Preventing, er, Countering Violent Extremism comes to America: Part 5 -- The Basics of Prevent
I apologize for taking so long to continue this series (see parts one, two, three, and four). I have been travelling. Still am actually. I'd like to start in on Prevent in the UK. There are some significant misconceptions about Prevent in Washington (particularly about its implementation and the 'changes' in CONTEST II) that I worry may hinder informed policy analysis and formulation. In this post, I just explain the basics of Prevent and briefly mention some of its flaws. The sins of Prevent will be explained in more detail in following posts.
Prevent is one of the four 'P's' of CONTEST, the UK's counterterrorism strategy. It seeks 'to stop people from becoming terrorists or supporting violent extremism.' According to the revised CONTEST strategy released last year:
To reduce the risk from terrorism – our aim – we need not only to stop attacks but also to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting violent extremism. The Government introduced its revised Prevent strategy in October 2007. The strategy is based on a better understanding of the causes of radicalisation (the process by which people become terrorists or lend support to violent extremism), to each of which it aims to provide a coherent response.
Thus, Prevent seeks to challenge violent extremism ideology and support 'mainstream' voices, disrupt those who promote violent extremism, support vulnerable individuals, increase community resilience, and address grievances exploited by "ideologues." It does so by allocating funds to local authorities who in turn fund community initiatives that are meant to interface with Muslim, er, I'm sorry, 'vulnerable' youth and prevent them from becoming violent extremists. This is known as PVE, or preventing violent extremism and is the aspect of Prevent that Daniel Benjamin and other US government officials like Arif Alikhan, Assistant Secretary for Policy Development for the Department of Homeland Security (more on that later), seem to be taking a liking to
The police also receive Prevent funds. The Channel program, as part of Prevent, identifies those who are vulnerable to being recruited by those who seek to launch attacks in the UK and seeks to channel them in a different direction.
Now to some flaws (in this context, I recommend Lorenzo Vidino's Foreign Policy piece, 'Toward a Radical Solution'):
(1) Wrong partners: A significant number of the community groups being funded by local authorities and the Home Office happen to be Sawha-type Salafis (see page 53 of this book) or are oriented toward the Muslim Brotherhood. The reasoning behind this seems to be that these groups are the only ones with the Islamic credibility and 'street cred' to convince radicalizing/radicalized youth from becoming violent in the UK. Further, they seek to channel people into 'political activism' (usually Brotherhood-style) that serves as a sort of 'safety valve' for anger and disaffection.
This is problematic to say the least. If, as I have stated in earlier posts that grievance is far less important than grievance interpretation in driving people toward action, it is folly to fund groups who foster the same grievances and promote such similar narratives to that of al Qaeda. It is also misguided to finance those who are openly supportive of jihad against British and American personnel (not just military personnel) in Afghanistan and Iraq.
(2) PVE is not well-suited to the British Muslim population. The dominant religious interpretation and practice among those receiving Prevent funding are Brotherhood, Jama'at, and Salafi oriented. These are all hard-line interpretations of Islam, but the plurality of British Muslims come from a Sufi background. While these are all within the Sunni sect, Brotherhood/Jama'at/Salafi Islam are all in direct conflict with Sufism (despite the fact that Hasan Al Banna himself was a Sufi).
(3) There are no clear metrics for measuring success.
(4) PVE is a security program with a social orientation. It should be a social program with a security orientation.
(5) It is essentially a social re-engineering effort and there has been no serious discussion about whether social re-engineering is something the modern liberal state should be engaging in.
(6) The idea of local councils being empowered toward differential application of Prevent based on varying local environments is a good one, but a lack of oversight from the center has led to differential interpretations of what Prevent is trying to do.
(7) The idea of preventing extremists from becoming violent extremists (rather than trying to prevent them from becoming extremists in the first place) is cynical to say the least. The idea that the most effective way the British can prevent terrorism is to cede their Muslim youth to conditionally non-violent extremism (not entirely non-violent, as they support violence there rather than here) is intellectually bankrupt and reflects ignorance about the natures of (a) movement participation, (b) the Islamist movement, and (c) Islamist ideologies.
(8) Lastly, Prevent is in direct conflict with social cohesion. Empowering hard-line social actors within the Muslim community who do not support gender equality, homosexual rights, free speech, etc can only deepen divisions in society and create new ones. The societal consequences of this are already beginning to emerge and will only worsen over time.
More on all this in following posts.
Comments
| Thanks for your comment. I am glad someone who (at least seems to be) involved with PVE has chimed in.
Many of your objections seem to revolve around the fact that I identified problems with PVE that have been identified before. I don’t claim to be raising 8 new issues here. And we seem to be largely in agreement on at least half of them and are not too far apart on others. I will also point out that I do not make these observations this as someone who spends all or even most of his time ensconced in a DC office building, but as someone who spends a substantial amount of time in the UK looking at these issues and talking to people involved with the matter at hand. 1) One thing I wish I would have made clearer in my post - and something your comments reflect – is that PVE certainly does not exclusively fund Salafist/Islamist projects. There are a variety of non-Islamist/Salafi groups that are funded but to dismiss the number of projects run by Salafists/Brotherhood as ‘small’ does not reflect reality. The most prominent and well-funded PVE programs are Salafist or Islamist in orientation. Yes, most do not have the Brotherhood logo on their websites (those that have them) or in the shiny brochures they passed out at the Prevent conference in Birmingham two months ago, but when you speak with the activists running many of these programs (as I have) and look at what they say publicly and in print, an Islamist orientation becomes clear. Do me a favor and ask key activists receiving PVE funding if they believe there is a legal jihad underway against the American occupiers in Afghanistan. You will get a surprisingly honest answer. I stand by what I said about many of these PVE funded activists openly supporting armed jihad against UK and US personnel. I will expand on this in the next post. 2) They can disagree with my description, but what you stated in this point did not prove me wrong. I am aware of the problems of getting social actors in the Muslim community to buy into PVE, but this seems to be a different point (though related) point than the one I made. The reason that PVE disproportionately funds Islamists and Salafists is not because they can’t get anyone else to play along. 3) I am glad you agree with me on the metrics. I am not solving Prevent’s problems in this post, merely pointing them out to help people in the U.S. learn from the Prevent experience – something you call for in your comment. I do hope to offer some solutions on the metrics issue in a future post or at least discuss the ideas that are out there. 4) Glad you seem to agree with me here too. 5) Even though you start out your response to this point with the word ‘No,’ you then seem to go on to agree with me. While there is some overlap, I would make a distinction between a so-called ‘war of ideas’ and social re-engineering. Yes, PVE has been reluctant to admit it is an attempt at the former (albeit a counterproductive attempt that is funding the problematic ideology in question), but is engaging in the latter. I share your hopes for the DCLG report and have been following the testimony they have posted on the web (http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm/cmcomloc.htm, for the rest of you) 6) I have no objection to different methods being used in different localities. That is, in fact, necessary as I think you’ll agree. The problem is that different localities are working at cross-purposes due to an insufficient understanding of what needs to be done, almost non-existent training, and insufficient oversight from the center. And I’ll get to Denham in the next post. 7) To say as you do that the Salafist/MB options are small in impact is simply incorrect. More in following posts. 8) Glad you agree with me here as well. Again, thanks for chiming in and I hope you continue to do so. |
| Amm Sam - 06 Feb 2010 (17:21) |
| Amm Sam,
From contacts who have travelled around the UK far more than I in 2008-2009 found that: a) Only the Salafist / MB groups would agree to publicity (which has it's own problems) and non-Salafist groups could produce no evidence that they were actually doing any PVE - even if they were funded. b) Fewer and fewer in the Muslim communities were volunteering to "stand up & be counted" through involvement in any community-based PVE work, funded or not This may explain why the government has steadily shifted it's focus from working with and in the Muslim communities to work in public institutions, like prisons, schools etc where co-operation maybe easier. Co-operation that rarely moves beyond well funded conferences (like that in B'ham), statements from senior staff "We will work together", training courses and publicity material. There is still prevention to be done, the scale of the task is bafflingly unknown - unless OSCT has private research (polling, focus groups etc) and the joint agency analysis to date is unconvincing. |
| Visitor - 06 Feb 2010 (23:51) |
Add Comment
Introduction
FREErad!cals is the ICSR blog. It's a forum for debate and fresh ideas on radicalisation and political violence. It features some of the most innovative, young thinkers, discussing radicals and radicalisation. They are looking at how the challenge has been understood, and how it should be addressed.
Contributors
Guest Contributors
Recommended Reading
-
General
-
Blogs
-
Regional
-
Online Radicalisation
Not all PVE funds go to local authorities (LA) or community initiatives. I do not have the figures to hand, but a substantial amount remains with central government, overseen by OSCT and other public agencies e.g. prisons.
The Channel Project is a joint agency programme, in its early stages of being implemented across the UK under local government supervision and is similar to intervention schemes dealing with prolific offenders and violent offenders. Have a look at the Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA), which have a longer history.
Yes, MAPPA is for offenders and so Channel is different as the emphasis is totally before an offence is committed.
Few outside officialdom deny that PVE has faults and weaknesses. Even more so when Muslim communities make comments - reflected in the recent written submissions to the Select Committee on DCLG enquiry.
1) Yes a small number of projects run by Salafists / Muslim Brotherhood receive funding, if I recall correctly mainly from the OSCT direct and not local authorities. Many involved in PVE here will now who they are, as they are often publicised in the media as examples of what is going on. I am not aware that they channel anyone into political activisim, rather seek a better understanding of their version of Islam and the wider context of non-theological issues. Nor that they (OK not named by you and I) are 'openly supportive of jihad against UK & US personnel'.
2) 'PVE is not well suited to the UK Muslim population'. Many would disagree with your description. One of the known weaknesses of PVE is the failure to persuade more in the Muslim communities to seek funding. Yes, often those cited in the public domain e.g. TV documentaries, who do get funding are from a small part of the community. Some groups who have taken PVE funds have then returned the money; one I can readily recall was a well-known non-Salafist cleric and associated group in London. In fact I suspect that most of the funding whether from the OSCT and locally does not go to community groups. Critics of PVE call many of those who do get funds are 'extremism entrepreneurs' who have no real "roots" in the community.
3) 'There are no clear metrics for measuring success'. Yes true and many have thought about that for a long time. What do you offer?
4) 'PVE is a security program with a social orientation. It should be a social program with a security orientation'. Critics of PVE and some who have reviewed PVE schemes readily acknowledge this. It is a 'lesson learned' and one I expect if the UK started again would not be the repeated.
5) ' It is essentially a social re-engineering effort and there has been no serious discussion about whether social re-engineering is something the modern liberal state should be engaging in'. No, a central weakness of the PVE strategy is the reluctance to admit it is an ideological contest between the Jihadist (AQ) narrative and competitors. This may reflect that local authorities as one example have not been involved in such a contest before, including throughout the 'Cold War'. I fully agree with 'no serious discussion', although I prefer no parliamentary and democratic discussion. The strategy and principles of PVE have not once been subject of a parliamentary debate, nor I expect such a debate in local authorities - which weakens any democratic legitimacy. One hopes the Select Committee DCLG report will get a debate (I expect that after a General Election).
6) Partial quote 'differential interpretations of what Prevent is trying to do'. I am sceptical that the objectives are interpreted differently, the methods used are different and this has been acknowledged now and accepted by John Denham, DCLG's No.1 Minister, partly as some local authorities seek to avoid using the PVE label.
7) In part 'The idea that the most effective way the British can prevent terrorism is to cede their Muslim youth to conditionally non-violent extremism'. No. I cannot recall anyone - even critics - think this is 'the most effective way'. The Salafist / Muslim Brotherhood options are one method, for a particular section of disaffected youth in cities and remain small in impact.
8) In part 'Lastly, Prevent is in direct conflict with social cohesion'. PVE can conflict with social cohesion, a point many accept and know needs to paid attention to. This aspect is often argued openly, if I recall correctly by Ted Cantle in an academic setting. Many involved in PVE, whether "insiders", critics or in the community, acknowledge some of those involved and not just 'hard line social actors' have been divisive in their actions and words.
Here in the UK we hope that the USA will learn from our PVE experiences and listen to all those who have a viewpoint. Not just those "insiders", 'extremism entrepreneurs' and others who appear to be listened to in DC. Thankfully some in the USA do listen to alternative voices. Your problems are not the same in my opinion.