A couple of weeks have passed since 35-year old Libyan Mohamed Game attempted, in an alleged  revenge for Italian involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq, to carry out a suicide attack on the Santa Barbara army barracks in Milan, where forces going to Afghanistan are based.

Using a fertilizer-based explosive concealed in a tool box, Game detonated his bomb in the morning of October 12, apparently as a reference to 12 November 2003 when a suicide bomber blew up an Italian military police base in Iraq killing 19 Italians. The bomb failed to completely explode, mutilating Game (his hand was amputated, he was blinded by shrapnel and remains on life support), while only injuring one guard at the base.

The attack raised speculation about possible connections with other extremists in Italy. Game had apparently been a congregant at the infamous Viale Jenner Mosque in Milan and the barracks he targeted where on the list of possible targets of a cell arrested in Milan last December. However, the President of the Milan Islamic Institute in Viale Jenner, Abdel Hamid Shaari (also of Libyan extraction), said he had only seen Game a couple of times at the Mosque and police rapidly dismissed these connections saying Game had not been on their radar before.

The next day, however the police arrested two men in connection with the attack: 52 year-old Egyptian engineer Abdel Haziz Mahmoud Kol and 33-year old Libyan electrician, Mohammed Imbaeya Israfel. The day before his arrest Israfel had been interviewed about Game, and had said that Game had been "talking about jihad generally in the last month," that "it was likely suicide" was his intention, and "he probably wanted to end his life and go to paradise" (rough translation of mine).

None of the men had appeared in any serious way on police radars before ( even though Israfel's home had been searched in July) and Italian security services continue to call the group an independent cell with no connections to a wider terror network or to Italian radical milieu's.

And this is most alarming: all three men are apparently below any radar. All three had their papers in order, two were employed (Game had lost his business a couple of years ago), and Kol and Game were both married with children. According to the security services, the three men self-radicalized and formed a cell, they set up a bomb factory (in a flat rented by Kol, went to nearby Corvetta to buy 120kgs of fertilizer and other reagents then used a recipe taken off the internet to mix the explosive. Kol apparently drove Game to the scene of the attack.

It seems to me that other details should be investigated: in the flat, 40 more kilos of fertilizer were found; there was a fridge full of food which could indicate that more than just three men were present and a mysterious "list of important people's families" was found. It also seems unclear where their money came from given all three were living in rather tough circumstances (some reports suggest that Kol and Game were squatters). Game and his wife were even interviewed in August by a local news show to show the plight of poor families in Milan.

It is perfectly likely that this group will turn out to be a cell of lone wolves who, aggrieved at their downtrodden situation in Italy and stirred up by the nation's involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq, concluded that a path of violence was their only option left.

This is not the first time such incidents have occurred in Italy – on September 11th, 2003, Jordanian Mohammed Al Khatib tried to blow himself up outside a synagogue in Modena, while on March 29th, 2004, Moroccan Moustafà Chaouki attempted a similar action outside a McDonald's in Brescia. In both instances, the wannabe-suicide bombers and their cars were the only victims, though they both left letters behind explaining what they were doing, something Game has not done. The only hint of a rationale behind his action is the disputed allegation that he shouted something about Italian involvement in Afghanistan before blowing himself up.

All of which suggests that the combination of dissatisfaction and Al Qaeda's single narrative is one that appeals to a growing constituency in Italy. It is still too early to dismiss possible connections between the cell and others but the seeming surprise with which the police were caught and the relatively amateurish nature of the attempt all suggest that none may be uncovered.

Italian investigators should be alarmed as this could suggest that the problem of radicalization in Italy has moved beyond the traditional networks of North Africans providing support for fighters going to Afghanistan or Iraq (which in some cases stems from previous networks sending support to Bosnia), to a domestic problem which is refusing to go away and is a source of violent anger amongst the community of Muslims in Italy.

The call by Interior Minister (and Lega Nord member) Roberto Maroni who called for a profiling of Muslim communities based on the radicalization model of Game to identify possible threats in the future and the hawkish statements aimed at the Viale Jenner mosque by Defence Minister Ignazio la Russa suggest that the social aspect of the problem will most likely not be addressed.

What is worrying is how many more cells alike may be operating beneath the radar and how long it will be before one of them gets their explosive blend right.

UPDATE:

Since publishing this, a friend has pointed out to me that the Viale Jenner link may be stronger than Shaari indicated in his telling. Stories in the respected Corriere della Sera and more right-leaning Il Giornale, show photographic evidence that he was involved in a Ramadan event being held near (and organized by) the Mosque in September of this year. The Giornale report goes so far as to say he served as security at the event, suggesting a possible closer link.
 

Comments

Great piece Raff (and welcome!). You underline a crucial aspect of radicalisation which is the social issues of poverty and social rejection that these people might feel. Not that it is in any way an excuse to becoming a jihadist. I think the government should address theses issues first, rather than trying to implement 'authoritarian' laws which will only increase the Muslims' strong feelings against Western societies.

Judy - 29 Oct 2009 (13:25)

An excellent article despite its chilling undertones for other Western countries whose presence in Afghanistan may result/provoke similar contagion-style attacks. The difficulty in detecting and preventing such lone-wolf attacks undertaken by "intergrated" migrants in our societies will cause much head-scratching.

Oliver - 29 Oct 2009 (14:07)

Judy - I'm not sure "poverty" is the lesson you want to draw from this. Perceived social alienation may have been a contributory factor (along with many other factors), and as Raff hints at, it fits with AQ's narrative that views the West as a racist, anti-Muslim plague. But studies have consistently shown that poverty does not correlate with participation in terrorist activity. On the contrary, terrorists as a group tend to be better educated and better off than the average Joe. As Trotsksy said, along similar lines: "In reality the mere existence of privations is not enough to cause an insurrection, if it were the masses would be always in revolt." To view "social issues" as the cause of and solution to our radicalization problems is misguided. Some play an important role, to be sure, but it is only one part of the picture

Amm Sam - 30 Oct 2009 (12:27)

Raff your concluding sentence was: What is worrying is how many more cells alike may be operating beneath the radar and how long it will be before one of them gets their explosive blend right. I know very little about Italy, but know a bit more about other places. The 'radar' is not perfect and never will be. 'Lone wolves' rarely if ever appear on the 'radar', Micheal Stone in Northern Ireland was an unknown before his appearance at Milltown Cemetery and had been killing for years before. If Stone was off the 'radar' till Milltown that puts the often cited penetration of the Loyalist para-miltary scene in a different perspective, let alone other state methods of surveillance. Leaving the 'radar' of the state aside what can we do? Ensure the first responders know their trade; that law enforcement do not over-react; the media likewise do not vilify the community the 'lone wolf' came from (not always Muslim). Much is made in the rhetoric used in UK that 'Only communities defeat terrorism' and what is their role? It is glib to say create and maintain trust and confidence in law eneforcement. A lot more hard thought is needed to make that a reality. There are very few UK examples of individuals and institutions in the Muslim community providing help in identifying possible threats. What should the community look for, what are the danger signs? Some Muslims will argue many signs of outward radicalisation are in fact signs of becoming more devout. Who do they tell? The police, MI5 or Crimestoppers? It will be a brave public official who says publically "One day the bomber will get through".

davidbfpo - 30 Oct 2009 (21:13)

I would consider it way too early to state whether these guys are 'lonely wolves'. As mentionned in your update, these guys hovered around in the infamous Vialle Jenner (Islamic Institute of Milan) mosque. That mosque has a quite some history and once was a hub for all kind of terrorist activity. Even if quite a lot might have changed, some of these former days extremists are probably still around. I would consider it extremly unlikely the three of them got radicalized in some kind of a vacuum and were not connected to other likeminded individuals. Second, one of the three had already passed 'above' the rader, since DIGOS raided his house in june; That makes it likely there must have been some connection towards other known elements; Same goes for the 'bomb making recipe'. They might have taken it from the internet, sure, but what about the links they had online with other extremists ? There might not be any, but at this moment in time, it still probably is too early to exclude there weren't any.

Osint76 - 30 Oct 2009 (21:57)

I didn't previously recognise the date of the attack (October 12th). Rather than referring back to the suicide bombing of the Italian barracks at Nasiriyah I was struck by the fact that October 12th was the date of the Al-Qaeda suicide bombing of the USS Cole in 2000, and the Al-Qaeda inspired/affiliated suicide bombing in Bali in 2002. Something to think about.

Interesting - 31 Oct 2009 (1:18)

Thank you all for your comments and the warm welcome! First, Judy, I must say that I agree with Amm Sam's assessment - poverty or social deprivation can clearly be a factor (often more as a backdrop of perceived societal blockage) than necessarily being the sole motivator. My belief that it is all part of a jigsaw. This said, with the Italian case, the social deprivation angle is quite prominent and gets very little attention often. Dave, i concur, lone wolves by their very nature are hard to detect (though as osnit76 points out, it the verdict is not totally in on whether these chaps were total unknowns or not) - and noone can just throw their hands up and say thats it. What always strikes me about them though is the fact that they would appear to be proof to me that the single narrative espoused by radical groups is still a flame which draws all kinds of moths. This suggests we still need to dampen that appeal. What can policymakers do? Hard to know really, except to make sure people are aware of the possible threat I suppose. My own sense is that these chaps may have been below the radar as part of a bigger group of people who may have a number of what one might term possible radical precursors in Milan - but this is probably a very big group of whom the overwhelming majority are up to nothing (I conclude this from the Jenner connection, the fact they had appeared on the periphery of other investigations, the fact there was more than one of them, etc...). Hard maybe to identify them from the general pool though, which is what appears to have been the case. Those who watch the forums more closely may have seen a claim of responsibility, but I have not seen or heard anything yet, so not clear whether part of some big external network. "Interesting" - I am yet to be completely convinced about dates and their significance if I can be honest, though you do raise a couple of significant ones I suppose.

Raff - 31 Oct 2009 (11:37)

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