligence services and Islamists. The report notes that GCHQ agrees, and it created something called the Network Defence Intelligence and Security Team (NDIST) in September 2008, to address this issue. This is a group you won't find on Google, and which I've never heard of. How this will play together with the Cyber Security Operations Centre (CSOC), also at GCHQ , and due to become operational at the end of this month, remains to be seen, particularly as the ISC criticises government for not letting it know sooner about the CSOC.

For obvious reasons, the report is short on details, but it does give us a glimpse of how the UK's intelligence community views the Islamist threat in the specific area of cyber attacks. It's not talking about propaganda or recruitment, just about attacks on infrastructure and networked assets. To be honest, it's hardly earth-shattering, and government seems to have a handle on it, even if GCHQ complains about a lack of staff and is running at "about a third below the level planned" in this field. I guess we'll have to wait until next year to see how things change with respect to this particular confrontation in cyberspace.

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In response to Amm Samm's last post, "visitor" raised a number of interesting points, one of which I wanted to use the opportunity to quickly highlight.

Amm Samm: "there are no clear metrics for measuring success"
Visitor: "what do you offer?"

This is something that I have to admit that I have also been guilty of, complaining about the absence of metrics of PREVENT without necessarily offering any solutions. Consequently, I will use this opportunity to sketch out some thoughts I have been recently having on the topic (Amm has some coming up too I believe).

On the one hand, it should be quite easy to measure success: no terrorism attacks means the strategy is "preventing" terrorism. But how do we know whether what we are spending public money is actually having an impact and it is not other factors? This is important if we do not simply want to be throwing money away.

One solution that has been offered is to calculate the amount of good that groups receiving Prevent funding are able to do in their community: are they helping kids, providing useful local social functions, etc.

A police view that I have instead heard is that success in Prevent is measured by the amount the community trusts and engages with them – are communities coming forwards to offer information on people unsolicited? Are traditionally more sceptical communities using local social services, and thus "trusting" the system and becoming more engaged and less alienated?

But while both of these sound like reasonable areas to use as a basis to measure success, it remains hard to know exactly how many terrorists have been "prevented" in each case for each pound spent. Also, it seems awfully unclear to me that either of these metrics is somehow evidence that the government's strategy is in fact shielding us from the few individuals within society who choose to get involved in terrorism.

Without wanting to sound like I am throwing the baby out with the bathwater, maybe the root of the problem is that the scope we have defined for PREVENT is simply too large, and thus this is why we cannot find suitable metrics: maybe if we pared PREVENT down to simply being activity which pre-empts terrorist activity before it reaches the PURSUE stage then we might be able to measure success it in better.

As I have said before, this does not mean stopping work being done under PREVENT, simply de-tagging it from security. Instead, let us have PREVENT be more intelligence based activity or strengthened (and targeted) social work, alongside efforts to actively counter the spread of radical ideas and breaking up groups actively recruiting people to go abroad to fight. While it will remain hard to calculate success (we are still after all talking about measuring something by its absence), it will theoretically be more tangible than the slightly abstract societal measures that are currently offered by NI 35.

I look forward to hopefully having a conversation with people on this either in the comments or via email if you would prefer.

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Last week, the UK government quietly announced that a new unit in Whitehall would begin sifting through complaints from the public about 'hate, extremism and terrorism online'. In what seems to be the result of four years of civil service head-scratching about how to design a delivery mechanism for the Section 3("notice-and-takedown", NTD) provisions of the Terrorism Act 2006, the result is probably the most benign mechanism Whitehall could come up with to assuage pressure groups (both internal and external) whilst saving political face.

Under the new initiative, the government is enlisting the help of the internet-using public to find and report on various types of content and behaviour deemed illegal under the provisions of the Terrorism Acts of 2000 and 2006. To its credit the Home Office states, “most hateful or violent website content is not illegal. While you may come across a lot of things on the internet that offend you, very little of it is actually illegal.” That’s an important message, although I guess it will be some time before we know if it sufficiently discourages axe-grinders from submitting various types of legal content to the new Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit.

There may be some utility to this measure. It signals that certain types of material that fall foul of counterterrorism legislation will not be tolerated in the UK. As such, it will bolster government's promotion of its 'values' in this area, as well as contributing in some small way to making "the internet a more hostile environment for terrorists and violent extremists who seek to exploit modern technology", as the press release claims. However, as a genuine bulwark against violent extremism it is a non-starter and will certainly fail to deliver on government's stated objectives of reducing radicalisation and countering violent extremism online. For a start, even if such a scheme―assuming it can maintain any kind of visibility, which is unlikely―succeeded in driving all illegal internet material currently served by UK persons and companies to foreign locations, this content would still be accessible to those who look for it.

This criticism relates to a mere practicality but there is a more important issue. This looks very like policy retrospectively trying to justify poor legislation. Recall that the Section 3 provisions of the Terrorism Act 2006 have never been used, partly because the police―who are charged with serving NTDs―have consistently backed away from being the ones to adjudicate on what might be lawful or not in contentious areas like the 'glorification of terrorism'. Rather than just accept that if they were really serious about prosecuting UK citizens and companies for hosting certain types of material that breach any number of much older established statutes regarding incitement, racial hatred, etc, this government persists in attempting to justify badly drafted legislation under the rubric of counterterrorism policy.

Why a specific reporting mechanism for terrorism? We have one for child abuse, surely a near-universal taboo, but we don’t bother for much else. Why not any other crimes? If it's deeply-held cultural convictions and social norms that the government is trying to uphold, why resort to highly contentious legislation borne of fear and panic, rather than existing legislation that, quite apart from having been successfully tested many times in the courts, directly reflects those norms and values upon which British society claims to be based, pre-9/11?

This government, in common with most others, has yet to make a firm case demonstrating even the weakest causal relationship between internet 'content', 'radicalisation', and 'violent extremism'. Sure, it crops up in the biographies of many terrorists as a behavioural indicator, but many other things do too. This is not a disingenuous statement, and it should not be up to academics, civil servants and rights activists to refute the case for regulation of expression. Rather, it is up to government to make the case for it, and it has yet to do so.

So much for evidence-based policy. In 2002, in a speech to the Economic and Social Research Council, then Home Secretary David Blunkett said, "this government has given a clear commitment that we will be guided not by dogma but by an open-minded approach to understanding what works and why." Unless this government is sitting on a body of data that has thus far eluded the world’s academic community, I suggest that even a small thing like the new internet referral unit shows how hollow this claim sounds now. On its own, this initiative is unlikely to do much damage―nor achieve much of anything, to be frank―but one has to wonder at the institutional processes that more-or-less demanded something like it, for better or for worse.

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Last night BBC 2 showed the first episode of Peter Taylor's three-part series on 'Generation Jihad'. The opening episode focused on the roots of radicalisation among young British Muslims.
Taylor is an experienced and talented journalist, who is chiefly known for a series of well-regarded documentaries on Northern Ireland. But the first instalment of Generation Jihad also raised a number of important additional questions – particularly about the relationship between radicalisation and Western foreign policy.

Two prominent themes that emerged early in the programme were the central importance of the internet as a tool of radicalisation (something dealt with at length in Tim Stevens's report for ICSR) and the crucial role played by radicalisers, as active and predatory agents of extremism within Muslim communities.

For example, Taylor discussed the case of Hammad Munshi, Britain's youngest terrorist convict who was targeted and groomed by older extremists at the age of 15, without the knowledge of his family. Indeed, there is evidence that even younger children have been targeted in this way. At the end of January, police from the Counter-Terrorism Unit in Manchester released a video seized in a raid, apparently showing two infants handling a Kalashnikov rifle and being encouraged to express their desire to 'kill the infidels'.

In tracing the genesis of Islamist extremism within the UK, Taylor identified the furore over the publication of Salman Rushdie's Satanic Verses in 1988 as a moment of awakening and heightened political consciousness among UK Muslims, which was subsequently manipulated by extremists to their own ends. He also emphasised the continued importance attached by UK Muslims to the 'Ummah', the wider Islamic diaspora.  

Most of Generation Jihad was filmed in West Yorkshire, the home of a number of Mohammad Sidique Khan, the 7/7 bomber, and where Taylor himself grew up. Those interviewed (by a Muslim colleague, rather than Taylor himself) included Bilal Mohammed and Rizwan Ditta, who have both served prison sentences for terrorism-related offences. These young men articulated a long list of Muslim grievances about the conduct of 'Western' foreign policy over the last two decades. The list included the plight of Bosnian, Chechnyan and Palestinian Muslims, and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. While denying active support for terrorism, some of the interviewees did express sympathy for the al Qaeda aim of cleansing Muslim lands of the presence of Westerners.

Much of this is binary narrative is, of course, familiar. Indeed, it is often given credence by those who campaign against perceived Western ‘imperialism’ but have no formal connection to the Muslim community. It is also temptingly plausible to Western audiences, as its exponents are well aware. But the reality is that extreme Jihadist Salafist ideology is not as relativist or reactive to Western actions as this narrative would suggest.

It would have been interesting to see the interviewees pressed further on the contradictions in the Al Qaeda narrative, and the shifting sands on which it is predicated. In the case of Bosnia for example, there is evidence that it was the failure of the West to do more to prevent the slaughter of innocent Muslims – that radicalised many young British Muslims, rather than the NATO intervention of the mid-1990s.  

Likewise, even amongst strong opponents of the Western presence in Iraq, it is hard to make a case for Al Qaeda in Iraq as liberators. That group’s tactics, which peaked in 2007, have been to ignite sectarian warfare between Muslims through a succession of huge attacks against the Shi'ite community in the country.

In other words, while there are many links between foreign policy and domestic radicalisation, these are not as simple as are often presumed and should be distilled with care.
Taylor ended the programme by reflecting on the difficulties faced by the authorities in dealing with the threat of home-grown terrorists. He agreed that it was serious and that 'the police and security services cannot afford to take their eyes of Generation Jihad' but expressed concern that 'the danger is that we create even greater resentment that will only end in further attacks'.

This evokes a point that Taylor has often made in his earlier work on Northern Ireland – that heavy-handed security measures exacerbated the terrorist threat from the IRA, by gaining them more sympathisers and recruits. It is certainly the case that the less resentment the police and the security services create, the more that they will be able to isolate extremists within these communities. As yet, however, despite some notable mistakes, there have been no major security blunders against 'Generation Jihad' on the scale that characterised the early phase of 'the Troubles' in Northern Ireland. And to this point, as far as existing evidence goes, the counter-terrorism efforts of the authorities have not in themselves been a primary driver of violent radicalism.

The next part of Generation Jihad will be on BBC Two at 9pm on Monday 15 February.

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I apologize for taking so long to continue this series (see parts one, two, three, and four). I have been travelling. Still am actually. I'd like to start in on Prevent in the UK. There are some significant misconceptions about Prevent in Washington (particularly about its implementation and the 'changes' in CONTEST II) that I worry may hinder informed policy analysis and formulation. In this post, I just explain the basics of Prevent and briefly mention some of its flaws. The sins of Prevent will be explained in more detail in following posts.

Prevent is one of the four 'P's' of CONTEST, the UK's counterterrorism strategy. It seeks 'to stop people from becoming terrorists or supporting violent extremism.' According to the revised CONTEST strategy released last year:

To reduce the risk from terrorism – our aim – we need not only to stop attacks but also to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting violent extremism. The Government introduced its revised Prevent strategy in October 2007. The strategy is based on a better understanding of the causes of radicalisation (the process by which people become terrorists or lend support to violent extremism), to each of which it aims to provide a coherent response.

Thus, Prevent seeks to challenge violent extremism ideology and support 'mainstream' voices, disrupt those who promote violent extremism, support vulnerable individuals, increase community resilience, and address grievances exploited by "ideologues." It does so by allocating funds to local authorities who in turn fund community initiatives that are meant to interface with Muslim, er, I'm sorry, 'vulnerable' youth and prevent them from becoming violent extremists. This is known as PVE, or preventing violent extremism and is the aspect of Prevent that Daniel Benjamin and other US government officials like Arif Alikhan, Assistant Secretary for Policy Development for the Department of Homeland Security (more on that later), seem to be taking a liking to

The police also receive Prevent funds. The Channel program, as part of Prevent, identifies those who are vulnerable to being recruited by those who seek to launch attacks in the UK and seeks to channel them in a different direction.

Now to some flaws (in this context, I recommend Lorenzo Vidino's Foreign Policy piece, 'Toward a Radical Solution'):

(1)    Wrong partners: A significant number of the community groups being funded by local authorities and the Home Office happen to be Sawha-type Salafis (see page 53 of this book) or are oriented toward the Muslim Brotherhood. The reasoning behind this seems to be that these groups are the only ones with the Islamic credibility and 'street cred' to convince radicalizing/radicalized youth from becoming violent in the UK. Further, they seek to channel people into 'political activism' (usually Brotherhood-style) that serves as a sort of 'safety valve' for anger and disaffection.

This is problematic to say the least. If, as I have stated in earlier posts that grievance is far less important than grievance interpretation in driving people toward action, it is folly to fund groups who foster the same grievances and promote such similar narratives to that of al Qaeda. It is also misguided to finance those who are openly supportive of jihad against British and American personnel (not just military personnel) in Afghanistan and Iraq.

(2)    PVE is not well-suited to the British Muslim population. The dominant religious interpretation and practice among those receiving Prevent funding are Brotherhood, Jama'at, and Salafi oriented. These are all hard-line interpretations of Islam, but the plurality of British Muslims come from a Sufi background. While these are all within the Sunni sect, Brotherhood/Jama'at/Salafi Islam are all in direct conflict with Sufism (despite the fact that Hasan Al Banna himself was a Sufi).

(3)    There are no clear metrics for measuring success.

(4)    PVE is a security program with a social orientation. It should be a social program with a security orientation.

(5)    It is essentially a social re-engineering effort and there has been no serious discussion about whether social re-engineering is something the modern liberal state should be engaging in.

(6)    The idea of local councils being empowered toward differential application of Prevent based on varying local environments is a good one, but a lack of oversight from the center has led to differential interpretations of what Prevent is trying to do.

(7)    The idea of preventing extremists from becoming violent extremists (rather than trying to prevent them from becoming extremists in the first place) is cynical to say the least. The idea that the most effective way the British can prevent terrorism is to cede their Muslim youth to conditionally non-violent extremism (not entirely non-violent, as they support violence there rather than here) is intellectually bankrupt and reflects ignorance about the natures of (a) movement participation, (b) the Islamist movement, and (c) Islamist ideologies.

(8)    Lastly, Prevent is in direct conflict with social cohesion. Empowering hard-line social actors within the Muslim community who do not support gender equality, homosexual rights, free speech, etc can only deepen divisions in society and create new ones.  The societal consequences of this are already beginning to emerge and will only worsen over time.

 

More on all this in following posts.

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The UK Home Affairs Select Committee has this morning published the results of its recent hearings on The Home Office’s Response to Terrorist Attacks, and it’s a mixed bag as expected. I haven’t read the whole thing but here are a few preliminary thoughts on its headline findings.

•    Ministers need to place greater emphasis on participation in emergency simulations.

No idea why this should be top of their list. I just keep hearing the late great Jean Baudrillard chuckling in my ears...

•    A formalised National Security Committee chaired by the Home Secretary or Prime Minister and assisted by prominent, publicly accountable National Security Advisers must be appointed.

This is also exactly what the Conservatives want. They claim it will not be “a new bureaucracy but a centre of decision-making”.

•    A lack of political will hindered the creation of regional counter-terrorism units; the Government was not proactive enough in instigating valuable reforms to the policing structure.

I wonder what the committee’s case is here? It implies that the reforms were valuable but happened too slowly.  Big deal.

•    The primacy of the Metropolitan Police in counter-terrorism operations should be enshrined in statute to increase accountability and simplify the command structures.

In statute? They already take the lead in SO15. I’m curious if the Met wants this too. Retired Met Deputy Commissioner Andy Hayman did make the point in evidence that if anything went wrong the current “gentleman’s agreement” between the Met and other forces would be seriously strained. What legal instrument would be employed to do this? Another Act of Parliament, in which the NSC is also set up forever?  We’ve already had six, or seven, or ... how many is it now?

•    The creation of a separate National Terrorism Agency modelled on the American Department of Homeland Security has the potential to cause major problems and will not represent a major simplification of policing structures.

Hallelujah. Such an organisation would have to be a standalone creation, or the merging of existing agencies. The last thing we actually need is a monolithic security agency à la DHS. There might be some short-term marginal gains but it seems to me that you need some tension between agencies to preserve oversight and avoid the worst group-think.

•    The Government should immediately introduce legislation allowing the admission of intercept evidence in court.

Absolutely. If you’re going to collect this stuff then at least use it in court. It’s a form of processual transparency, and will help CPS’ case if the evidence is good enough to bring genuine prosecutions.

•    Control Orders no longer provide an effective response to the continuing threat and the control order regime is no longer viable.

Finally. There has been a quite bizarre and persistent adherence by the government to control orders. Time to throw them out.

•    Budgets for counter-terrorism work have increased greatly but there is a lack of Parliamentary oversight of this spending and a possibility of problems caused by "ring fencing" this money.

This criticism cuts a lot deeper than might first appear, although I doubt the Committee is really being ballsy here. How about asking the really important question: just why are we even spending this money? And what the implications of this securitisation are?

•    The structures that are now in place may be suitable for combating the terrorist threat as currently constituted, but we are not confident that government institutions have the desire to constantly adapt to meet ever-changing threats.

“The terrorist threat as currently constituted”? And what’s that exactly? So, the threat’s constantly adapting, and government institutions are to do the same?  Good luck with that. This is an aspirational point, and governments everywhere are unlikely to deliver on this point. It’s a good idea not to support an NTA, as that would almost certainly stifle the adaptation they desire. I also wonder whether they’re conflating adaptation and innovation as processes/outcomes of change?

We’re a few months shy of a general election, so don’t expect much to change before summer. If the Tories get in we will see a National Security Committee/Council (they use both terms), and perhaps some legislation. There’s also the Defence Review in the next parliament, so there may be some overlap there too. In the meantime, I leave you with Home Secretary Alan Johnson’s reaction to the report. Would we have expected this government to have said anything else?

“I totally refute the unsubstantiated and wholly inaccurate claims in this inadequate report. The government fully understands the threat this country faces from international terrorism and has extremely effective systems and processes in place to deal with it. Indeed, it is all the more surprising, given that the same committee found only six months ago that; ‘the UK's counter-terrorism strategy is first-class, effective and as “joined-up” as any system of government can expect.’"

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Last night, the UK Chief of General Staff Gen Sir David Richards gave a speech at the IISS describing his aspirations for British armed forces ahead of the forthcoming defence review.  The basic gist was that our adversaries are fighting irregular wars and we should be prepared to engage them in flexible and agile manner.  Upshot: ditch the Cold War mentality, and let's get busy in these new theatres, not least of which is cyberspace.

Whether this will transfer into new cyber forces, we don't know, but it seems likely, should the money be found for the required investment in this field.  The current opposition is also very keen to develop offensive cyber capabilities, as set out last week in their national security green paper.

In his speech, Richards talks about the rationale for developing capabilities in cyberspace, which are actually quite understandable, but his comments at one point inevitably turned to al-Qaeda:

... Al Qaeda's use of technology has created a global network of grievances that are often linked by a nihilist theology used to justify local violence.  Dan Rather, the veteran US journalist, has commented that AQ’s physical location is virtual: "it's a worldwide, internet-based movement."

In all this time looking at the relationships between communications technologies and conflict, I have never once heard Dan Rather cited as an authoritative source on the subject.  I tracked down the quote to an interview with Rather on HDNet's World Focus in December 2009, in which he said, "al-Qaeda is not centred anywhere ... it's worldwide, it's internet-based", and then proceeds, without drawing breath, to say that AQ is actually based in Pakistan.

Rather looks like a spent force in the interview―permanent fallout from his ignominious departure from CBS Evening News in 2005 I guess―but the inconsistencies in his statement are obvious.  It would be unfair to single him out for criticism in this respect though―it's trendy now to say that AQ has a 'virtual sanctuary' and all that jazz, whilst at the same time declaring that we know them to be hiding out in Waziristan, or wherever.  

Everyone who reads this blog knows that 'AQ' can be parsed in various ways.  It's a shame that Richards saw fit to quote Dan Rather out of all the people that could have been cited on this subject.  Elsewhere in his speech, he quoted another venerable silverback of news broadcasting, the BBC's Nik Gowing, on communications technologies and democracy.  Richards could perhaps have turned to someone slightly more engaged with the subject, like Evgeny Morozov for example.  

I very much doubt anyone at the IISS cared, and it's really no big deal, I suppose.  Speeches like this do make me concerned that those who draft and make them aren't quite as clued up as they should be.  Richards is a military man, and doubtless knows UK defence inside out, but if he's moving into cyberspace he may need to update his sources.  It just sounds tired to trot out these two just because they're TV personalities.


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The decision to proscribe Al Muhajiroun, Islam4UK, and a cluster of their successor groups is not entirely surprising. The combination of a successful prosecution in Luton of five members (or individuals linked to Al Muhajiroun or one of its off-shoots) after their performance at a homecoming parade for troops from Iraq in March 2009 and the fact that the Prime Minister got dragged into the public debate over whether the group was going to make some sort of ceremonial march through Wootton Bassett, all pointed to things coming to some sort of a head. The question really is whether this time it might mean something final for the group?

The short answer is: no. It would seem highly unlikely that this is the last we shall hear of Omar Bakri Mohammed’s acolytes. Last time the Home Office went forwards with a decision to proscribe some of them in July 2006 (that time it was Al Ghurabaa (the strangers) and the Saved Sect), the decision was made in the months after a group of them had been picked up and charged by police for comments they made at a protest outside the Danish Embassy in which they crossed the line and "solicited murder." In that instance four group members were given custodial sentences, while in April and May of 2007 another six group members were arrested on charges of "inciting terrorism overseas" and "terrorist fundraising." 

This clamp-down of sorts appeared to work for about a year, though the group did not go away and simply adopted a lower profile. Then the website http://www.islam4uk.com popped up and things started to take off again, culminating with ever more confrontational and loud statements, an attack on Conservative Muslim peer Baroness Warsi and the protests for which the aforementioned Luton group were just convicted. And while I have seen nothing linking Christmas Day underwear bomber Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab to the group, the renewed attention he drew to today's Londonistan meant some reaction was likely.

If history is anything to go, this should mean that we will see some further arrests in the near future – recent comments by some prominent members appear to tread close to the lines laid out in recent terrorism legislation of incitement or glorification of terrorism. But this will undoubtedly not stop them from reappearing once again, as such groups thrive on the oxygen of publicity (Anjem Chaudhury was quite open in his admission that the main reason for their raising the idea of the march in Wootton Bassett was to attract publicity), and given the relatively light sentences that will be imposed, these individuals will be in and out of jail (some of those from the previous swathe of arrests are already back out). These boys believe they are about God's work and a short stint inside is unlikely to deter them.

The more interesting question is what is their relationship to terrorism? The fact they have been proscribed under anti terrorism legislation means that the British government says there is a link – according to the BBC the impetus for the ban was a JTAC report that was commissioned after Al Muhajiroun reappeared last year – but it is hard to imagine that serious terrorists would associate with people who go around drawing the sorts of attention to themselves that the Al Muhajiroun chaps seem to thrive on. Instead, it is more likely that individuals who are involved in terrorism operate on the fringes of such groups – keeping an eye out for possible recruits amongst the zealous youngsters who are drawn in by to these groups. By shutting them down in this way, the government is at least creating a further hurdle to making them quite so easily accessible – though it is likely that they will in the long-term simply reappear under a new guise. For a period at least, they will have to tread carefully.

Conveniently I suppose, this decision to ban the group comes just ahead of an upcoming article that I have in March's Studies in Conflict and Terrorism journal entitled "The Tottenham Ayatollah and the Hook Handed Cleric: An examination of all their jihadi children," which catalogues the links to terrorism from Al Muhajiroun and Supporters of Shariah (Bakri and Hamza's groups respectively). More on that later!


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The revelations that Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab may have been in part radicalized in the United Kingdom are not entirely surprising. He was in the UK while he was a student, traditionally a young person's most fecund period of political activism. Furthermore, there is the unfortunate reality that while the more overt forms of extremism and training offered by individuals like Abu Hamza al-Masri, Abdullah el-Faisal or Abu Qatada may have died down (or gone beneath the radar), many elements of what has been termed "Londonistan" do remain active. Put simply, London remains a place where extreme elements and ideas are easy to find for anyone seeking them.

But nonetheless, we need to be wary of sparking off some sort of overreaction to this. That Abdulmutallab, like a number (according to the Times count, a further three) of previously convicted terrorists in the UK, may have been the President of the University Islamic Society and organized conferences on subjects related to Islam and the war on terror cannot in itself be read as some sort of marker of his later terrorist action. How many have been through these roles and gone on to nothing remotely related to terrorism? To watch all of these individuals would doubtless be tough for already stretched services, and to ban all such groups and conferences would merely drive them underground and raise all sorts of fearsome debates about freedom of speech.

Unlike some friends, I would also contend the argument that the University of London is somehow the connective tissue – while a number of convicted British terrorists have passed through these hallowed halls (about 10 if I recall a count over drinks the other night) – innumerable others have passed through harmlessly (including most contributors to this blog). Compared to other Universities, it may seem like a high concentration (though I have not seen an absolute count yet anywhere making this an unsubstantiated assertion), but then again, consider how many students have passed through University of London: according its own count, there are currently 120,000 enrolled. The most likely explanation for these similarities is that extremist recruiters seeking warriors for Al Qaeda’s cause are probably hidden amongst London's diverse community, and they are fishing in the pools nearest to them.

Maybe a more disturbing link should be drawn through the Yemen-UK connection. Back in late 1998, seven British Muslims (two of whom were related to Abu Hamza) were picked up and incarcerated for their part in plotting a bombing campaign and kidnapping alongside a local Islamist group. In 2000, following the death of a young Briton in a incident involving a firearm at a madrassah north of the capital Sanaa, the British Ambassador went to investigate and was shocked to discover 30 British students at the school. Since then I have heard stories of journalists coming across young Britons, amongst other foreigners, seeking jihadi camps in Yemen. Furthermore, the presence of fabled extremist preacher Anwar al-Awlaki, means that these youngsters can find a teacher there who speaks a language they understand.

What really stands out, however, is the familiarity of all of these connections. The fact they are not that novel highlights the fact that the ideological battle is nowhere near won. Here we are almost a decade since 9/11 and we are still seeing suicide attackers on airplanes, having passed down a path that is not unknown. This is both a break-down in security, but also a sad indictment that the stream of young men seeking martyrdom has not diminished.

Here are a few links if you want to dig deeper:

News from Nigeria
Britain turned him away
Organized "terror conf"
AQ "groomed" him in London
His time at UCL
Unis "complicit" in his radicalization
Con Coughlin "when will we wake up"
NYT long piece on London links
NYT piece news on his contacts and family background
CNN with interviews with London friends, and that he became more radical in London
Farouk "not radicalized" at UCL
THES article by UCL head

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I suppose I knew it was inevitable, but it looks as if Britain's Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) strategy is coming to America, as...Countering Violent Extremism (CVE). Prevent is one of the 4 P's (the others being Pursue, Prepare, and Protect) of CONTEST, the UK counterterrorism strategy. Prevent is a national effort that draws heavily on local governments and funds community organizations. It is designed to:

•    challenge violent extremist ideology and support 'mainstream' voices
•    disrupt those who promote violent extremism and support the institutions where they are active
•    support individuals who are being targeted and recruited to the cause of violent extremism
•    increase the resilience of communities to violent extremism
•    address the grievances that ideologues are exploiting

And, it is very controversial.

I now quote Daniel Benjamin, the head of the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the State Department, at length. He gave a speech last month on CT policy in the Obama Administration. I know this post is about a month late, but I thought it best to wait until after the holidays.

Benjamin's speech is signaling a major domestic and foreign policy development – partially in reaction to a year full of Islamist terrorist plots. Benjamin is an old National Security Council hand from the Clinton years and one of the first people to start seriously talking about al Qaeda and mass casualty terrorism in government before 9/11. Now, as Benjamin explained in his speech:

We are also addressing the local drivers of radicalization that still lead large numbers of people to adopt al-Qaida's ideology, and as I said earlier, we understand the dangers of radicalization, and we are working both to undermine the al-Qaida narrative and to ameliorate the conditions that make it attractive. We know that violent extremism flourishes where there is marginalization, alienation, and perceived–-or real–-relative deprivation. In recognition of this, my first step has been to build a unit focusing on what we in the government call "Countering Violent Extremism" in my office to focus on local communities most prone to radicalization. There is a broad understanding across the government that we have not done nearly enough to address underlying conditions for at-risk populations–-and we have also not done enough to improve the ability of moderates to voice their views and strengthen opposition to violence.

Adopting a tailored-approach to countering violent extremism does not mean we can neglect broader structural problems. There is no denying that when children have no hope for an education, when young people have no hope for a job and feel disconnected from the modern world, when governments fail to provide for the basic needs of their people, when people despair and are aggrieved, they become more susceptible to extremist ideologies. But a tailored-approach to CVE requires identifying which of these problems are driving radicalization and are amenable to change with the help of local governments and leaders who understand the problems best.

Over time, the measures and the methods I have described above will reduce terrorists' capacity to harm us and our partners. No element can be neglected if we are to succeed since they reinforce one another. Global engagement builds coalitions based on mutual interests and mutual respect. And these coalitions, in turn, help us partner with individual nations to enhance their capacity to counter extremism. This, finally, enables us to work with them to develop tailored-approaches to preventing extremists from becoming violent extremists.

The influence of the British experience is evident: Focusing on 'local communities most prone to radicalization.' Local governments and leaders will be vital to the effort.  And, most significantly, the last sentence in the excerpt indicates the strategy will be focused on keeping extremists from becoming violent extremists, rather than keeping them from becoming extremists in the first place – a major hallmark (some might call it a flaw) of Prevent. And c'mon: PVE and CVE?

Stay tuned for a series of posts on radicalization and counter-radicalization. I'll be...

•    Challenging some of the assumptions in Benjamin’s remarks that are also pervasive in the discourse on the subject (namely about marginalization, alienation, and deprivation – relative or otherwise);
•    Addressing the crucial and overlooked role of collective identity;
•    Discussing the problems with Prevent in the UK and its applicability to the US;
•    Observing how US-based ‘non-violent’ Islamists have seen the writing on the wall and are positioning themselves to co-opt any US counter-radicalization programs;
•    And tying it together with some other thoughts and observations.


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The conclusion of the trial against Adam Khatib, 22; Nabeel Hussain, 25; and Mohammed Shamim Udin, 39 marks further confirmation of the apparently very real plot that was being hatched back in the summer of 2006. The three, described by the prosecution as the "backroom team" were all linked to Abdulla Ahmed Ali, the man who appears to be at the centre of the UK end of the plotting. Ali was convicted in September of this year along with co-conspirators Tanweer Hussain and Assad Sarwar – all were given life sentences (Ali 40 years; Hussain 36 years; and Sarwar 32 years). Three other men who appeared in court with them are facing a third re-trial, sometime next year.

These three appear to be part of the network of East London natives that Abdullah Ali recruited to help in various aspects of the plot. It is not clear that any of them knew that airlines were the target, but in at least Khatib's case, he was deeply involved in the plot. By his own account a rebellious teenager, Khatib dabbled in drugs and wrote an essay at school for French class about "going to Afghanistan, finding a wife and joining Al Qaeda," signing it "Adam Osama bin Laden." After graduating, he met Abulla Ali through one of Ali's brothers and the older man appears to have taken him under his wing.

Significantly, in 2005 Khatib went with Ali on a six month trip to Pakistan – at the same time as already convicted co-conspirator and plot "quartermaster" Assad Sarwar. Sarwar admitted on the stand to learning how to make bombs in Pakistan, and in emails and information released during this trial, it would appear as though Khatib too – as when they returned from their trip in Pakistan, he started undertaking in-depth research into bomb making materials. He also shared notes on his findings with other plotters, giving advice on how to construct devices and was apparently in direct contact with their contacts in Pakistan.

The other two appear to have played a more supportive role – Nabeel Hussain met with Ali a number of times, had written a will, was in contact with him on a particular number that Ali only used for him and Sarwar, and had applied for a £25,000 loan. The jury obviously did not find anything suspicious in the fact that Uddin had allowed Ali to use his computer to do research on bomb making material, but did find him guilty of possessing information useful to terrorists. According to a police statement, "the three men made no comment during police interviews."

While two allegedly key players in this plot remain at large – one on a control order and the other living freely in London (Bruce Hoffman's recent article in Studies in Conflict and Terrorism goes into some detail about them) – this set of arrests highlights again the importance of Abdulla Ali in this cell. He may not have been the absolute emir of the plot, but it certainly appears as though it was his ability to draw his East London friends into his conspiracy that turned a plan being developed in the badlands of Pakistan into a conspiracy involving up to 8 British Muslim suicide bombers.

Yahya Birt has argued that this plot will mark the "end of an era" in Al Qaeda plotting against the UK – in that the model of using British Muslims who appear loosely connected to networks on the periphery of the radical preachers appears to have been repeatedly compromised and is probably now beyond practical use for Al Qaeda. This may be a premature, though it has been almost three years since these chaps were arrested and while a number of other individuals connected to this network have been arrested, none have been involved in what Jonathan Evans described as "late stage planning." This is unlikely, however, to mark the end of Al Qaeda's plotting against the UK.

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I've just had the pleasure of finishing reading Heartland by Anthony Cartwright. It is what I have been allowing myself by way of a break as I continue to plough through mountains of information about extremism and radicalization in the UK.

The book is a work of fiction (hence the break I referred to above), that explores in a wonderfully nuanced and sensitive way the issues around the BNP's rise in the British Midlands against a backdrop of inter-racial tensions in the immediate post-9/11 period. Set in the fictional ward of Cinderheath – which is in the real city of Dudley in the heart of the Black Country – the book follows Rob, a young man who briefly touched minor celebrity as a footballer, but who is settling into life as a school P.E. teacher/assistant. His uncle is the local Labour councilor who is fighting a seemingly losing battle against a slick BNP candidate and his army of football thugs, as the local Muslim community builds a large mosque and people worry about the precedent set by the revelation that three local lads are in Guantanamo Bay (the very real "Tipton Taliban"). In the front of everyone's minds, however, is football – with England battling their way through the 2002 World Cup (to no avail), while the country's press are fixated on a local league game which is pitting a local Muslim side against a non-Muslim side.

Written in a way that seamlessly blends dialogue and prose, with a fine ear for the local brogue, the book does get a little confusing in parts. There are no chapters (it is divided into four sections: first half; half-time; second-half; and final score), and it can be hard to know exactly what is being said sometimes. But it really feels like it captures the underlying tensions that lie at the heart of the BNP's rise. There is less exploration of the motivations that might persuade young men from these areas to throw their lot in with the Taliban, but we get a sense of what it might be like for the locals with the references to a ghostlike "Adnan the mujahedeen" peppered throughout the book. Overall, well worth the read if you have a moment.

This also gives me an opportunity to highlight the case of the Tipton Taliban – who after being freed worked with Michael Winterbottom to produce the impressively one-sided The Road to Guantanamo (which can actually be found on YouTube in its entirety), which while rightly highlighting the excesses of Guantanamo, probably should have done a little more background research before charging ahead. I say this, as on largely un-watched and un-reported Channel 4 show called "Lie Lab," one of the chaps admitted that he had in fact been to a training camp and fired weapons while in Afghanistan (another refused to take the polygraph-type device that was at the heart of the show). Not quite the babes in the wood that they are portrayed as in the film.

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At the beginning of November I posted a story here at FREErad!cals about the curious legal limbo of remand prisoner XC.  Having not been prosecuted for terrorism offences for which he was previously suspected and arrested during Operation Pathway, XC remained in custody whilst the Home Office continued deportation proceedings against him.  The case against him had hinged on the interpretation of emails which his defence lawyers claimed were innocuous but which the security services suggested were evidence of conspiracy to commit terrorism.  Although the Crown Prosecution Service refused to bring a case on this basis, the Home Office pursued it, citing national security concerns.

In my piece I queried this process, wondering how evidence the CPS had rejected as unsound could subsequently be the basis for deportation.  I was taken to task by an anonymous commenter¬ – come on people, please have the balls to show yourselves – for being 'naive', and for not understanding the difference between intelligence and evidence, duh.  Well, neither then must the High Court judges who today ruled in favour of XC and a co-defendant, who had been denied bail pending resolution of the deportation hearings:

Two men suspected of terrorism-related activities won a landmark high court battle today when judges ruled a person could not be denied bail solely on the basis of secret evidence.
Lord Justice Laws, sitting with Mr Justice Owen, said bail applications should be treated the same as control order cases, where terror suspects must be given sufficient material to enable them to answer effectively the case made against them.

The ruling, which could have wider implications for the use of secret evidence, was described as a 'historic victory by the human rights lawyer Gareth Peirce. The home secretary, Alan Johnson, said he was ‘surprised and disappointed’.

The two judges said it was ‘impossible' to conclude ‘that in bail cases a less stringent procedural standard is required [than in control order cases]'.

This does not mean that XC will not eventually be deported but it does mean that the 'secret evidence' on which the case hinges is insufficient grounds for holding someone without legal hearing, even if national security reasons are cited for doing so.  The judges refused permission to appeal in the High Court, but the Court of Appeal may yet end up ruling on this issue.

In the meantime, I agree with Shami Chakrabarti, the director of Liberty, who said that it had taken a senior judge 'to point out what most people already know – if the government is going to lock you up, it needs to tell you why' – as it is required to do with other types of case.  'Terrorism' is a crime, not an excuse to suspend legal process.  It was this failure of process to which I initially objected, and which assertion now seems to have been validated.  It’s nice to be right sometimes.


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ICSR hosted Maajid Nawaz of the Quilliam Foundation for a talk today on their new report, Unlocking Al-Qaeda: Islamist Extremism in British Prisons (pdf).

Nawaz said that the UK's National Offender Management Service (NOMS) faces a huge challenge now that more and more people who have been convicted of terrorist offences are populating the prison system.

In his view, the authorities have vastly underestimated the potential role of prisons in the process of radicalisation. Prisons have been the incubators of terrorism, yet – in many countries – they have also served as the principal engines of de-radicalisation.  

Which one it will be in the UK's case remains to be seen.

Right now,  he says, there are few signs that the challenge is being taken seriously. Extremist literature is widely available in prisons, and – on a number of occasions – imprisoned extremists have been allowed to become the representatives of prison wings.

The audience was particularly interested by Nawaz' explanation of the latent, untapped power of a corpus of literature renouncing violence that was produced by al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya, the Egyptian Islamist group responsible for waves of terrorist violence in Egypt during the 1990s.

Those of us studying terrorism have been aware of these books for a long time and, like Nawaz, we have wondered why they have not been translated into English.

His analysis is connected, of course, to his incredibly powerful personal story. As many readers of this blog are likely to know, Nawaz – a former member of Hizb-ut Tahrir – was imprisoned in Egypt shortly after the 9/11 attacks in the United States. There, he became acquainted with the imprisoned luminaries of the Egyptian Islamist movement, including some of those behind the assassination of Anwar Sadat.  

While in prison, Nawaz came to question his (then) radical beliefs, especially under the influence of al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya's new literature and after he was adopted by Amnesty International – an organisation he had previously vilified – as a prisoner of conscience.

Maajid Nawaz' talk was recorded and can be listened to here. 

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Much of the media attention into the publication of Lord Carlile's review of the dramatic arrests back on April 8th of this year in Liverpool and Manchester has focused on the criticisms he levelled at the police, security services and government in their conduct of the case, known as Operation Pathway. However, there has not been much analysis of the details of the alleged terrorist plot that the report uncovered, something that has been made even more interesting by the later revelations that the thread for the unravelling of the alleged plot around Najibullah Zazi came from a British source, "after an email address that was being monitored as part of the abortive Operation Pathway was suddenly reactivated." Zazi, you may recall, was the young Afghan arrested in the U.S. in September of this year who admitted to having trained at an Al Qaeda camp and who was building some sort of hydrogen peroxide device.

The report by Lord Carlile highlights MI5's belief that the central figure in the Pathway plot was one Abid Naseer – a Pakistani national registered as being a student at John Moores University in Liverpool where he was doing a BSc in Computer Sciences. It is unclear where Naseer is now, but a report from earlier this month in the Pakistani press seems to suggest he is still in British custody. Aside from assertions that he was connected to Al Qaeda overseas, the report indicates that Naseer was the author of a suspicious email which was at the centre of police concerns about how advanced the plot was (the email was found in his possession on a USB drive). The email, which can be found in full in the report with under the nickname "the 'hi buddy' email", seems to indicate that Naseer has chosen a wife, has met the family, and has now chosen a date for their "Nikkah" (wedding). This final element was what pushed security services into action, as it seemed to indicate that an attempted attack was imminent.

Under interrogation (over 7 days, using 33 tapes), Naseer provided no explanation or comment on any of this. No-one else appears able to corroborate his story that he may have been about to marry a girl called Nadia, and there was little evidence he was preparing to get married. It is likely that the same could be said for the many other women referenced during the earlier email intercepts that were partially leaked in the Telegraph. The report highlights, "throughout the period of police etc interest in the group, no women had been seen, and there had been absolutely no signs of wedding preparations."

In addition, it has now been revealed that a second man who was lived in the same house as Naseer in Cheetham Hill Manchester, a UK national named Hamza Khan Shenwari, was apparently working at a hair products company and had registered a hair care company at Companies House. Presumably the suspicion is that they intended to use this as a way of obtaining hydrogen peroxide – a common base for explosives. Under interview (over 6 days, on 21 tapes), he apparently also stayed mute, answering only one question "about the contents of a bag." Possibly of greater significance, "he became very agitated when shown the 'hi buddy' email."

None of this is of course conclusive in any way, but it, and the intelligence information he has seen, does appear to provide Lord Carlile with enough to assert "if the above [intelligence community information] was correct, the potential threat posed to national security was grave." He certainly seems to agree that some of the men may have been up to something, but the links to some of the others appear tenuous.

Further speculation in the press has hinted that this plot may have been linked to the broader network around the ever elusive (and possibly dead) Rashid Rauf, but as with most things connected to the man, it appears hard to pin anything down. The initial information into the group is believed to have possibly come from interrogations of a young American Bryant Neal Vinas, who is currently facing charges of plotting to attack the Long Island Rail Road after having trained at an Al Qaeda camp. What remains clear is that the Security Services are convinced something nefarious was afoot (according to Greater Manchester Police, the case remains "live"), but it will likely be a while before anything definitive comes out.

Finally, somewhat off this central point of this post, I note in paragraph 114 of the report that Lord Carlile highlights that "it would be useful too if a government Minister were to have added to his/her responsibilities the coordination of the community consequences of any major counter-terrorism operation." I am surprised that this does not already take place, as I would have assumed it might be a DCLG responsibility – can anyone out there cast a light on this?

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As I mentioned in an earlier post, the other major theme that appears to be on everyone's minds in Britain's Muslim communities is focused around the belief that the UK's "Prevent" counter-terrorism strategy is in fact a vehicle for spying on Britain's Muslim communities. This is not an entirely new concern – one can see earlier expressions of it amongst the almost complete lack of trust in the British government that can be found, in particular when considering the counter-terrorism strategy, amongst communities in the UK.

The recent spate of worries have been set off by a report released by the Institute for Race Relations (IRR), which looked in detail at the Prevent program (Prevent being the forward looking aspect of the 4 P's of Britain's counter-terrorism strategy which seeks to prevent people from choosing a path to terrorism). In particular, press attention was grabbed by the salacious details of how the government was using programs funded under Prevent to gather intelligence on communities. The scandal around this was spurred on when Ed Husain made some comments that proved a gift for the Guardian's Vikram Dodd, giving him the eye-catching headline: "Spying morally right, says thinktank."

Reports have long been bouncing about of the intelligence community pushing community workers in a variety of ways (one report from the Independent showed how Somali youth workers were being harassed into helping the Security Service), and I have heard first hand reports of tales of community workers being asked for intelligence information. Similarly, an official report by the Audit Commission & Her Majesty's Inspectorate of the Constabulary (HMIC), entitled Preventing Violent Extremism: Learning and Development Exercise, done for the Home Office and Department for Communities and Local Government in October 2008, highlighted that "partnerships need to collect and process information from staff so that vulnerable individuals and communities can be identified."

And more generally, have we all forgotten about the infamous "Operation Rich Picture" by which the security services sought to map out Britain's Muslim communities and thereby understand them better? The point here is that I am surprised by how much of a splash this has made, though admittedly some of the more egregious cases should be highlighted and frowned upon. None of this is of course to excuse it, but I think the furor is masking a bigger picture issue.

As Prevent has expanded out to becoming Preventing Violent Extremism and from being one of four strands to being the central focus of counter-terrorism, it has started to grow beyond what one might usefully describe as its practical parameters. One of the deleterious side-effects of this is that it has slowly turned everyone into counter-terrorists, as it evolved from being program to counter terrorism to being something which was seeking to remodel a substantial portion of our society. Not only does this mean that a wide community of individuals beyond traditional security services need get involved, but also that an ever expanding pool of money was guided towards a specific community in an ever-broader fashion (a recent Newsnight report put it at £140 million).

On the one hand, a case can be made that years of underinvestment needed to be redressed, but at the same time, this focus appears to have also had the impact of exacerbating the community cohesion problems that the money was in part meant to fix. But within this also lies at the core of the problem: work which should be defined as social work is being re-defined as counter-terrorism.

The problem with Prevent is that it would appear as though we have long lost our way in understanding exactly what Preventing terrorism is about any more. In the quest to understand and fix this, the solution has been to push the program out to an ever expanding circle of individuals as we move further and further back up the radicalization chain (though I hate linear descriptions of radicalization). This has had the added problem of confusing what everyone’s roles within this are.

Police need community intelligence to be able to do their jobs; but this should be obtained through confidence building, rather than bluntly milked from community workers. It is unlikely to be helpful to the cause of countering terrorism, or policing more generally if the current trend continues. Programs seeking to redirect youngsters from a radical path should stay firmly within a local community and civilian remit – putting them in a police direction has implications which will naturally make community workers less comfortable with using them.

More generally, however, Prevent needs to be re-focused. A tighter remit needs to be drawn up which separates out the social work being done under a Prevent banner – to work that should once again be done under its proper heading. Instead, Prevent work should remain firmly focused on countering-terrorism, as in de-radicalizing prisoners, stopping young men making contact with extremists, and lessening the appeal of jihad. Making people more integrated into British society, helping them get jobs or training, giving them a more positive outlook, and making sure they are accepting of other religions are all important things, but not things that should be tagged as counter-terrorism work.
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"My son is 20 years old and I am his mother aged 43", wrote Mrs Lauderdalle from Yorkshire to Prime Minister Clement Attlee in February 1948. She went on to say: "I appeal to you to let my boy come home from Palestine".

Another mother sent a letter to the Prime Minister saying, "I am writing to you to demand my son to leave Palestine before he is slaughtered by the Arabs or Jews. I am enclosing this picture published in the Daily Mail today. Thank God! It is not my boy. As I saw the face, I thought for a moment it was him, and I was absolutely devastated. But they are some other mother's boy. Why should our boys die for the sake of lousy Jews and Arabs? It is not our war".

These are two out of hundreds of letters sent to Prime Minister Attlee urging him to withdraw from Palestine. And now we’ve got to do the same: to send hundreds and thousands of letters and emails to Prime Minister Gordon Brown to pile pressure on him to get British troops out of Afghanistan.

We must not, however, delude ourselves: our messages will not change the situation overnight, and it is likely that British troops will continue to patrol Afghanistan for many years to come. You see, it is relatively easy to invade a country, but it is always much more complicated to disengage. As a young captain in the Israeli army I was one of those who invaded Lebanon in an operation which was supposed to last between 48 and 72 hours; troops then stayed in Lebanon for 18 years. What eventually brings about disengagements (the US disengagement from Vietnam, the Israeli retreat from Lebanon, and so on) is a combination of blood and public pressure. And this is how we are going to get out of Afghanistan:

Although they do not know it yet, many British troops will be killed in Afghanistan and return to Britain in coffins. With the growing number of casualties, public pressure on the government to get out of Afghanistan will also increase, but ministers will repeat, like parrots, the mantra that Britain is a "safer place", as long as British troops operate in Afghanistan, and that eventually “we will defeat the Taliban”.

Some ministers will utter this nonsense because they are expected to do so, others because they are ignorant – they either do not know history, or have learned nothing from history. And then more casualties ("Breaking News: 74 British troops were killed when a helicopter ferrying them was shot down in Afghanistan") leading to even more public pressure on the government.

And then a new Prime Minister will be elected (well, as I write, the poor guy is probably still at school) and he will ask: "What's the purpose? Why are we still there? We've already lost 2,744 young men …" He will then set up a committee which will report back that the entire Afghan affair is pointless, because you can not defeat the elusive Taliban and chasing them in the Afghan mountains would not turn Britain into a safer place. The committee will then recommend to get out of this hell-of-a place within 5, 7 or 10 years.

And yes - this is how it will all end. Then, we will all just forget about it, with the only ones to continue and live with this sorry episode being the mothers who, as I write, do not yet know that their world is about to be turned up-side-down.

 

Photo courtesy of Getty Images

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I have been traveling around the UK the last few weeks. Two things appear to be atop everyone's concerns, the "rise of the right" and the fact that the British government may be using the "Prevent" counter-radicalization and counter-terrorism program to spy on Muslim communities. I plan on dealing with each in separate posts, but first on the "rise of the right".

For those who have missed it, the United Kingdom is finding it has an increasingly belligerent and noisy right-wing which is not only managing to make unpleasant speeches and protests, but are also able to win votes in elections. The far right British National Party has won a growing number of seats in first local elections, and most stunningly in the 2009 European Parliament elections it was able to secure two seats and a total of just under 1 million votes nationally.

This seeming acceptance of an openly xenophobic party into the mainstream of British politics received its crowning moment recently when BNP leader (and holocaust denier) Nick Griffin made an appearance on the BBC's flagship politics program Question Time.

In parallel to this seeming legitimization of racists by the ballot box, the UK has also recently seen the emergence of the English Defence League (EDL), a group claiming to be "demonstrating against the spread of radical Islam" for whom the infamous Luton protests against returning British soldiers in March of this year were the "final straw".

Their response was to stage a series parades up and down England in which overwhelmingly caucasian crowds of well-lubricated shaven-headed chaps protest against extreme Islamists (a full list of their demos shows a fixation with the latest incarnation of Omar Bakri Mohammed’s extremist group Al Muhajiroun). At core a blend of skin-heads and football hooligans (something most clearly borne out during the violence in Birmingham), the group is nevertheless able to rally a few hundred protesters at a go under the banner of "taking back England" from "jihadists".

Disturbingly, there has also been an increase in armed far-right terrorists, including one group who apparently had some 300 weapons, 80 bombs and links around the world, the two right-wing extremists who were convicted for "inciting racial hatred", and separate "lone wolves" Martyn Gilleard and Neil Lewington (who was picked up with incendiary devices in his bag after he got pissed on a train and took a leak in public while on his way to a date. Lucky girl).

Responding to this growing threat, one police commander said, "I fear that they will have a spectacular", suggesting that extremists might attempt some major action in order to stir up inter-ethnic hatred.

This last group can be addressed as a clear counter-terrorism issue, but what of the others and their impact which might be said to provide the ideological backdrop for the violent extremists?

The BNP may have managed to secure the veneer of respectability, but they have not found many friends in the European Parliament (something no doubt helped by Mr. Griffin’s charming comments about sinking boat-loads of migrants) – this is significant as it dilutes their power.

Furthermore, while they may have mustered just under a million votes, this should be seen against a backdrop of falling support nationally for the main parties, who cannot shake pay scandals and a bad economy. The BNP specialize in going into economically depressed parts of the country, where they capitalize on local grievances and a sense of abandonment from Westminster with a localized narrative which dresses up anger in anti-immigrant and "national identity" language.

This is enough to rally a core group of voters who actually show up on Election Day and give the BNP its success (it is worth highlighting that it was with a less-than-impressive 9.8% and 8% of the vote that they won in each EP seat).

Similarly, while the EDL appear able to get crowds after football matches, they are almost always matched by a larger counter-protest uniting a wide array of factions. BBC's Newsnight (part 1, part 2) called them a "drinking club with a website," estimating their numbers at some 300-500 members nationally.

One concern they have voiced, about the focus of current counter-extremism funding towards Muslim communities appears to also have some parallels amongst other communities, but they do not seem to have much of a plan of action beyond running around the streets and ejecting people like Anjem Choudhary from the country. This may win them some more drinking buddies, but is hardly the basis of an election manifesto.

For Muslims in the UK, it is the terrorist group that is most bothersome – if there is this growing menace of potential right-wing terrorism, then why isn’t there the same fixation on them that one sees with terrorists who instead choose an Islamist garb?

The answer is relatively simple (the right-wingers tend to be local nutters bereft of serious external connections, and their inability to carry out effective attacks reduces their news value) – but the bigger problem does exist of how these far-right groups (violent and non-) might be impacting cohesion between communities in the UK.

More radicalization amongst Britain’s right means more protests on the streets, and likely more violence. Maybe even to the level of the famous 2001 Northern City riots, in which localized social problems provided kindling which was set alight by a growing far-right presence. None of this is to exaggerate the threat (the numbers are still quite small in contrast to continental Europe which appears to have institutionalized racist parties long ago), but it would be dangerous to simply ignore the groups all together.

What does seem clear, however, is that there is a growing well-spring of disaffection amongst Britain's communities which is finding solace in extreme rhetoric – what is positive is that we are seeing a substantial grass-roots reaction against it, and the main political parties appear willing to stand up against it.

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In a recent post, I suggested that terrorist internet activity is not always as anonymous as its perpetrators assume.  This week, a leading security expert proposed that the only way to reduce cybercrime―which might also include terrorist use of the internet―is to force all internet users to be registered, such that anonymity no longer exists.

Eugene Kaspersky, co-founder and CEO of Kaspersky Lab, a leading player in the global computer security market, had this to say in an interview with ZDNet Asia:

Q: What's wrong with the design of the Internet?
A: There's anonymity.  Everyone should and must have an identification, or Internet passport.  The Internet was designed not for public use, but for American scientists and the U.S. military.  That was just a limited group of people―hundreds, or maybe thousands.  Then it was introduced to the public and it was wrong…to introduce it in the same way.  I'd like to change the design of the Internet by introducing regulation―Internet passports, Internet police and international agreement―about following Internet standards.  And if some countries don't agree with or don't pay attention to the agreement, just cut them off.

At present, it is often difficult to ascribe individuals to IP addresses―the codes that identify individual machines on the network, and which are often the first major leads in investigations of online activity.   To avoid the use of fake registrations of domain names, broadband contracts, etc, Kaspersky would like to introduce … more layers of registration and identification.  It's not clear how this would work but we can probably assume that Kaspersky and his company might just be able to produce some prototype technology to demonstrate this concept.  Technology, of course, that will itself be amenable to hacking.

It’s a terrible idea.  Governments are having enough problems regulating online activity, catching the bad guys, and introducing physical identification methods as it is.  Whilst Kaspersky's idea might be music to the ears of many governments (authoritarian or otherwise), what value is there in creating a whole new layer of intrusive technology that will only fuel further accusations of ‘Big Brother'-ness?  We have in the last few days read about the problems of putting whole communities under suspicion on the basis of counterterrorism and national security.  Importantly, if you treat your citizens as potential criminals, will they push back against the very policies ostensibly meant to protect them?  I have yet to find a strong case for internet regulation of this type, nor for ID cards, let alone a technology that is itself secure enough to deliver their promised benefits.

It's too early to tell if Kaspersky's ideas will have any traction beyond a single interview.  Kaspersky has upwards of 90% of the Russian internet security market, and the Russian government has not been backward in restricting freedom of expression where it can, so his comments may have been aimed at domestic ears.  I doubt that, as Kaspersky is very much a global company, and Kaspersky notes the transnational nature of the internet in the interview.  Regardless of Kaspersky's motivations, the 'internet passport' is a non-starter in my opinion, and will do almost nothing to solve the problems it purports to address.  Instead, it may give rise to a whole host of civil liberties issues―just the sort of thing that any wise government would wish to avoid.

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Dalia Mogahed, President Obama's advisor on Muslim affairs, recently appeared on a London TV discussion show hosted by Ibtihal Bsis – an official from Hizb ut Tahrir. Hizb ut Tahrir is a global Islamist movement that calls for the overthrow of un-Islamic governments worldwide and revival of the Caliphate.

The Telegraph reports:

During the 45-minute discussion, on the Islam Channel programme Muslimah Dilemma earlier this week, the two members of the group made repeated attacks on secular "man-made law" and the West's "lethal cocktail of liberty and capitalism".

They called for Sharia Law to be "the source of legislation" and said that women should not be "permitted to hold a position of leadership in government".

Miss Mogahed made no challenge to these demands and said that "promiscuity" and the "breakdown of traditional values" were what Muslims admired least about the West.

She said: "I think the reason so many women support Sharia is because they have a very different understanding of sharia than the common perception in Western media.

"The majority of women around the world associate gender justice, or justice for women, with sharia compliance.

"The portrayal of Sharia has been oversimplified in many cases."

This story about the interview also graces Hizb ut Tahrir's website.  Dr. Mogahed, a member of the President’s Advisory Council on Faith-Based and Neighborhood Partnerships, is also the executive director of the Gallup Center for Muslim Studies and wrote a book with John Esposito, a well known scholar and apologist for Islamism.

The White House needs to send an unambiguous message that it is not acceptable for its advisors to appear on television with enemies of the United States and empower their message.

Dr. Mogahed missed a great opportunity to challenge Hizb ut Tahrir and engage in an informed debate with them about Islam, values, and the place of the United States in the world. Clearly she did not feel inclined to do so. This is a simple issue – hopefully one that will be resolved soon.

 I am not surprised to see Dr. Mogahed promoting Sharia. I believe in freedom of speech and she should be able to say whatever she wants (no matter how distasteful and dishonest), but not as a representative of the President of the United States.

Fire Dalia Mogahed.

 

UPDATE: The television segment can be viewed here

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Back in June 2009, the UK launched its Cyber Security Strategy, which covered a wide range of topics but was in part intended to counter terrorist use of cyberspace, including radicalisation.  The reform it offered included the creation of two new bodies charged with responsibility in this field. 

The first, an Office of Cyber Security (OCS), would oversee the whole of the Government's cyber security strategy and foreign co-operation, working from within the Cabinet Office.  The second, a Cyber Security Operations Centre (CSOC), would be based at GCHQ in Cheltenham, hub of the UK's SIGINT capability.  This would monitor internet 'health', conduct attack analysis, and develop appropriate responses, as well as inform the public and industry about online security risks.  

Both were supposed to be established this month, in order to be operational by March 2010.  So, what's happened so far?  How are these two prongs of the UK's strengthened cyber policy coming along?

Anything from the Cabinet Office on its progress with the OCS?  Nope, not a word.  Not even a place-holding webpage.  Perhaps we shouldn't expect too much from GCHQ, but how are CSOC preparations coming along?  They're not saying.

In fact, try as I might, I can find no reliable information about either unit published after June 2009.  We've heard a little about MI5 hiring 'Asian teen hackers' to 'battle cyber terrorism' and why that approach is flawed. 

Yesterday, the Centre for Secure Information Studies (CSIT) was opened at Queen's University Belfast to lead the way in the UK's fight against cyber crime, but this initiative is separate from the Cyber Security Strategy.  Unless CSOC and OCS have changed their names, or have been buried for some reason, it seems as if the UK government just isn't interested in keeping us informed about them.

If the Cyber Security Strategy is partly intended as a form of public reassurance, which we should assume it is, surely government should be better communicating its progress in this area?  OK, so it's only been three months, but compare the British approach to that of the US, which has been very open about its operations in this field, even if you disagree with them. 

We presumably will hear about these units in time, but if government actually wants to be seen to be 'doing something', it should communicate its actions better to the public.

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Does anyone know what the following equation represents?:

                                                WP + SIOE = 573,710

Well, that's the traffic volume you get when you combine the free Wordpress blogging platform with the charming Stop the Islamisation of Europe group – it translates into 573k+ hits in the space of a couple of weeks.

The SIOE have leapt to relative fame as the new 'blackshirts', as the press reported the recent comments of Communities and Local Government John Denham.  The SIOE, of course, are completely guiltless of provoking violence at recent 'anti-Islamisation' demonstrations, and reject 'Dhimmi' Denham's criticisms of the SIOE and their ilk.  (For the record, Denham did not give the SIOE the credit of being even remotely as savvy or dangerous as Mosley's 1930s bootboys.)  The SIOE are also totally politically confused, and will undoubtedly disappear up their own behinds before too long, as most right-wing anti-everything groups tend to do.  

In the meantime, though, they are milking the opportunity afforded them by the combination of a free blogging platform, the 'oxygen of publicity', and the accessibility provided by Google.  Half-a-million hits is fair going for any bunch of part-time loonies, and the SIOE must be lapping up the attention.  I'm not going to link to anything in this post – far be it from me to give the SIOE any more hits; you can Google them if you like.

And since the SIOE are probably chronic self-Googlers, if they happen to end up on this site, I'd just like to say, "no, I don't think for a second that your blog should be banned." In fact, I think it's great that we can all read your public discussions about the crimes of selling 'ethnic clothes' in supermarkets (I kid ye not), how left-wing the British National Party are, and how Benjamin Zephaniah supports "Nazislamists who want to install sharia law with it hanging of homosexuals,  stoning of women and paedophilia." [sic]  The mind boggles.

All good stuff, I'm sure you'll agree.  With the likes of 'F*** Mohammad' and 'Anglo Saxon' beefing up the supporting cast of commenting bigots, the SIOE site is a real joy to surf.  I appreciate that this is far from an academic analysis of the impact and influence of a group like SIOE, but really – how can anyone take them in earnest?  As Oscar Wilde is alleged to have said, "It is a curious fact that people are never so trivial as when they take themselves seriously."

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The story came out a couple of weeks ago of a man known only as XC, detained early this year as part of the Operation Pathway counter-terrorism raids in Manchester.  The Crown Prosecution Service failed to bring charges against him due to a lack of evidence, but the Home Office is now seeking to deport him on the basis that he is a threat to national security.  At a bail hearing before the Special Immigration Appeals Commission, the following emerged:

Richard Hermer QC, for XC, criticised the case against his client and said it contained "not one jot of evidence" linking him to bomb-making. The Government's evidence file was made up of eight emails sent or received between December last year and April, markings on an A-Z, and observations of XC meeting with friends, he said.

Analysis by the Security Service (MI5) of the emails suggested the words "weak and difficult to convince" referred to a low-concentration explosive liquid, and "crystal clear" to other chemicals – despite being used in the context of a normal conversation about women, Mr Hermer said.

 

In putting such an interpretation on "entirely innocuous" emails, the Government was guilty of imposing a hidden meaning where there was none, Mr Hermer said.

 

"If you look for meaning and that's the purpose for which you do it, that's bias. What's missing is any consideration of the evidence as to whether there is a totally benign explanation for the messages."

Well, quite.  We have little way of knowing at this remove what else might have been informing the police and MI5’s interpretation of these emails.  Clearly, the press reports would seem to indicate that anything else ‘known’ was inadmissible to the court.  Conspiracy aside, if there’s no case against him, why on earth is facing deportation?

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I was sitting in a Home Office seminar yesterday when someone mentioned in offhand fashion that the UK's terrorism threat level had changed.  MI5 and the cross-agency Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) have reduced the threat level from 'severe' – where an attack is deemed highly likely – to 'substantial', where an attack is considered a strong possibility. 

This might seem like linguistic tweaking but has evidently been the result of a significant intelligence assessment.  The 'severe' assessment is the lowest the national security footing has been at since 9/11 – the threat level has oscillated between severe and critical since August 2006, when it was first made public.

Alan Johnson, current Home Secretary, had this to say: 'The change in the threat level to substantial does not mean the overall threat has gone away – there remains a real and serious threat against the United Kingdom and I would ask that the public remain vigilant.' 

Some have suggested that the downgrade is a political ploy to convince an increasingly sceptical public that the war in Afghanistan is succeeding in reducing the domestic terrorism threat – this week's stated strategy. 

Apart from the fact that JTAC works independently of Whitehall and Westminster, I doubt this slightly conspiratorial assertion, although the timing of the announcement might, of course, work in government's favour.

The reduction has been signposted for a while, with both ex-Home Sec Jacqui Smith and now CT police chief John Yates hinting in recent months it was imminent. 

I agree with Paul Wilkinson, widely quoted across the news and intahwebs, who says it is a 'very cautious, very tentative reduction'.  It does sit slightly at odds with MI5 boss Jonathan Evans' statement in January that two thousand terrorism suspects were under constant surveillance.  Can we assume that the situation is now firmly in hand?

The question is a straw man.  The downgrading is not a cause for a general relaxation of vigilance, as Alan Johnson says.  It merely means that the likelihood of a terrorist attack tomorrow is marginally less than it was yesterday; it is no longer probable but possible. 

The whys and wherefores of this assessment are unknown, and neither MI5 nor JTAC can be expected to tell us.  Nevertheless, an interesting development. 

One can only hope that nothing serious does happen; it would be unfair to the intel services to cop more flak for another status downgrade ahead of an attack, as happened prior to 7/7.

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The other night, the BBC aired yet another excellent instalment of its documentary series Conspiracy Files. This latest episode looked at the theories surrounding the London bombings on 7 July 2005, which killed 56 people and injured nearly a thousand.

As with 9/11, conspiracy theorists were quick to point out inconsistencies in the official records, speculating that the bombings were an 'inside job', carried out by the government, its domestic intelligence service MI5 and all the other usual suspects (America, Israel, etc.) in order to gain support for the 'War on Terror'.

These theories had never gained much currency outside the Muslim community and the so-called 'Truth Movement'. Recently, however, a film titled '7/7 Ripple Effect' appeared on the internet, which seemed to make a compelling and comprehensive case for the conspirators.

The BBC’s Conspiracy Files is brilliant in exposing the flaws, contradictions and profanity of many of the conspiracy theories contained in the 'Ripple Effect'. Critically, it also sheds light on those who are peddling them.  

The author of '7/7 Ripple Effect', for example, hides behind the supposedly Arabic sounding name 'Muad'Dib'. He is later shown to be a bearded Yorkshireman called Anthony John Hill, who - far from being an Arab or a Muslim - thinks of himself as the reincarnation of Jesus Christ.

Another leading member of the 7/7 'Truth Movement' is Nick Kollerstrom, who – besides uncovering the truth behind the London bombings – specialises in crop circles and has written several articles about how the Nazis' death camps never really existed.

In the age of 'old' media, people like Kollerstrom and Hill would have been ignored by the mainstream media. In the age of 'new' media, the internet provides them with a global platform for their ideas – with no journalistic 'middlemen' or quality control to filter out what really belongs into the gutter.

None of this would matter, except that conspiracy theorists – however discredited – are sincerely believed by significant sections of the population. That's why, in late 2005, I was among the first to call for a public inquiry into the events of 7 July 2005. (Annoyingly, much of the article, which appeared in Prospect Magazine, is no longer available for free).

It's not so much about resolving every possible contradiction, but about being seen to be transparent and honest. Faced with an increasingly sceptical public who get their information about current events from the internet as much as the traditional media, governments must put all their cards on the table, and do so early.

Otherwise, it will be the nuts and cranks of this world who determine the 'truth' behind events like 7/7.

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