The recent killings of al-Qaida’s top commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan by US airstrikes raise the common question of how such developments are going to affect the organization. Whereas these events highlight another loss for al-Qaida, recent history has shown that the organization recovers quickly and, in some cases, capitalizes on the deaths of its commanders.

The first recent hit was in Iraq. Abu Umar al-Baghdadi (Hamid al-Zawi), the Emir of the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI), was killed on 18 April in al-Tharthar desert area, north of Baghdad. He was killed with Abu Ayyub al-Masri (Yusuf al-Dardiri, otherwise known as Abd al-Mun‘im al-Badawi), his Minister of War. An Egyptian, who was a former mid-rank in al-Jihad Organization of Egypt, al-Masri succeeded the deputy of Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi, in taking the command of al-Qaida on 15 June 2006. In October of that year, al-Baghdadi’s Shura Council of al-Mujahidin and al-Masri’s al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) merged together, along with more than ten other smaller organization and various factions to form the ISI.

However, the formation of the ISI was a beginning of a decline of al-Qaida’s influence. The indiscriminately violent behaviour of AQI and its successor, the ISI, along with the expansion of the lists of enemies and targets to include less cooperative Arab-Sunni tribesmen, in addition to the coalition forces, the Iraqi military and security bureaucracies, Iran, and virtually all non-Sunnis; led to the revolt of Arab-Sunni tribesmen in early 2007. Al-Anbar province started the sahwat (awakening) phenomenon that not only pointed the guns at the AQI instead of the coalition forces, but also disseminated anti-Iranian propaganda and ideological materials as opposed to anti-American. The lack of a charismatic leader after al-Zarqawi and the stricter security policies of Syria and Saudi Arabia to stop the flow of funds and volunteers also helped undermine the AQI. Since no insurgency can survive without popular support, especially when the geography is not insurgent-friendly and the ideology and its manifestations are far from attractive to the locals, there was a sharp decline in the operational capacity of AQI/ISI after 2007.

Despite that, the ISI was swift in replacing its top commanders. Its new communiqué declared that “two were gone and three came.” Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi al-Qurashi became the new emir, Abu Abdullah al-Qurashi became his deputy and first minster, and al-Nasr Lidin Allah Abu Sulayman became the Minister of War, replacing the late al-Masri. All of these aliases have historical and religious relevance. Quraysh is the tribe of Prophet Muhammad and linking the ISI new leaders directly to the Prophet makes them ashraf or ‘noblemen’ in the Islamic culture. Al-Nasr Li Din Allah (The Supporter of the Religion of God) was the title of Saladin, the famous Muslim commander who fought against the Crusaders in the Levant in the 12th century. AQI/ISI is using more symbolism to substitute for the lack of charismatic leadership.

As for the new commanders, there is little known about them. Abu Bakr was a commander of one of small organizations that merged under the ISI. His minister of war is a Moroccan with close contacts to al-Qaida Central, like his predecessor. In his very first statement, al-Nasr followed the rhetoric of al-Zarqawi calling for an escalation against Shiite targets and Iraqi military and security forces.

In Afghanistan, Sheikh Said (Mustafa Abu al-Yazid), another former mid-rank in al-Jihad Organization of Egypt who became a leading figure in al-Qaida and, in May 2007, its top commander in Afghanistan, was also killed in a drone strike in Pakistan on 21 May. But, as opposed to its sister in Iraq, al-Qaida in Afghanistan (AQA) did not lack the charismatic leadership or the symbolism. To avoid the mistakes of Iraq, Sheikh Said declared more than once that al-Qaida is fighting under the banner of the Islamic Emirate in Afghanistan (the Taliban). In his interview with al-Jazeera in June 2009, he urged all other armed groups, including the Islamic Party (partly led by Gulbddin Hekmatyar), to join the Taliban. In other words, Sheikh Said was ‘embedding’ al-Qaida in its local contexts to guarantee the lifeline of local insurgent support. This is not far from the pattern in Yemen, where al-Qaida in the Peninsula is trying to avoid the mistakes of Iraq and therefore attentive to the interests of influential tribal leaders as well as the Southern Movement.

The deaths of Sheikh Said, Abu Ayyub and Abu Umar are important development in the war against al-Qaida. But the key lifeline to al-Qaida in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Yemen is its tribal and organizational alliances. Those alliances were undermined quite significantly in the Iraqi case, with the awakening councils, the inhospitable Arab-Sunni tribal areas, and the clashes with other armed groups most notably the Islamic Army of Iraq and the 1920 Revolution Brigades. Such developments have no parallels yet in Afghanistan and Yemen.

Decapitating the organizational leaders of al-Qaida, despite its significance, is not enough to end the lifeline for the rest of its transnational bodies. The other effect is that it may enhance the “demand side” to support or join al-Qaida. In his memoirs, Sayyid Qutb mentions that out of the 98 Muslim Brothers member imprisoned with him, 35 strongly supported his newly developed radical ideology, 23 strongly opposed, and 50 were hesitant. After his execution, the number of supporters and sympathizers was not only in the hundreds of thousands, but the commitments and the manifestations, took another level.  

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“The enemy of yesterday is the friend of today...it was a real war, but those brothers are free men now.” By these words, presidential scion Saif al-Islam al-Qaddafi referred to the leadership of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) in a press conference on March 23, 2010 attended by Western ambassadors and guests. The public proceedings of this event started last March by an invitation to a group of Western scholars, including the author of this article, to mark the release of LIFG leaders and discuss the major transformation of Libya’s largest Jihadist movement.

Established in 1990, the LIFG was modelled along the lines of the Egyptian al-Jihad organization: secretive, elitist, exclusively paramilitary, and aiming for a decisive action to topple the regime. However, the movement was discovered by the Libyan authorities and therefore it had to declare its existence for the first time on 18 October 1995. A brutal crackdown followed and the LIFG led a three-year insurgency mainly based in eastern Libya, including three attempts to assassinate Colonel Muammar Qaddafi in 1995 and 1996.  The confrontations left 165 Libyan officials dead, including high-ranks in the security and intelligence apparatuses, and 159 injured. The LIFG lost 177 members, including its top military commander in Libya and four of its Consultative Council members in the country. By 1998, the Consultative Council of the LIFG decided to impose a three-year ceasefire in Libya that was to have been reviewed in 2001, but the September 11 terrorist attacks that year changed all calculations.

According to the LIFG leaders and members I interviewed in Tripoli, the dialogue with the Libyan regime started in 2005. In 2006, six members from the Consultative Council, including the Emir of the LIFG, were involved in such talks. The breakthrough occurred when Saif al-Islam, the main sponsor of the de-radicalization and reconciliation process, invited former senior LIFG commander Noman Benotman to visit Libya secretly in January 2007 and consult with the imprisoned leadership. “It was very risky but I really trusted Saif...still this process was by no means an easy one,” Benotman said. Tensions between LIFG members and wary Libyan officials were still evident during the meetings in Libya; the head of the Libyan Internal Security, for example, referred to the process as “repentance from heresy” as opposed to reconciliation.
As opposed to the Saudi approach of rehabilitating selected individuals mainly at the grassroots level, the Libyan authorities targeted for de-radicalization well-known figures in the jihadist world. The released commanders included LIFG Emir Abd al-Hakim Belhajj (Abu Abdullah al-Sadiq), principal ideologue Sami al-Sa‘idi (Abu al-Munzir), and commander of the military apparatus Khalid al-Sharif (Abu Hazim). When I asked Belhajj about the current status of the LIFG, he replied that it had been dismantled; followers will be released and reintegrated as individuals, not as members of an organization.

The Libyan de-radicalization process followed a pattern seen before in Egypt and Algeria. Officials employed state repression, winning over charismatic leaders, encouraging interactions with the non-jihadists, and selective inducements. To a large degree, the LIFG was undermined militarily by the end of the 1990s. The military losses and the interactions with non-jihadists forced the LIFG leadership to update its worldviews, rethink strategically, and ultimately abandon political violence. Moderate Islamist figures, notably Sheikh Ali al-Sallabi, apparently played a crucial role in interacting with jihadist leaders, to the extent that Saif al-Islam thanked him publically in the press conference. Ex-jihadist leaders then had to interact with followers to convince them that armed action was illegitimate, an extremely difficult process in every de-radicalization case I examined. Finally, the Libyan authorities bolstered the process by offering selective inducements, starting with the release from prisons and ending with reintegration into Libyan society.  

As for the future, Saif al-Islam called on all Libyan fighters in the mountains of Algeria and Afghanistan, the deserts of Mali and Niger, and the valleys of Iraq to return home. The reintegration policies directed at the LIFG and other released prisoners will be crucial in providing credibility and support for this call. The lack of reintegration programs for the returnees from Afghanistan in the 1980s and early 1990s was one of the causes for radicalizing and internationalizing their activities.

Among the more remarkable features of the March 23 press conference was Saif al-Islam’s brief reference to the June 1996 massacre at Abu Selim of hundreds of political prisoners, which is still a taboo in Libya. It was the Libyan equivalent of Syrian President Bashar al-Asad opening the file of the Hama massacre of 1982 or Jamal Mubarak of Egypt acknowledging mass torture leading to deaths at the al-Wadi al-Jadid or al-‘Aqrab prisons in the 1990s.

Many questions remain unanswered in the Libyan de-radicalization case, most importantly the future of this process and whether it will lead to any real political reform in Libya. On the last issue, there is no question that the March releases were a significant step, not only towards innovative security policies but also towards a more mature, conciliatory approach towards opposition. This is a rare approach in the Arab world, where the elite generally perceives political conflicts as zero-sum games and adopts a “kill or be killed” approach. But it is also entirely possible—as has been the case in Egypt, Algeria, and Saudi Arabia—for a government to take a conciliatory approach to jihadists in order to end the security threat they present while ignoring their reintegration and still maintaining repressive policies toward non-violent political opposition. These policies may make both jihadist de-radicalization and national reconciliation a short-lived phenomena.  

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"From Usama to Obama, if our letters could be sent to you by words, we would not have sent it by plans!" By those words Usama Bin Laden (UBL) started his short audio message to the American President. Despite the short length, the contents of the message were quite salient. This was one of the rare time that Bin Laden himself takes direct responsibly for an operation organised and executed by a branch of al-Qaida. By doing that, he wanted to say that after eight years since 9/11, he is still an organizational leader, not only just a spiritual 'godfather' for global jihadists. This brings to mind the statement of General Stanley McChrystal to the BBC last December: "I don't think that we can finally defeat al-Qaida until Bin Laden is captured or killed." 

Another message was clearly demonstrated by the focus on Palestine. Al-Qaida intends to capitalize on the current increasingly frustrating conditions in the Middle East Peace Process in general and in the Gaza Strip in particular. Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan were all missing in Bin Laden's new message. Palestine was not; Bin Laden stressed that the operation was for it and about it. He repeated his old and probably favourite recruiting statement: "the Americans will not live in peace, until the Palestinians do."

The current conditions in the Middle East features a stalemate in negotiations between the PA and Netanyahu's government, a ceasefire imposed by Hamas in Gaza, a blockade imposed by Israel and the Mubarak regime in Egypt on Gaza, expanding settlement activities in the West Bank, a failure of the US envoy in the region, and a confession by President Obama that he underestimated the obstacles to peace in the Middle East. In other words, this is a good time for al-Qaida's recruitment activities. And the chances for recruitment can be significantly higher if the rhetorical focus is on Palestine. Bin Laden did not wait too long to capitalize.

A third message that can be read is that al-Qaida is continuing and officially adopting decentralization as its strategy in 2010. Branches, cells, or individuals may be self- or organizationally recruited. They will operate either by orders from al-Qaida Central or will self-activate. In the latter case, the centre will take responsibility for the action and it will be accredited to al-Qaida. Basically, we are back to 2001!  

A final message is about al-Qaida’s resilience. After each defeat, there is a quick recovery. The defeat in Afghanistan (2001-2002) was followed by a re-emergence in the Afghan-Pakistan border regions (2004-Present). Other defeats in Saudi Arabia (2004-05) and Iraq (2007-09) were followed by resurgences in Algeria (2007), Somalia (2009) and Yemen (2009). The 'resilience' was a clear message conveyed by Bin Laden: "our attacks will continue as long as there a US support for Israel." Eight years after 9/11, al-Qaida's leader still has the will and the capacity to continue the terror campaign and still lacks the desire for changing the rhetoric, the ideology, and the behaviour.   

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Since October 2009, the Egyptian Muslim Brothers (MB), one of the largest and most influential Islamist movements in modern history, has been going through a leadership crisis between the General Guide, Muhammad M. Akif (leader of the MB), and some of the members of the Guidance Office (GO - the highest executive body in the MB).

In the latest elections held on 18 and 19 December, the Conservative factions held an outright majority in the 18-member GO. This is not good news. But it should not come as a surprise either.

Despite (incorrect) rumors that the leadership crisis originated from Akif's statements siding with Hezbollah against the Mubarak regime; the General Guide asserted in an interview with al-Jazeera Network that the decision to support Hizbullah was unanimous in the GO.

This crisis (like in 1949, 1951, 1964, and 1995) had more to do with the enduring factionalism within the MB, a persisting phenomenon within the organisation since the 1930s. The different factions can be loosely termed as 'Reformists,' 'Pragmatists' and 'Conservatives.' The main points of contention between them are the nature of relationship with the Mubarak regime, with the West (and with the "other" in general); the relationship between the missionary and the political activities; and, finally, the relationship between the organisation and its peculiarities on the one hand and the society on the other.

The Reformists, whose leading figures include Dr Abd al-Moneim Abu al-Futuh (a member of the GO until this month) and Dr Essam al-Arayan (a former MP in 1987), tend to be more open towards the "other" and more interested in separating the missionary (or the religious) and the political (in other words secularism finally!).

The most well-known figure of the Pragmatic camp is Dr Muahmmad Habib, a geology professor from Assyut University in Upper Egypt and the first deputy of the General Guide. The stance of this camp shifts quickly depending on the balance of power within the organisation. The Pragmatist camp is perceived as the main losers in the latest GO elections. As a result, Habib declared that the elections were "illegitimate."

The Conservatives, or as some analysts like to call them, the ‘Qutbists’ (though it is a bit misleading since they include more than just the followers of Sayyid Qutb) are led by Dr Mahmud Izzat, the General Secretary of the MB.  That faction has multiple ideological orientations. But its defining characteristics include utter secrecy when it comes to internal organisational affairs (in other words the MB should remain a black box for the outsider), mistrust regarding the "other," and less inclination for political alliances. Many of the Cons leaders (Izaat included) belong to the so-called "1965 generation" (the grassroots and mid-ranks who were imprisoned with Sayyid Qutb in 1960s, witnessed the time of his execution, and were severely repressed by the state). The mentality of that generation is usually different from those of the "1970 generation" (the mid-ranks who were active during the time of relative openness of the Sadat regime). Most of the leading Reformist figures belong to the latter generation.  

The success of the Conservatives in the recent elections are rooted in the conditions of political repression and frustration in Egypt do not in any way reward moderation of behavior or encourage openness or toleration. For the grassroots, the mid-ranks and the shura (Consultative) Council members, the intense cycles of repression made the Conservatives’ preferred behavior of secrecy, mistrust and exclusion sound necessary for survival.

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"Brother Mujahid Umar al-Farouk is a hero who destroyed the legend of American intelligence."

By that sentence al-Qaida's branch in the Arabian Peninsula (mainly in Yemen) took responsibility for the recent terrorist attempt to blow up the Northwestern flight over Detroit on Christmas day. The statement declared war on all western diplomats in the region, called for launching a full-scale war against the "crusaders," and stated that the failed attempt was a response to the US-sponsored attacks on al-Qaida’s camps in Yemen earlier this month.

The rhetoric is not new, nor is the elusiveness of al-Qaida. The organization and its branches suffered severe losses in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Saudi Arabia, its central command is under intense pressures in Pakistan. But then it reemerges like a phoenix in Yemen to plot an international attack in Detroit. This "phoenix phenomenon" can also be observed in West Africa (the home region of Umar Farouk Abdul Mutallab) and East Africa (where the Shabab movement declared allegiance to al-Qaida-Central). In the Middle East, however, al-Qaida's center of gravity has shifted from Iraq to Yemen.

Since al-Qaida's birth in the late 1980s, Yemen has been always under the organization's radar. In addition to Bin Laden's blood ties to Hadhramaut in Central Yemen, the conservative social setting, the rugged geographical terrain, the traditionally weak central authority, and the dominance of the tribal system over the state system are all factors that al-Qaida manipulated and capitalized upon.

Over the past twenty years, Al-Qaida's life in Yemen can be divided into three phases:

•    The first was between 1990 and 1994 when Bin Laden and his Yemeni associates tried to unite other Islamist factions to topple the regime and declare an Islamist state. That attempt failed. Instead, elements of al-Qaida and their supporters fought in the 1994 Yemeni civil war on the side of the incumbent president, Ali Abdullah Salih.
•    The second phase is between 1995 and 2006. That phase was characterized with a distinct organizational structure for al-Qaida and a constant confrontation with the Yemeni regime. By 2006, al-Qaida was severely weakened due to security strikes, international coordination, and a de-radicalization program that was partly successful.
•    In 2006, a third phase for al-Qaida in Yemen started with a successful escape attempt from the Political Security Prison in Sanaa by al-Qaida’s commanders. The escape was just the tip of the iceberg. The imprisoned leaders were able to reorganize the group and communicate with Iraq and Afghan Yemeni veterans. Following reorganization, al-Qaida was able to strike multiple targets including military, state security, and foreign ones. The more recent activity of the group was giving life to the defunct “al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula,” an organization that was already burned-dead by the Saudi security services.

Al-Qaida has declared that it reestablished a regional, organizational leadership in Yemen. Last January, the leader was declared to be Abu Basir Nasr al-Wahishy from Abyan Province in the south. Earlier this month, al-Qaida held a public rally in Abyan, in the same site of the US-backed air raid; there its commanders declared that they will take revenge, just a few days before the Detroit terrorist plot unfolds.

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Major 'Abbud al-Zumur, the former military intelligence officer who served on the governing bodies of both the Jihad organisation and al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group - IG) in Egypt, published in August 2009 a book entitled The Third Alternative: Between Authoritarianism and Surrender which analyses the causes of violent radicalism and prescribes ways of ending political violence within Arab- and Muslim-majority states.

This book is the latest development in what can be called a second wave of modern Islamist de-radicalisation. It is one of several instances of this literature to address political participation and pluralism explicitly. However authors from the very same movement sometimes have different views on this topic: IG's ideologue Nagih Ibrahim, for example, has called on Islamist movements to abandon politics and focus on missionary activities, while IG leader, Karam Zuhdi, declared that the group's current rejection of democracy could change based on its interests.

This new literature features a departure from upholding fiqh al-'unf (Islamic jurisprudence justifying violence) toward discouraging armed confrontations in general and de-legitimising political violence in Muslim-majority societies in particular. Most of the arguments in de-radicalisation literature are not new but the message bearers made a difference. As one of the former commanders of the IG's armed wing puts it: "Hearing the [theological] arguments directly from the sheikhs [IG leaders] was different….we heard these before from the Salafis and from al-Azhar…we did not accept them…we accepted them from the sheikhs because we knew their history."

The new body of literature mainly deconstructs the eight major arguments of jihadism: al-hakimmiyya (God’s exclusive right to legislate), al-riddah (apostasy, mainly of ruling regimes), al-jihad/qital (fighting) for the Islamic state, jihad al-daf'(defensive jihad),  ahkam al-diyar (rules of conduct in the "abode of Islam" and the "abode of infidelity"), methods for sociopolitical change, the inevitability of confrontation, and the "neo-crusader" arguments.

Deconstructing those arguments in post-jihadist literature entails an inference shift. The theological arguments of jihadism rest on the idea that literal orders from God supersede any rational calculations or material interests. This usually translates into an impetus to engage in armed confrontations against much stronger powers. In post-jihadist literature, there is a shift to the idea that interests determine the interpretation of the text. If a confrontation, or any other behaviour, is likely to lead to negative consequences, it must be forbidden and should be avoided.

Despite the persistence of jihadism, violence, and the conducive conditions to both paths, a post-jihadist era has begun. On the ideological level, post-jihadism involves de-legitimisation and discouragement of political violence in general as well as upholding theologically-sanctioned pragmatism. On the behavioural level, it criticises Islamists who still engage in violence is another feature, and on the organisational level, it aims to disband armed wings and secret units.

Most post-jihadist literature does not take a clear stance on democracy. But accepting the "other," moderating rhetoric and behaviour, and participating in electoral politics may be the only viable options for these groups if they want to remain politically significant. In other words, if jihadism heralded the inevitability of armed confrontation, post-jihadism might well entail the inevitable acceptance of democratisation.

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The current surge in violence in center-east Tajikistan sheds some light on a precarious and dicey situation in the Central Asian country. Host of a five years ugly civil war, the likes of deceased Arab-Chechen warlord, Amir Khattab (Samer al-Suwailem) and the Head of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan's (IMU) Armed Wing, Jum'a al-Namanjani (Jumaboi Khojayev), the country is no stranger to jihadism and armed Islamism (yes, there is quite a difference...and no, not just another academic luxury….the distinction has an impact on both behaviour and policy). 

Very briefly, recent developments in Tajikistan included the return of a few "Afghan-2001" veterans (as opposed to Afghan-1979), the resurfacing of Mullah Abdullah, the strong militia leader who refused the 1997 peace agreement, and a few clashes. One of those resulted in the death of the former leading field-commander of the United Tajikistani Opposition (UTO), Mirzo "Jaga" Ziyoev. In the post-conflict agreement, the UTO, a combination of Islamists, democratic and nationalists forces (though clan, region and sect may explain the fault-lines better!), was supposed to be granted 30% share of the government.

In that regard, Ziyoev was handed the "Ministry of Emergency Situations;" a ministry that was created for him with no power and no clear mandate! Disenchanted with the political conditions in the country as well as with the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) (which he severed as one of its leading commanders but never joined it officially), Ziyoev chose to exit: rearm and hit the mountains.

He had few followers this time. Commander Ziyoev was more attractive for jihadist wannabes than Minister Ziyoev . What we do not know so far are the details of his plan, the scope of his contacts, and why did he chose to go down and negotiate with the government forces. What we do know is that he was killed during these negotiations.

The regime, armed opposition and even the IMU are denying responsibilities. More importantly, however, is that the conditions in Tajikistan are bad enough to make a former minister prefer the mountains to the office; the gun to the pen. Some Tajik analysts described post-2001 political environment as follows: "Iraq lost Saddam, we are about to get one!" In other words, Takrit and Dangra became synonymous. 

It is no coincidence that the IRP, a party that once led the armed opposition and now looks up to the Turkish AKP as a model, is losing grounds to Salafis, Hizb al-Tahrir as well as armed Islamism. In a recent meeting with Dr Muhiydin Kabiri, the head of the IRP, a Tajik youngman asked: "if you can't influence policy, constantly harassed and repressed, and suffering from election rigging, why are you in that game?!"

The current political environment is by no means rewarding moderation; if it is not punishing it. The potential for re-radicalization is quite high. In that repressive context, Mirzo Ziyoev might not be regarded anymore as a "sellout" but as a "martyr" whose steps in the Tavildara Mountains should be followed.

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The recent visit of President Husni Mubarak of Egypt to Washington indicates a new "warmth" in the American-Egyptian relations after a short period of coldness during the second term of the Bush administration.

The latter understood that repressive autocrats produce violent theocrats who ultimately haunt America, the West and the rest.

The result was the Freedom Agenda and an underlying belief that democracy in the freedom-less region is in the long-term interest of the US (of course, the keyword here is "long-term"). In any case, the Bush administration pushed for democratization in a country ruled by emergency laws since 28 years.

The push was not welcomed by Mubarak, especially when leading liberal dissidents like Saad Eddin Ibrahim and Ayman Nour met with senior US officials, including the President. As a result, Mubarak, a frequent visitor to Washington, did not visit the US since 2004. His son, the groomed successor, did, however.

Now, the new administration is faced by an old dilemma: stability and friendly dictators for short-term gains or reform and democratization for long-term ones. Despite all the "hope and change" rhetoric, the Obama administration just turned back the clock on its Cairo policy. Mubarak can help in preventing a permanent Hamas state in Gaza, containing the Iranian influence in the region, and more pressure on other Arab dictators to "normalize" with Israel.  In exchange, freedom and democracy promotion for the 83 million Egyptians have to be put on hold for now.

The new administration has cut democracy aid for Egypt by more than half and cut aid to independent civil society organizations by more than two-thirds (although the administration increased its request for democracy funding in the Middle East overall).

The question now is with democratization on hold, weak civil society without much aid, continuous political and socioeconomic frustrations, will the radicalization patterns persist on individual and organizational levels or will the strong security apparatus be able to stifle those patterns for a while?

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As we all know by now Taliban-Afghanistan, under the command of Mullah Omar, has issued a document laying down more than a code of conduct for its fighters.

The document was entitled La’iha - da Afghanistan Islamii Imarat da Mujahidinu lparah or The Code of Conduct for the Mujahidin of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. It included also theological and ideological legitimatization of most of the military commands outlined. The La’iha is quite comprehensive. It has 13 chapters and 67 articles. The major topics covered can be listed under four categories: military tactics, asylum and prisoners, unity of the 'jihad' and sociopolitical relations.

Regarding military tactics, suicide attacks and civilian casualties were the main highlights in the La’iha.  On the former, the leadership of the Taliban declared that suicide bombings should only be used on 'high and important targets,' and the 'utmost effort should be made to avoid civilian casualties.'” On the latter, the La’iha stresses that governors, district chiefs and line commanders and every member of their armed formations 'must do their best to avoid civilian deaths, civilian injuries and damage to civilian property.'

Regarding asylum, the La’iha recycles 'aman al-'ahad, an established concept in classical Islamic jurisprudence, into an Afghan contemporary setting: 'every Muslim can invite anyone working for the slave government in Kabul to leave their job, and cut their relationship with this corrupt administration. If the person accepts, then with the permission of the provincial and district leadership, a guarantee of safety can be given.' In other words, it provides an exit for government employers and legitimize it in an intelligible narrative.

Regarding prisoners, the policies outlined in the La’iha stresses centralization: 'whenever any official, soldier, contractor or worker of the slave government is captured, these prisoners cannot be attacked or harmed.

The decision on whether to seek a prisoner exchange, or to release the prisoner, with a strong guarantee, will be made by the provincial leader. Releasing prisoners in exchange for money is strictly prohibited.' Depending on the prisoner's rank, the decision to kill or release him is made by the upper echelons of the Taliban. If the prisoner is a director, commander or a district chief or higher, Mullah Omar (referred to as the Imam) or his deputy (na’ib) will decide his/her fate.

The same applies if a NATO soldier was captured: 'if a military infidel is captured, the decision on whether to kill, release or exchange the hostage is only to be made by the Imam or deputy Imam.' In other words, if the captured soldier was killed Mullah Omar and his deputies will be directly responsible.

Regarding unity, the Taliban repeats a chapter from the Algerian GIA's history by outlawing all non-Taliban armed Islamist activities.  The La’iha states clearly that: 'creating a new mujahidin group or battalion is forbidden.'” It implies punitive measures if that order was violated.

Finally, it is clear that Taliban leadership understands the importance of winning the hearts and minds to win this war : 'The mujahideen have to behave well and show proper treatment to the nation, in order to bring the hearts of civilian Muslims closer to them.' More than that, the La’iha has a Taliban-style 'equal opportunity' code: 'the mujahideen must avoid discrimination based on tribal roots, language or their geographic background.'

Overall, the Lai’ha can be seen as an attempt by the leadership of the Taliban to centralize the organization, before possibly launching a new wave of attacks. The development can be also seen as an attempt to distance the organization from al-Qa'ida's and other jihadist experiences in Egypt, Algeria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and other countries – where popular discontent marked the end of the Islamist insurgency.

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Imagine this news headlines: 'Bin Laden’s New Fatwa Prohibits Attacks Against the West' or 'Bin Laden Denounces Terrorism.' Too preposterous? May be. But the series of processes that we now call 'de-radicalization' does not suggest so. 

De-radicalization is a process of relative change, one in which a violently radical group reverses its behavior and ideology to abandon and de-legitimize the use of violent methods to achieve political goals, while also moving towards an acceptance of gradual social, political and economic changes within a pluralist context.  Does that even apply to armed Islamists? Yes, it does – in quite a large scale. 

Several armed movements, factions, and individual militants have shown remarkable behavioural and ideological transformations towards non-violence. The 'de-radicalization' processes of these movements removed tens of thousands of former militants from the ranks of al-Qa'ida's supporter and acted as disincentives for would-be militants. These processes have taken place on a large scale (organizational levels, in Egypt, Algeria, Tajikistan, and on a relatively smaller scale (factional and individual levels) in the United Kingdom, France, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Jordan, Iraq, Afghanistan, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia -- among other countries.

Too many questions pop up: Reasons? Conditions? Repercussions? I cannot answer them all here. However, previous research on de-radicalization processes concludes that a combination of charismatic leadership, state repression, interactions with the 'other' as well as within the organization, and selective inducements from the state and other actors are common causes of de-radicalization. 

There is a pattern of interaction between these factors leading ultimately to de-radicalization in many of the aforementioned cases as well as in non-Islamist cases. State repression and interaction with the 'other' often affect the ideas and the behavior of the leadership of an armed organization and probably lead them to initiate three endogenous processes: strategic calculations, political learning, and weltanschauung(s) revision(s).

The first process is based on rational-choice calculations and cost-benefit analyses. The second process is a product of socialization and interaction with the 'other'. The leadership will update its beliefs and reassess its behavior due to the behavior of their interaction partner(s). The third process is mostly based on perceptional and psychological factors. It is a process in which the leadership of an armed Islamist movement modifies its worldviews as a result of severe crises, frustration and dramatic changes in the environment.

Following these processes, the leadership initiates a de-radicalization process that is bolstered by selective inducements from the state as well as by internal interactions (lectures, discussions, meetings between the leadership, mid-ranking commanders, and the grassroots in an effort to convince them about the merits of de-radicalization).

Also, de-radicalized groups often interact with violent Islamist groups and, in some cases, the former influence the latter (domino effect). That type of interactions is well-demonstrated in the Islamic Group and al-Jihad Organization in Egypt; the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS) and other smaller Islamist militias as well as factions from the GIA and the GSPC in Algeria; and de-radicalized Islamist figures and individual suspects in Saudi Arabia.

So what should we do from here – both policy and research-wise? Well, for starters, this is an understudied phenomenon not only in security studies, but also in sociological, political, Islamic and area studies. In that sense the new project on de-radicalisation of ICSR is commendable (yes, Neumann strikes again!). 

Policy-wise, there are already some implications regarding counterterrorism, security, foreign and social policies. There is no wonder that more than thirty countries rushed to setup de-radicalization programs in their prisons – from the liberal and free (UK, US and others in Western Europe) to the repressive and not so free (Uzbekistan did not miss the rush!).

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Coming on  the  heel  of  President Obama's speech in Cairo, the  swift   march  of  events seem  to  have  energized  voters  in  Lebanon and Iran who  turned  out  in  a  record number. President Obama did  mention  the  imperative  of  upholding minority  rights; and  singled  out  both  the  Christian Maronites  of  Lebanon  and  the Copts  of  Egypt .

By  the  same  token  he  emphasized  women's  right  to  full  inclusion  in  public  life. At  least  in  the  case  of  Lebanon, both Maronites  and  women  voted  at an   unprecedented  rate  (60%) . Last  month  not  only  a  similar  high  turn  out  took  place   in  Kuwait ,  but  also  four  women  were  elected  for  the  first  time, despite  the fierce  resistance of  a  coalition  of  tribal  and  Islamist elements .  

The  parliamentary  elections   in  Lebanon  earlier  and  from  Kuwait  last  month  clearly  indicate  that  Islamist  parties  lost  significant  grounds  to  secular  liberal  counterparts. Along  with  Turkey, these  two  countries  have  had  some democratic  traditions by  Middle  Eastern  standards. 

Scholars  of  the  subject    maintain  that  societies  which  manage  to  have  four  or  more  consecutive, free and fair  elections  are   usually  judged  to  have  achieved  a democratic  transition.  Without  direct  visible  foreign intervention, both  Lebanon  and  Kuwait  seem  to  have  such  transition  well  under way . 

The  fear  that  Islamists  might  impede  the  process  have  not  materialized. Leaders of competing Islamist forces conceded defeat and accepted the result. To  his  credit,  the  much  demonized  Hassan  Nasrallah  of  Hezbollah  made  an  eloquent  sport-like concession. The  often  repeated  contention  that  with  Islamists  in  the  fray, it  would  be "a one  man, one  vote, one time" is  yet  to  be  proven.

Now, enters Iran and the optimism for democratic transition starts to fade a bit. The tenth presidential elections of the Islamic Republic were held on 12 June 2009. The Incumbent President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad had won the election with 66% of the votes cast and Mir-Hossein Mousavi, the reformist candidate, had received 33%.

There was a big outcry of foul, both domestically and internationally. Ayatollah Khamenei, the supreme leader of Iran's dual system (the theocratic and the democratic ones) came out in a Friday prayers sermon declaring that the winner is definitely Ahmadinejad.

The whole sermon (yes, supposedly a religious, spiritual ritual) was centered on the election results and conveyed four messages to the four raisons d'être of the Islamic Republic: the people of Iran, the Islamist political elite, the enemies of the Islamic Republic Iran (or the imperial forces), and the hidden Imam.

The conclusion of the Supreme Guide, who supposedly should be above factionalism, was siding publicly and heavily with Ahmadinejad. That was expected. The election had to be stolen because otherwise Iran's hardliners would have been confronted by a democratically elected president determined to revive republican values and institutions.  

But the interesting part of the speech was the message delivered to America under Obama's administration. It was not the regular "death to the imperialists" (despite the chants of the crowd). It was challenging Obama on his own turf: "Human Rights?!!...you Democrats burned Davidians' children alive in Texas!" Ayatollah Khameini recalled (in a different context, he would ve probably added WTF?!).

Will the "Obama effect" crash when it comes to Iran? This we will yet have to see. But the defiance of the Iranians for democracy and freedom, the outpouring applause the President received in Cairo, and the electoral results of Lebanon and Kuwait all show that the overwhelming majority of Arabs and Muslims are ready for democratic transition.

But being ready is just one little factor supportive of that transition. It takes a lot more than that. In most of the Middle East, the balance of power (and of terror) is heavily tilting towards the state against their own societies and whoever hijacks the state and the electoral results – whether Islamist or secular – is not ready for democratic transition.  

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Obama in Cairo Winning Hearts and Minds…Wildly Raising Hopes

In sharp contrast to the unwelcoming shoe hurled at President Bush in his last media conference in the Middle East, President Obama and his speech were very well-received in Egypt and the rest of the Muslim-majority world.

The audience in Cairo University interrupted the speech 23 times by waves of applause (that is just slightly above average by Middle Eastern standards, especially when the cheering crowd is hand-picked by the Egyptian State Security Investigations).

Outside of the university, reactions were also quite positive. Speaking to my apolitical mother and two of her friends in Cairo, the reaction was: “he is such a beautiful kid,” “we love him,” and “we are praying for God to protect him.”

There are several reasons for this Middle East Obama-mania. The crowd in Cairo has no recollection of Clinton’s eloquent speeches and did not care to hear Bush’s. In other words, they have few comparative references.

But much more important, this is the first time Arabs and Muslims are hearing a very eloquent, “politically correct” speech from a Black American President who has Muslim relatives. For many, that is revolutionary in content and rhetoric –if not necessarily in policies.

But let us not dance around this jarring disconnect: On a normal day in Cairo or al-Azhar Universities (the two institutions that sponsored the speech), there is little time and space for genuine, open-minded contemplation or debate.

Both universities are big intellectual prisons ruled by the State Security Services. State Security Generals decide which professor gets hired, which one gets promoted, which one gets fired, and which one gets detained.

If President Obama were to visit Cairo University on a normal day, he would find four trucks of Central Security Forces parked on the right side of the main entrance. They never go away – 24/7. Al-Azhar as an institution is not hospitable to political correctness or Egyptian democrats. It did establish itself, however, as a leading authority behind censorship of book and creative ideas. It is also the institution that constantly calls on punishing and harassing secular intellectuals, most notably Dr Nasr Abu Zeid.

Dr. Ayman al-Zawahri, al-Qaida’s second-in-command, and Dr. Omar Abd al-Rahman, the radical cleric imprisoned in the U.S. for the WTC bombing in 1993, were both radicalized in, and graduated from, Cairo and al-Azhar Universities. The constant cycles of repression that plagued the two universities between 1960s and the 2000s made them strongholds for radical groups.

Yet the core idea of repressive autocrats breeding violent theocrats was absent from the President’s speech.

What the Obama administration will probably understand from the outpouring of applause the President received is that Arabs and Muslims are yearning for democracy, not the Caliphate; and abhorring repression, not America.

The administration, however, should also understand that the Arab-majority world has known eloquent leaders before. Those leaders raised the hopes and the expectation of Arabs and Muslims but never delivered on their promises. Nasser comes to mind.
President Obama’a speech was historical.

It raised the hopes and the expectations of many Arabs and Muslims and they will look back to it and measure his policies against it. The hope now is that the President will not sacrifice America's core values of freedom and self-determination for short-term political expediency by supporting repressive autocrats.

Only then can the United States reclaim its moral force in the Arab- and Muslim-majority world.

 

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