Those with institutional journal access should check out the new issue of Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, particularly an article by Na’ama Nagar of the State University of New York.

In Who is Afraid of the T-Word? Labeling Terror in the Media Coverage of Political Violence Before and After 9/11, Nagar suggests that we should be cautious when thinking about one particular aspect of the relationship between media and terrorism:

Several studies conducted after 9/11 found that American journalists have largely embraced the government's official frame of the ‘War on Terror’.  Drawing from the claim of an ideological bond, this study investigates how American news media covered politically violent organizations that are not linked to Al Qaeda or the events of 9/11.  More specifically, the article examines whether the media's inconsistent use of the word ‘terror’ changed as a consequence of 9/11 by comparing the coverage of these organizations before and after 9/11.  A quantitative content analysis of American media indicates that overall the coverage of political violence did not change after 9/11.  Moreover, journalists remained vigilant about using the word ‘terror’ when covering politically violent organization.

This is an interesting conclusion, given that it is often assumed―and I have fallen prey to this myself―that the press have actually been quite irresponsible at times in their representations of both ‘terrorism’, and ‘political violence as terrorism’, regardless of the actual tactics or strategies of the objects of their journalistic gaze.

Nagar concludes that the news media are actually ‘rather cautious’ when investigating political violence, and suggests why this might be so:

First, the news media may strive for objectivity and balance, which would be called into question by the use of the t-word since it implies choosing a side.  The fact that the t-word is often put in quotation marks seems to support this interpretation.  Second, as noted by [Brigitte] Nacos, news organizations may wish to maintain access to politically violent groups, which use of the t-word might jeopardize.

If correct―and I have no reason to doubt Nagar’s analysis―this means that the journalistic ethos is alive and well and, I would suggest, actively resisting the reproduction of ‘war on terror’ discourse.  However, Nagar cautions that the study only analyses the ‘elite press’, what we in the UK would call ‘broadsheets’.  As Nagar states, ‘Future research might want to analyze popular [tabloid / red-top] newspapers, which could be more likely to adopt the official language’.  This would seem―intuitively, at least―to be a sensible suggestion.  

In 1984, at a heavyweight Harper’s Magazine discussion on terrorism and the media, John O’Sullivan of the Daily Telegraph said:

The assumption of the popular press is that terrorists are important for what they do.  The assumption of the quality press is that terrorists are important for what they say.  I suggest that the first assumption is much more sensible.

That’s quite a striking differentiation, which could easily form the basis for about five doctorates, so I won’t go into it here, but it does suggest that, long before 9/11, there was marked distinction between how terrorism was reported and represented in the two principal genres of mainstream printed news.

Nagar examines how real, actual organisations engaging in political violence are referred in the press―Lord’s Resistance Army, FARC, ETA, etc.  There’s probably a bunch of studies out there looking at how ‘terrorism’ is used as a frame for people, events and processes that have nothing to do with terrorism-as-political-violence.  To me, this is the more insidious discourse and I suspect―again, just a hunch―that this is more common in the popular press than the broadsheets.  

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At the beginning of last month, I posted a story about London’s Metropolitan Police entering into a voluntary surveillance-and-reporting arrangement with internet cafe owners in North London, specifically the borough of Camden. There was a little uncertainty at the time about whether this was correct but the following poster was snapped at an internet cafe in Leather Lane, EC1:

 

Credit: Cory Doctorow (gruntzooki) on Flickr [image link]

This was not just any random blogger either, it was Cory Doctorow, science fiction author, copyright reform campaigner, and highly influential netizen. If the Met wanted advertising for this pilot project, they’ve certainly got it now―Doctorow posted this story at Boing Boing, the #7 most popular blog in the English-speaking world.

Because it’s election day here in Blighty, I won’t detain you any further but just in case the image should disappear or something, the text of the poster reads:

Police Notice

Internet Policy

The owners of these premises are working with the Metropolitan Police Service to prevent unlawful or offensive material being accessed on the internet.

All customers agree that while using our systems they will not access, upload, download any material, or author, transmit or store documents, including emails or attachments of a pornographic, violent, extremist, or otherwise offensive or inappropriate nature.

Breaching the above will result in the user’s internet access being terminated immediately and, where appropriate, the police being informed.

Downloading or accessing certain material could constitute a criminal offence.

Well, at least they’re telling us we’re being watched. Just like the Chinese. Congratulations.

 

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The US News & World Report has been digging into ‘hundreds of pages of heavily redacted court documents’ and finds evidence that al-Qaeda ‘has launched successful cyberattacks, including one against government computers in Israel.’ According to the paper, this is the first public acknowledgement of a terrorist group launching offensive cyber operations.

The court records are from one of the many legal hearings involving Mohamedou Ould Slahi, since his arrest in November 2001 on suspicion of involvement in the failed ‘Millennium Plot’ to bomb LA International Airport. The Mauritanian spent the subsequent years in Guanatanamo until a district court recently ordered his release on the basis that the US government could not in fact prove he was a ‘member of the Taliban or al Qaida’ at the time of the alleged offence [pdf], partly because the use of torture could have compromised the evidence provided.

The US News journalist, who has at least been following this case for a while, claims to have unearthed the following:

The court records do not specify when and under what circumstances Slahi discussed al Qaeda's venture into cyberwar ... For instance, Slahi told interrogators that al Qaeda ‘used the Internet to launch relatively low-level computer attacks.’ Al Qaeda ‘also sabotaged other websites by launching denial-of-service attacks, such as one targeting the Israeli prime minister's computer server,’ court records show. The Israeli embassy in Washington had no comment on the information published in the court records.

Denial of service attacks are common and relatively easy and cheap to coordinate. They aim to overload and temporarily disable websites for the duration of the attack. Al Qaeda's interest in the tactic, however, has received little discussion and attention.

Slahi, like many al Qaeda recruits, was highly educated and knowledgeable about computers, according to court filings. A citizen of Mauritania, he says he worked as a systems administrator for an Internet service provider there from May 2000 until July 2001. Slahi told interrogators that bin Laden's group posted hacking instructions ‘on specific websites that directed the date and time of the attack.’

I don’t know if anyone has more details of this particular individual’s skills, or AQ’s actual capabilities in this area. This is not a naive enquiry, as I don’t mean any one of the thousands of articles on cyberterrorism clogging up the arteries of policy space. On that note, this piece quotes Richard Clarke, ex-presidential counterterrorism advisor:

To date, al Qaeda has not used its own hackers or rented hackers to damage, disrupt, or destroy important systems like banks, electric power grids, trains. We should expect that at some point a terrorist group might engage in low-level cyberwar, but the real threat is nation state action.

Which is what his new book is about, of course. It’s quite interesting to note how cyberterrorism has been downplayed since there’s a more plausible ‘cyberthreat’ to shriek about in the media. It would be quite ironic if now the furore over cyberterrorism has died down a little some evidence might emerge in the public domain that shows AQ actually were planning such attacks, even if they were not carried out to much effect. More likely, this information would be used as post facto justification for all the hysterical yelling over the topic in recent years.

Nevertheless, Clarke is technically correct on the terrorist threat, as also is the quoted ‘senior US counterterrorism official’ when he says, ‘sure, some computer-savvy terrorist sympathizers try to make trouble from time to time, but at this point we’re talking about things that cause more of a nuisance than lasting harm.’ One of his colleagues rounds out the piece, saying ‘when someone from al Qaeda jumps online, then we can jump on them.’ This is a sentiment heard often in counterterrorism circles―keep ‘em where you can see ‘em, the mantra goes.

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In an article in this past weekend’s Observer, Luke Harding tells the story of 17-year old Dzhennet Abdurakhmanova. According to Harding, it was she who detonated her suicide belt at Moscow’s Lubyanka metro station, killing nearly two dozen commuters last Monday, 29 March. Notwithstanding the confusion over the identities of who did what where, Harding has at least identified the reason why this act of terrorism happened:

But though a precise explanation for Dzhennet's actions can never be known, we shouldn't ignore a simpler reason: the internet. In recent years the insurgency in Russia's north Caucasus has mutated. During the 1990s, the rebels were largely Soviet-educated and secular, seeking to establish their an [sic] independent Chechen state. Today's insurgents are radical Islamists, fighting for a Taliban-like emirate across the Caucasus mountains. The web has become a potent tool for recruiting volunteers. According to Kommersant newspaper, Dzhennet and Umalat [Magomedov, husband, insurgent, dead] met while chatting online; at the time she was just 16.

And so ends the article. Somewhat abruptly, but that’s OK as the ‘mystery’ is obviously solved.  This is fairly typical for what passes as comment and analysis in the mainstream press when it comes to examining the links between the internet and political violence.  

In this case, what Harding has provided is a classic case of a ‘logical fallacy’, of the post hoc ergo propter hoc or ‘questionable cause’ variety: because Y happened after X, X must have caused Y. In the context of Abdurakhmanova’s internet use and her subsequent terrorist act, correlation does not imply causality, and this particular example is a form of technological determinism that allows little room for human agency.

It belongs to the same school of thought that treats people as empty vessels into which an ideology is placed, ‘causing’ radicalisation, leading to terrorism.  At the same time, proponents of this view also like to generalise from specific cases, an inductive approach that tends to result in ‘othering’ as many people as possible. You can argue for the relevance of many factors in someone’s biography leading to the commission of violence but you can’t have your cake and eat it.

What compounds Harding’s error is that he arrived at this conclusion because he cannot appeal to any other data. This is not even an application of Occam’s Razor: it’s just lazy. Such linear and dubious argumentation has plagued counterterrorism policy for years, although governments are far cannier about such things these days. In this case, both journalist and The Observer’s editorial staff are at fault. Why is taking so long for the media to catch up?

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It’s difficult to know what to make of this new Metropolitan Police counterterrorism pilot scheme in north London, announced in the press last week:

Anti-Terror Police Seek Help from Internet Cafes, BBC News, 25 March 2010

Police battling the threat of terrorism have unveiled a new tactic - they are targeting internet cafes. As evidence suggests that several people convicted with terrorism acts have visited internet cafes while plotting their crimes, the Metropolitan Police are trialling a new initiative in which owners agree to monitor what customers are looking at, and report any suspect activity to police.

The visit by two policemen and a community support officer is unannounced - but this is not a raid. Instead they are here at an internet cafe in Camden in London as part of a new programme in the government's £140m Prevent strategy to help counterterrorism.

The new initiative involves getting internet cafe owners to monitor the websites their customers view and to pass on any worries over suspicious activity to the police.

Critics claim this is ‘another step in the direction of creating a society of total surveillance’. Given the recent Community and Local Government Committee report on problems with Prevent, this project will look to many like another attempt to monitor Muslims’ behaviour.  The BBC goes on to quote more from the author of these concerns, Arun Kundnani of the Institute of Race Relations:

 

What is dangerous about this initiative is that it does not just focus on preventing access to illegal material but also material that is defined as 'extremist' without offering an objective definition of what that is. It thus potentially criminalises people for accessing material that is legal but which expresses religious and political opinions that police officers find unacceptable.

This is a good point but it is not constables in the front line of this endeavour but internet cafe owners and users.  This is another delegation of state responsibilities to the populace, which sounds like an attractive proposition but is precisely the opposite.  I find it difficult to see why this is significantly different to reporting someone for reading a ‘seditious’-looking book on the Underground.  

The police say that ‘the internet cafe programme is not about arresting people, but more to determine if their users need what they term as "support"’.  This is distinctly problematic.  What this says to the casual observer is not that this is a law enforcement issue but a social engineering one.  If the intention is to shape people towards the norms engendered by the last ten years of counterterrorism legislation as regards what we are allowed to access on the internet, we should perhaps wonder about the legitimacy of such measures when another parliamentary committee last week called for a ‘thorough going, evidence-based review of the necessity for and proportionality of all the counter-terrorism legislation’ passed since 9/11.

When I lived in Egypt, a country famous for its political pluralism, I had frequent cause to use internet cafes.  I vividly remember the first one I used in downtown Cairo in about 2004.  Pinned to each wall behind the monitors were laminated posters which said, ‘Patrons are asked to refrain from accessing material which deals with sex, religion, or politics’.  Whilst the UK has a very long way to go before it is even remotely as bad as Egypt with respect to communication rights, the new Met scheme will use posters and screensavers to ‘tell people that what they’re doing is not on’.  Not illegal, just ‘not on’.  Be careful: this time, somebody actually is watching you.

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A recently released high-level report reveals the UK intelligence services' assessment of the threat posed by Islamist terrorists in the form of 'electronic attack', or what are increasingly referred to as 'cyber attacks'.

The Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) is the statutory body with oversight of the Security Service (MI5), Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), and Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ).  Since it was set up in 1994, its remit has expanded to include the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), and the Intelligence, Security and Resilience Group (ISRG).  Every year, it presents a report to the Prime Minister, which also includes the results of its consultations with other bodies, including the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS).  In short, its job is to tell Number 10 how well the UK's intelligence agencies are doing, and what problems exist.

The new report [pdf] was presented to the PM on 16 December last year and was eventually published last week [press release, PDF]. The section of interest to us is on page nine:

The Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) told the Committee:
...
Electronic attack is also used by Islamist terrorists who have the capability to launch limited forms of attack over the internet. Technical capability varies greatly, and it appears that their intentions are the defacement or denial of service of specific websites. These attempts are often ***. There are, however, indications that awareness and use of electronic attack is on the increase and ***.

Note the redacted sections, which I'll leave to you to fill as you see fit. It is clear from this document that CPNI regards the two principal vectors of cyber attack to be foreign intelligence services and Islamists. The report notes that GCHQ agrees, and it created something called the Network Defence Intelligence and Security Team (NDIST) in September 2008, to address this issue. This is a group you won't find on Google, and which I've never heard of. How this will play together with the Cyber Security Operations Centre (CSOC), also at GCHQ , and due to become operational at the end of this month, remains to be seen, particularly as the ISC criticises government for not letting it know sooner about the CSOC.

For obvious reasons, the report is short on details, but it does give us a glimpse of how the UK's intelligence community views the Islamist threat in the specific area of cyber attacks. It's not talking about propaganda or recruitment, just about attacks on infrastructure and networked assets. To be honest, it's hardly earth-shattering, and government seems to have a handle on it, even if GCHQ complains about a lack of staff and is running at "about a third below the level planned" in this field. I guess we'll have to wait until next year to see how things change with respect to this particular confrontation in cyberspace.

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Earlier this week, the United Nations met with private sector representatives at Microsoft’s Redmond HQ, to discuss how to tackle the use of the internet for terrorist purposes.  This is from the UN press release:

The Working Group on Countering the Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes – part of the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) – is holding talks at Microsoft’s headquarters, near the United States city of Seattle, with the company and others, including Symantec and McAfee, to examine technical issues surrounding the topic.

The two-day gathering which started today is the first of its kind at the UN level to bring together Member States and entities of the world body with the private sector and academia to examine ways to counter terrorist use of the Internet.

There is a high level of crime on the Internet, and “it is essential that you bring in the private sector, [which is] an essential partner in moving forward,” Richard Barrett, who co-chairs the Working Group, told the UN News Centre.

This reliance on private-public partnerships is certainly where things are moving in cybersecurity generally.  It is recognition that governments do not have the necessary skills and capabilities in-house to tackle issues that in part derive from and also affect the global communications infrastructures that are, after all, largely under corporate control.  

It will be interesting to see what the Working Group proposes as a result of this ongoing consultation process.  The melding of commercial, political, media and security networks is an inherently tricky and risky business and the UN will have to address up front how to preserve the integrity and safeguards afforded to ‘normal’ users of the internet.  It is no simple task just to get everyone talking, and for progressive proposals to emerge from that process.  As the press release recognises of just one particular issue:

Member States have yet to agree on a precise definition of “terrorism.” This complicates discussions on possible legal frameworks to prevent or curtail terrorists’ use of the Internet due to the resulting questions over possible infringements on the freedom of speech and human rights, Mr. Barrett noted.

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Last week, the UK government quietly announced that a new unit in Whitehall would begin sifting through complaints from the public about 'hate, extremism and terrorism online'. In what seems to be the result of four years of civil service head-scratching about how to design a delivery mechanism for the Section 3("notice-and-takedown", NTD) provisions of the Terrorism Act 2006, the result is probably the most benign mechanism Whitehall could come up with to assuage pressure groups (both internal and external) whilst saving political face.

Under the new initiative, the government is enlisting the help of the internet-using public to find and report on various types of content and behaviour deemed illegal under the provisions of the Terrorism Acts of 2000 and 2006. To its credit the Home Office states, “most hateful or violent website content is not illegal. While you may come across a lot of things on the internet that offend you, very little of it is actually illegal.” That’s an important message, although I guess it will be some time before we know if it sufficiently discourages axe-grinders from submitting various types of legal content to the new Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit.

There may be some utility to this measure. It signals that certain types of material that fall foul of counterterrorism legislation will not be tolerated in the UK. As such, it will bolster government's promotion of its 'values' in this area, as well as contributing in some small way to making "the internet a more hostile environment for terrorists and violent extremists who seek to exploit modern technology", as the press release claims. However, as a genuine bulwark against violent extremism it is a non-starter and will certainly fail to deliver on government's stated objectives of reducing radicalisation and countering violent extremism online. For a start, even if such a scheme―assuming it can maintain any kind of visibility, which is unlikely―succeeded in driving all illegal internet material currently served by UK persons and companies to foreign locations, this content would still be accessible to those who look for it.

This criticism relates to a mere practicality but there is a more important issue. This looks very like policy retrospectively trying to justify poor legislation. Recall that the Section 3 provisions of the Terrorism Act 2006 have never been used, partly because the police―who are charged with serving NTDs―have consistently backed away from being the ones to adjudicate on what might be lawful or not in contentious areas like the 'glorification of terrorism'. Rather than just accept that if they were really serious about prosecuting UK citizens and companies for hosting certain types of material that breach any number of much older established statutes regarding incitement, racial hatred, etc, this government persists in attempting to justify badly drafted legislation under the rubric of counterterrorism policy.

Why a specific reporting mechanism for terrorism? We have one for child abuse, surely a near-universal taboo, but we don’t bother for much else. Why not any other crimes? If it's deeply-held cultural convictions and social norms that the government is trying to uphold, why resort to highly contentious legislation borne of fear and panic, rather than existing legislation that, quite apart from having been successfully tested many times in the courts, directly reflects those norms and values upon which British society claims to be based, pre-9/11?

This government, in common with most others, has yet to make a firm case demonstrating even the weakest causal relationship between internet 'content', 'radicalisation', and 'violent extremism'. Sure, it crops up in the biographies of many terrorists as a behavioural indicator, but many other things do too. This is not a disingenuous statement, and it should not be up to academics, civil servants and rights activists to refute the case for regulation of expression. Rather, it is up to government to make the case for it, and it has yet to do so.

So much for evidence-based policy. In 2002, in a speech to the Economic and Social Research Council, then Home Secretary David Blunkett said, "this government has given a clear commitment that we will be guided not by dogma but by an open-minded approach to understanding what works and why." Unless this government is sitting on a body of data that has thus far eluded the world’s academic community, I suggest that even a small thing like the new internet referral unit shows how hollow this claim sounds now. On its own, this initiative is unlikely to do much damage―nor achieve much of anything, to be frank―but one has to wonder at the institutional processes that more-or-less demanded something like it, for better or for worse.

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The UK Home Affairs Select Committee has this morning published the results of its recent hearings on The Home Office’s Response to Terrorist Attacks, and it’s a mixed bag as expected. I haven’t read the whole thing but here are a few preliminary thoughts on its headline findings.

•    Ministers need to place greater emphasis on participation in emergency simulations.

No idea why this should be top of their list. I just keep hearing the late great Jean Baudrillard chuckling in my ears...

•    A formalised National Security Committee chaired by the Home Secretary or Prime Minister and assisted by prominent, publicly accountable National Security Advisers must be appointed.

This is also exactly what the Conservatives want. They claim it will not be “a new bureaucracy but a centre of decision-making”.

•    A lack of political will hindered the creation of regional counter-terrorism units; the Government was not proactive enough in instigating valuable reforms to the policing structure.

I wonder what the committee’s case is here? It implies that the reforms were valuable but happened too slowly.  Big deal.

•    The primacy of the Metropolitan Police in counter-terrorism operations should be enshrined in statute to increase accountability and simplify the command structures.

In statute? They already take the lead in SO15. I’m curious if the Met wants this too. Retired Met Deputy Commissioner Andy Hayman did make the point in evidence that if anything went wrong the current “gentleman’s agreement” between the Met and other forces would be seriously strained. What legal instrument would be employed to do this? Another Act of Parliament, in which the NSC is also set up forever?  We’ve already had six, or seven, or ... how many is it now?

•    The creation of a separate National Terrorism Agency modelled on the American Department of Homeland Security has the potential to cause major problems and will not represent a major simplification of policing structures.

Hallelujah. Such an organisation would have to be a standalone creation, or the merging of existing agencies. The last thing we actually need is a monolithic security agency à la DHS. There might be some short-term marginal gains but it seems to me that you need some tension between agencies to preserve oversight and avoid the worst group-think.

•    The Government should immediately introduce legislation allowing the admission of intercept evidence in court.

Absolutely. If you’re going to collect this stuff then at least use it in court. It’s a form of processual transparency, and will help CPS’ case if the evidence is good enough to bring genuine prosecutions.

•    Control Orders no longer provide an effective response to the continuing threat and the control order regime is no longer viable.

Finally. There has been a quite bizarre and persistent adherence by the government to control orders. Time to throw them out.

•    Budgets for counter-terrorism work have increased greatly but there is a lack of Parliamentary oversight of this spending and a possibility of problems caused by "ring fencing" this money.

This criticism cuts a lot deeper than might first appear, although I doubt the Committee is really being ballsy here. How about asking the really important question: just why are we even spending this money? And what the implications of this securitisation are?

•    The structures that are now in place may be suitable for combating the terrorist threat as currently constituted, but we are not confident that government institutions have the desire to constantly adapt to meet ever-changing threats.

“The terrorist threat as currently constituted”? And what’s that exactly? So, the threat’s constantly adapting, and government institutions are to do the same?  Good luck with that. This is an aspirational point, and governments everywhere are unlikely to deliver on this point. It’s a good idea not to support an NTA, as that would almost certainly stifle the adaptation they desire. I also wonder whether they’re conflating adaptation and innovation as processes/outcomes of change?

We’re a few months shy of a general election, so don’t expect much to change before summer. If the Tories get in we will see a National Security Committee/Council (they use both terms), and perhaps some legislation. There’s also the Defence Review in the next parliament, so there may be some overlap there too. In the meantime, I leave you with Home Secretary Alan Johnson’s reaction to the report. Would we have expected this government to have said anything else?

“I totally refute the unsubstantiated and wholly inaccurate claims in this inadequate report. The government fully understands the threat this country faces from international terrorism and has extremely effective systems and processes in place to deal with it. Indeed, it is all the more surprising, given that the same committee found only six months ago that; ‘the UK's counter-terrorism strategy is first-class, effective and as “joined-up” as any system of government can expect.’"

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One of the things that's always bothered me about the 'lone wolf' moniker, used to describe violent extremists seemingly acting on their own initiative, is the simple fact that they’re usually not alone.  Although there may be little or no material support from an active network of co-conspirators, 'lone wolf' Islamists act precisely because they are not, in their own minds, isolated at all: they have the love of Allah, solidarity with the ummah, and the ideological and psychological support of online and other communities, who may or may not be aware of their intentions.

For me, the term retains associations with Freud's Wolf Man, of whom Lacan wrote, his "fascinated gaze is the subject himself", and Herman Hesse's Steppenwolf, in which Harry Haller attempts to achieve transcendence of his paradoxical nature through the murder of the bourgeois Hermine. Haller's sociopathy may well be apparent in the psychology of some terrorists, and the narcissism of many terrorists and insurgents has long been evident. Think of Andreas Baader and tell me that guy didn't 'fancy himself', in modern parlance.

Please correct me if I'm wrong, but as far as I’m aware the use of 'lone wolf' to describe Islamist terrorists is a Western characteristic, and it speaks more to our north European cultural heritage than it does to its analytical utility in trying to understand the phenomenon. In fact, it may be a classic example of framing, or at least projection, and reveals more of our cultural anxieties than it does of the organisation or psychology of those who would attack 'us'. In that sense, it may hinder the West's abilities to counteract those individuals rather than help it.

Last October, Raff Pantucci suggested that lone wolves might run in a 'pack', which he quickly equated with a 'cell', a transference of terms quite compatible with theories of 'leaderless resistance' originating in earlier white supremacist movements. I don't know if Raff meant thereby to neutralise the lupine metaphor but I think he did it quite successfully anyway. Lone wolves are, in this context, potential or actual terrorists, and the collective noun is a 'cell', as per decades of insurgent and terrorist theory (i.e. it didn't start with Marc Sageman's 'leaderless jihad').  

In a new article for Foreign Policy, essentially a review of jihadi online punditry, Jarret Brachman writes of Al Qaeda's Armies of One. Jarret argues that web jihadists are now 'joining the physical fight', and that,

countries across the world―and particularly the United States―should brace themselves for an exodus from the Web forums and onto the battlefield by self-styled al Qaeda armies of one.

'Armies' can belong to larger military units like battle groups, military alliances and international coalitions, and the phrase taps into the belligerent rhetoric of jihad quite succinctly, as well as noting the importance of self-image. Again, I don't know if Jarret is intentionally abandoning the 'lone wolf' tag, but it does not appear once in his piece. The point here is that discussions of 'online radicalisation' usually include this phrase to somehow both describe and explain those who become radicalised via internet activity, and go on to perform acts of violence we normatively recognise as terrorism.

'Lone wolf' is applied to almost anyone outside of a traditional command structure, regardless not only of ideology, but whether they actually communicate with others of similar mindset. The original 'lone wolves' of the far right were defined by their lack of contact with their ideological brethren. The current crop of Islamists is defined precisely by mutual contact and the sense of shared identity, another reason why the term doesn't sit well with me. A terrorist acting alone is rare enough, one truly thinking alone even more so.

What should they be called, then? I’m not sure, and my thoughts can be rubbished at many levels. I don’t think Jarret means for 'an army of one' to be a unit of analysis, for example, and we would perhaps do best just to call these guys terrorists or extremists, or something that is generally understood across the security spectrum as a measure of tactics and intent. That doesn't help us discover or define their specific modus operandi but neither particularly does 'lone wolf', as this can mask the connections that actually exist between superficially autonomous individuals and the movements of which they are a part, formally or otherwise. The Unabomber was a genuine lone wolf, so perhaps Abdulhakim Muhammad and many others; the likes of Hasan Nidal are not. Just because the ties are virtual does not mean they act in isolation, and we should understand what lies behind the term before we sprinkle our discourse with it. Otherwise it means very little indeed.

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Last night, the UK Chief of General Staff Gen Sir David Richards gave a speech at the IISS describing his aspirations for British armed forces ahead of the forthcoming defence review.  The basic gist was that our adversaries are fighting irregular wars and we should be prepared to engage them in flexible and agile manner.  Upshot: ditch the Cold War mentality, and let's get busy in these new theatres, not least of which is cyberspace.

Whether this will transfer into new cyber forces, we don't know, but it seems likely, should the money be found for the required investment in this field.  The current opposition is also very keen to develop offensive cyber capabilities, as set out last week in their national security green paper.

In his speech, Richards talks about the rationale for developing capabilities in cyberspace, which are actually quite understandable, but his comments at one point inevitably turned to al-Qaeda:

... Al Qaeda's use of technology has created a global network of grievances that are often linked by a nihilist theology used to justify local violence.  Dan Rather, the veteran US journalist, has commented that AQ’s physical location is virtual: "it's a worldwide, internet-based movement."

In all this time looking at the relationships between communications technologies and conflict, I have never once heard Dan Rather cited as an authoritative source on the subject.  I tracked down the quote to an interview with Rather on HDNet's World Focus in December 2009, in which he said, "al-Qaeda is not centred anywhere ... it's worldwide, it's internet-based", and then proceeds, without drawing breath, to say that AQ is actually based in Pakistan.

Rather looks like a spent force in the interview―permanent fallout from his ignominious departure from CBS Evening News in 2005 I guess―but the inconsistencies in his statement are obvious.  It would be unfair to single him out for criticism in this respect though―it's trendy now to say that AQ has a 'virtual sanctuary' and all that jazz, whilst at the same time declaring that we know them to be hiding out in Waziristan, or wherever.  

Everyone who reads this blog knows that 'AQ' can be parsed in various ways.  It's a shame that Richards saw fit to quote Dan Rather out of all the people that could have been cited on this subject.  Elsewhere in his speech, he quoted another venerable silverback of news broadcasting, the BBC's Nik Gowing, on communications technologies and democracy.  Richards could perhaps have turned to someone slightly more engaged with the subject, like Evgeny Morozov for example.  

I very much doubt anyone at the IISS cared, and it's really no big deal, I suppose.  Speeches like this do make me concerned that those who draft and make them aren't quite as clued up as they should be.  Richards is a military man, and doubtless knows UK defence inside out, but if he's moving into cyberspace he may need to update his sources.  It just sounds tired to trot out these two just because they're TV personalities.


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There's a good discussion going on at Kings of War, our academic cousins in the KCL family.  Rob Dover's post, Terror on Campus, has kick-started some informed debate about the role of higher education in radicalisation, and the susceptibility of well-educated persons to radical narratives and ideas.

In response to Rob's suggestion that 'a look back in history might be worth while', the commenters have come up with several historical examples, touching on the 'engineers of jihad' phenomenon and the radical movements of the 1960s and 1970s.  David Betz mentions the Red Army Faction (RAF/Baader-Meinhof) and wonders about the 'revolution is sexy' interpretation of RAF recruitment, which Steve Corman develops further.  I've just finished reading Stefan Aust's The Baader-Meinhof Complex (2008), the revised edition published as a tie-in to the film of the same name that acts mainly as a visual portrayal of the book.  David is right about the narcissism of the main protagonists, particularly Andreas Baader and Gudrun Ensslin, and the relatively dispassionate tone of movie and book allows this facet of their characters to emerge quite naturally.  Although we can happily argue that the initial impetus of the RAF derived in part from the broader political milieu of the turbulent '60s, including the student movements of the far left―radicalised bourgeois youth, let’s not forget―it's hard to ignore the role of charisma in the sustenance of the first and second generations of the RAF.

More pertinent to the radicalism/education discussion, I came across a passage late in the book on the life of Zohair Youssif Akache prior to his role as 'Captain Mahmud' in the hijacking of a Lufthansa 737 in 1977.  The hijacking was intended to force the West German government to release Baader, Ensslin and other RAF members from prison, and ended in Mogadishu in October 1977 after the plane was successfully stormed by German special forces.  Have a read of what Aust has to say about Akache, and note the similarities between this account and the concerns raised recently about Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab’s background and the intelligence failings prior to his attempted destruction of Delta Flight 253:

'Captain Mahmud', whose Iranian passport bore the name of Ali Hyderi, and whose real name was Zohair Youssif Akache, was known to the police.  He had enrolled as a student of the Chelsea College of Aeronautical and Automobile Engineering in London in 1973, and received his diploma in aeronautical engineering two years later.

He first came to the notice of Scotland Yard in December 1974, when he suddenly attacked police officers at a peaceful pro-Palestinian demonstrators in Trafalgar Square.  He was known to be a member of the PFLP, and was in danger of being deported, but was finally allowed to remain and continue his studies.  A year later, Akache attacked the police during another pro-Palestinian demonstration.  This time he was arrested and ended up in Pentonville prison.  After going on hunger strike, he was deported to Beirut.

He was back in London at the beginning of 1977.  Under a false name he moved into a hotel opposite the Royal Lancaster, where the former prime minister of North Yemen was staying.  On 10 April, the ex-prime minister, with his wife and a member of the staff of the Yemeni embassy, got into a Mercedes outside the hotel.  Akache had been in wait behind the car.  He walked around the vehicle, opened the right-hand front door, and fired a pistol fitted with a silencer at the three occupants.  They died instantly.  Akache managed to fly out of London the same day.  Scotland Yard had had him under surveillance before the assassination, but had not sent his personal details and description through to Heathrow Airport. (pp.384-5)

Six months later he was dead on the Somali tarmac, and dozens of airline passengers could breathe again.  The differences between the two men are as great as their superficial similarities but 32 years later, does any of this sound even remotely familiar?  


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The new year opens with governments around the world showing that their most imaginative response to terrorism is to crack down further on innocent citizens everywhere.  Viva, the War on Terror!  As if further proof were needed that states lack the critical capacity to examine their own actions and characters, governments left and right have decided that the principal appropriate response to recent acts of intended and actual violence is to abandon any appreciation of risk management and go for a zero-tolerance, 100%-security option.

So, it's all systems go for full-body scanners at airports!  Let's fire up the Interception Modernisation Programme!  Load up the cyber-bombs, lads, we're going to launch pre-emptive strikes in cyberspace!  Expect security vendors to have a bonanza year.

Forgive my scepticism but really, does anyone truly believe that increasing 'security' in these ways is going to make any real difference to the central purpose of counterterrorism, i.e. to prevent acts of terrorism taking place?  There is no surer sign of the hollowness of many counterterrorism policies than kneejerk calls for more CT measures once a failure occurs.  We would do far better to improve our current systems than to plaster on additional layers of restriction and invasions of privacy.

The most significant failure ahead of the thwarted Delta Flight 253 plot was not Schiphol airport security but of the US intelligence community, including the National Security Agency, State Department, CIA, and possibly the National Counter-Terrorism Center.  Together they managed not to process effectively information already collected under the existing security regime.  It's not that the CT procedures in place can't work but that the processes currently in operation did not function properly on this occasion.  The failure to integrate already extensive global intelligence networks is not the fault of law-abiding citizens, and we should not be held accountable for the actions of a few extremists.  The problem is one that will be familiar to students of Information Theory 101: information does not equal knowledge.  

If I follow 25,000 people on Twitter, this does not make me wise.  It's all very well absorbing information osmotically, as it were, but how does this help me to make decisions, or to parse vast tracts of data to inform appropriate responses and effect positive outcomes?  I need to be able to filter that information somehow, so I can use it intelligently.  This is the challenge that faces those who call for massive monitoring and data-gathering programmes like the IMP that may, rather than help counterterrorism, actually hinder it.  You can have too much of a good thing, particularly if the data you seek are buried in a mass of irrelevant data.  There's a scene in The Simpsons Movie (2007, 2 stars in the Stevens film reviews) in which an NSA operative in a room full of eavesdropping peons rejoices when he finally overhears a US citizen plotting something subversive.  All those billions of dollars―and the erosion of civil liberties―and Uncle Sam learns only of a little girl's plans to save a local lake from toxic dumping.  

Supporters of such schemes do not understand the Law of Diminishing Returns.  They will say that the answer to this conundrum is simple and twofold: if we employ more people, and ramp up the technology, the system will yield the results we want.  Wrong.  The answer―unless we really want total surveillance―is to improve how we use information rather than a priori increase the amount we gather.  Something nasty will always slip through the net and the sooner governments accept that total security is impossible, the sooner we can jettison the absurd myopia of this 'war' on terrorism and get on with our lives.  Whilst we allow politicians to continue to make political capital out of this charade, Abu Musab al-Suri must be laughing all the way to the exercise yard.

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On 16 December, Jarret M. Brachman, author of Global Jihadism: Theory and Practice (2008)―and fearless blogger―gave testimony before the US House Armed Services Committee’s Sub-committee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities.  The topic of his statement was ‘cyberspace as a medium for radicalisation and counter-radicalisation’ and should be required reading [pdf] for all those interested in the relationships between online technologies and people’s transitions to violence of thought and action.

Jarret cites a series of 2009 case studies, all characterised by some level of online activity―Nicky Reilly, David Headley, the Sargodha Five, Hasan Nidal, Najibullah Zazi, all of whom have been discussed on this blog over the last few months.  No surprise that the internet has played a role in all these foiled plots, and Jarret moves swiftly on from this element of radicalisation to address a much broader point about US policy.

His observation is that the US is ill-equipped to engage in the ‘war of ideas’ because it has insufficient intellectual capital to do so.  Jarret maintains that the US has no equivalent to the Norwegian FFI’s TERRA program, for example – a dedicated centre for the study of Islamist ideology and culture.   Jarret’s reasoning is summed up best thus:

History, culture and language are the keys to long-term national strategic endurance.  Understanding the world, not on a reactionary, threat-by-threat basis, but from a global perspective is the preferred approach, and a lesson that was not seemingly learned from the Cold War.

We have seen glimpses of the US admitting this.  The flawed Human Terrain System is an attempt to redress the institutional paucity of area experts by employing civilian social scientists in the US Army.  I recall (hopefully not erroneously, as I can’t find the source) some figures from a couple of years ago suggesting that when the US finally invaded Iraq in 2003, their in-house language skills were such that only a single officer spoke Kurdish, for example.  No-one’s suggesting that the US must have staff competent in every language of the world but when the Middle East is one of your strategic priorities it pays to have people who can converse with those who live there.
 
The importance of cultural understanding applies to almost every field of human intervention―medicine, law, social policy, commerce, etc.  It’s not for nothing that HSBC claims to be ‘the world’s local bank’.  Jarret recommends that a program is implemented that allows for ‘creative, collaborative academic scholarship’, with the first step of developing an online platform where ideas can be exchanged about jihadi ideologies and cultures; mirroring, in fact, the ways in which jihadis and Islamist use the internet.  A network to counter a network.

This does raise questions about the relationships between the academy and government, however, not least of ethics and autonomy.  Academics who work in security policy should constantly be aware of their own epistemological stance and seek to be open about what it is they do and why.  Although Jarret states that the US ‘needs to invest in up-and-coming scholars doing work on social, cultural and historical topics, particularly when it does not seem directly applicable to operational necessities at-hand’ (my emphasis), I can see a lot of academics bristling at the idea of conducting research just in case it becomes useful to government.

It’s not for me to decide for government or scholars what they research and why, although I’d obviously be happy for more state investment in research, with obvious caveats.  I think that Jarret’s ideas are useful for one simple reason though: I’d rather the US and its allies acted with cultural understanding than without it.  Academics surely do not know all but as Karl Popper said: ‘Our knowledge can only be finite, while our ignorance must necessarily be infinite.’ The last eight years reminds us of the costs of action at the expense of understanding. 

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I fail to see why anyone is surprised anymore that the internet is routinely used in the planning or execution of terrorist attacks, or that it is a factor in the passage of individuals from peace to violence.  It’s also inevitable that every time it crops up in the context of a new arrest, someone somewhere calls for increased powers for security agencies to monitor the internet.  The former is a fact of life; the latter will not change that.

The current debate is about the so-called Sargodha Five, a group of young men detained in Pakistan last week, who travelled from the US to link up with Islamists in the Punjab.  The basic story is that back in North Virginia they bonded over YouTube jihadi videos, and that an initial laudatory comment left on one alerted a man called Saifullah to their presence and proclivities.  They subsequently set up a dead-letter email drop in order to correspond with Saifullah, who eventually facilitated their passage to Pakistan.  Once there, Saifullah had problems passing them off to local al-Qaeda (possibly) activists due to their unproven legitimacy, and they wound up in the hands of local security services instead.  Saifullah is assumed to be a form of middleman, possibly freelance, and is now the subject of a manhunt keen to snare one of the 'mystery men' thought to be a recruiter for various extremist groups.  The men themselves are in a tug-of-war between the FBI and the Pakistani courts.

Aaron Weisburd writes that this is a standard pattern of behaviour, observed many times over the years.  Raff Pantucci wonders if they copied the email drop method from previous cases revealed in court but they might also have been instructed by Saifullah to do so.  Whilst some uses of the internet might be extraordinary, most are banal, and we should remember this when thinking about how to tackle this element of terrorism.  

You’d have to be a fool to argue that the internet plays no role in many of the cases that come to light in the press and in the courts.  It almost always does.  So do cars, telephones and cheap hotels.  The internet is so deeply embedded in the lives of most people residing in the West that it would be unusual were this not so.  It is too easy to argue that government consistently fails to spot extremist use of the internet, and that more powers are needed to combat it.  If, as liberal societies, we determine that total surveillance of interpersonal communication is undesirable, we should also understand that it is utterly impractical.  It also won’t stop people turning to violence as a solution to their particular problems.  

The answer is not to monitor us all to combat the actions of a few.  Total security, in cyberspace or otherwise, is impossible, and attempts to create it are subject strongly to the law of diminishing returns.  The only way to combat violent extremism is to tackle its causes, a banal statement in itself perhaps.  Like it or not, states will decide what types of material are deemed inappropriate to view and share online, but treating all internet use as de facto potentially problematic and appropriate for regulation does no-one any favours.  Hot on the heels of Google's CEO last week stating, 'If you have something that you don't want anyone to know, maybe you shouldn't be doing it in the first place' (a specious argument at the best of times) there are rough times ahead.




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Two well-respected and prolific watchers of the soft, jihadi underbelly of the internet are having a respectful conversation about the use of a particular term to describe those who subscribe to the e-jihad.

Jarret Brachman and Aaron Weisburd know of which they speak.  Both are seasoned observers of the internet jihad and have not flinched from tackling their adversaries head-on; both are hate figures on the jihadi forums as a result.  Aaron describes Jarret's current strategy of baiting online jihadis as 'the curious art of poking homicidal freaks with a sharp stick', and this pretty well sums up his approach, which frequently deploys humour and ridicule as a means of calling out some of the patently ludicrous antics of our internet friends.

Aaron has now called Jarret out―for his use of the term jihobbyist, which he sees as downplaying the risk that some of these individuals pose.  Jarret countered by suggesting the word has 'increased the overall nuance in public discussions about what constitutes support for al-Qaida.'  Aaron's response to this reiterates his initial position but adds that as public discussions are mainly brokered by the mainstream media, Jarret’s assertion is somewhat weakened.  He also makes this pertinent comment, referencing David Kilcullen along the way:

… keep in mind that along with labeling there is self-labeling. These aspiring 'guerillas' are not so accidental.  They go to great lengths to construct an identity for themselves and feast on hate and violence.  It's as though they suffer from PTSD, only it's a self-inflicted wound.

Which goes to the heart of the grievances that fuel jihobbyists, or whatever you wish to call them.  I've glossed over the subtleties of Jarret and Aaron's arguments, so I recommend readers go direct to their posts.

I've used the term jihobbyist myself, although I'm more of a fan of pyjamahideen  I stole that from Bruce Sterling in another context, and I think it retains the insurgent flavour of which these individuals are so proud.  Neither term is flattering and both do indeed risk the label masking the reality.  For some elements of the e-jihad crowd they may be applicable but―as Jarret and Aaron would both agree―these terms are only shorthand, rather than a typology that should be followed without critique.

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At the beginning of November I posted a story here at FREErad!cals about the curious legal limbo of remand prisoner XC.  Having not been prosecuted for terrorism offences for which he was previously suspected and arrested during Operation Pathway, XC remained in custody whilst the Home Office continued deportation proceedings against him.  The case against him had hinged on the interpretation of emails which his defence lawyers claimed were innocuous but which the security services suggested were evidence of conspiracy to commit terrorism.  Although the Crown Prosecution Service refused to bring a case on this basis, the Home Office pursued it, citing national security concerns.

In my piece I queried this process, wondering how evidence the CPS had rejected as unsound could subsequently be the basis for deportation.  I was taken to task by an anonymous commenter¬ – come on people, please have the balls to show yourselves – for being 'naive', and for not understanding the difference between intelligence and evidence, duh.  Well, neither then must the High Court judges who today ruled in favour of XC and a co-defendant, who had been denied bail pending resolution of the deportation hearings:

Two men suspected of terrorism-related activities won a landmark high court battle today when judges ruled a person could not be denied bail solely on the basis of secret evidence.
Lord Justice Laws, sitting with Mr Justice Owen, said bail applications should be treated the same as control order cases, where terror suspects must be given sufficient material to enable them to answer effectively the case made against them.

The ruling, which could have wider implications for the use of secret evidence, was described as a 'historic victory by the human rights lawyer Gareth Peirce. The home secretary, Alan Johnson, said he was ‘surprised and disappointed’.

The two judges said it was ‘impossible' to conclude ‘that in bail cases a less stringent procedural standard is required [than in control order cases]'.

This does not mean that XC will not eventually be deported but it does mean that the 'secret evidence' on which the case hinges is insufficient grounds for holding someone without legal hearing, even if national security reasons are cited for doing so.  The judges refused permission to appeal in the High Court, but the Court of Appeal may yet end up ruling on this issue.

In the meantime, I agree with Shami Chakrabarti, the director of Liberty, who said that it had taken a senior judge 'to point out what most people already know – if the government is going to lock you up, it needs to tell you why' – as it is required to do with other types of case.  'Terrorism' is a crime, not an excuse to suspend legal process.  It was this failure of process to which I initially objected, and which assertion now seems to have been validated.  It’s nice to be right sometimes.


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In lieu of substantive commentary this week I'd like to point readers to a couple of recent pieces by acknowledged terrorism academics that are worth reading.

First, Audrey Kurth Cronin.  Cronin will be familiar to many readers as the author of How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns (Princeton, 2009).  In The Guardian (30 November 2009), Cronin argues that al-Qaeda is an idea, not a cult, which has important ramifications for dealing with this strain of international terrorism.

The al-Qaida movement is widespread but also fractionalised, a fact that suggests both opportunity and danger for western strategy.  The opportunity is the vigorous debate and fundamental areas of contention that are increasingly obvious within: most sharp is the divide between those who consider targeting Muslim civilians to be legitimate and those who do not.  There is ample potential for driving a wedge between them – they are doing this themselves.  The danger is that our focus on killing the al-Qaida leadership has led to strategic myopia, over-concentration of intelligence resources, and a failure to think through second- and third-order effects within a broader constellation.  The primary aim of decapitation should be to discredit the popular mobilisation that this movement seeks to catalyse, and it is doubtful that bin Laden and al-Zawahiri remain at the forefront.

These comments are set against the backdrop of Gordon Brown's commitment to a decapitation strategy and the Afghanistan troop surge just announced by President Obama.  She was also on BBC Radio 4's Start the Week talking about these issues and others.

Second, Malise Ruthven reviews Richard English's Terrorism: How to Respond (Oxford, 2009) in a recent issue of Prospect magazine (18 November 2009).  I’ve not read the book, but some of English's conclusions sound familiar and correct:

In English’s view, the most serious danger posed by terrorists is their capacity to "provoke ill-judged, extravagant, and counter-productive state responses" rather than the actual damage caused by their actions.  As a tactic, in other words, terrorism’s impact is more psychological than physical.  The 'propaganda of the deed'—showing people jumping from skyscrapers or bodies pulled from the Underground—creates an atmosphere of panic.  It is this mood that empowers the terrorists, creating the impression that, militarily speaking, they dispose of forces beyond their own numbers or the size of any constituency they may speak for.

It looks like English spent a substantial portion of the book tackling the definition of terrorism. 

 

This is the result:

Terrorism involves heterogeneous violence used or threatened with a political aim; it can involve a variety of acts, of targets and of actors; it possesses an important psychological dimension, producing terror or fear among a directly threatened group and also a wider implied audience in the hope of maximising political communication and achievement; it embodies the exerting and implementing of power, and the attempted redressing of power relations; it represents a subspecies of warfare, and as such it can form part of a wider campaign of violent and non-violent attempts at political leverage.

Snappy, but as Ruthven points out, 'pragmatic and realistic', and cognizant of the historical dimensions of terrorism.

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When Thomas Hegghammer publishes, it's always worth taking the time to read what he has to say, and his latest piece for Current Trends in Islamist Ideology is no exception.  Thomas focuses on The Ideological Hybridization of Jihadi Groups and argues that this phenomenon is poorly understood but may be evidence of a structural weakening of the jihadi 'movement'.  

Thomas proffers some ideas as to why this diversification of ideology might be occurring: changes in political environment, organisational structures, and radicalisation/recruitment pathways may all account for some of the differentials we can see between 'jihadi' groups across the world.  This is not to so that they do not remain a potent force under some circumstances and in some places, but that they are far less homogeneous than often thought.

One additional driver Thomas identifies is the modern media environment.  He writes:

A … possible explanation is that hybridization is the result of changes in the media and communications environment of jihadist groups.  The Internet revolution in the 2000s has, of course, greatly facilitated the production and distribution of jihadi propaganda, and this has made it easier for groups to borrow talking points and operational ideas from each other.  As such, new communications technologies may have had a homogenizing influence on jihadist groups.  For example, the increasing global jihadist influence on revolutionary groups since 9/11 reflected, at least partly, the realization by local groups of the formidable propaganda value of the al-Qaeda brand name.  The Internet also produced fierce competition between jihadist groups for the attentions of prospective recruits and supporters, as well as for the attention of the world’s mainstream media.  Thus, in an effort to extend their reach and influence, groups may have sought to opportunistically escalate their rhetoric on issues where they used to be relatively moderate.  

This is linked closely to another of Thomas' suggestions, that

Ideological ambiguity or heterogeneity may be seen by some groups as a way to appeal to a broadest possible constituency.  By addressing a wider range of grievances―global as well as local―they hope to widen their prospective recruitment base.

In this formulation, global information space is an environment of abundant opportunity (propaganda vehicles, recruitment channels) but also one of scarcity (recruitment base, attention span).  The medium is, in part, responsible for the shaping of the message, without which the message will not survive on the global internet.  To borrow a Darwinian concept, the message must be 'fit' for the medium in which it is intended to operate.  Darwin only stretches so far, though, as iterative attempts to make the message palatable and effective may actually be fragmenting the ideological integrity and 'fitness' of the message.  This is what Johnny Ryan calls the 'atomisation' of the message, and what Thomas suggests may in the long run hinder jihadis more than it helps them.

This is an important point.  Analysts often assume that the internet provides the perfect medium for jihadis to promote their cause and to which new followers adhere through radicalisation and recruitment.  The above comments suggest this is only partly true, at least as far as the ultimate utility of the internet.  The nature of the medium may be forcing propagandists to spread themselves mighty thin in an effort to remain relevant and to maintain a viable support base.  The ubiquity of the internet might actually be contributing to them becoming less effective, rather than more.  

This has significant implications for information counter-strategies as well as legal responses to 'internet terrorism', and shows once again that the internet is not something to be trifled with: things are not always as straightforward as they seem.


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Last Friday, Foreign Policy ran an online article by the NEFA Foundation’s senior investigator Evan Kohlmann, 'A Web of Lone Wolves', in which he exhorted US security agencies to get their act together in dealing with terrorist propaganda on the internet.  In a refreshing departure from his occasional hawkishness, Evan rightly summed up one particular factor in governments’ responses to the problem:

With such a generalized threat, it will be a continuing challenge for Western governments and societies to draw the fine line between what is protected under the freedom of speech and what is criminalized as direct incitement to murder.

This is correct, as we flagged up in our ICSR report on online radicalisation earlier this year, and is also a problem similar to those faced by governments in tackling the potential of cyberterrorism.  I wanted to just briefly point out the differences between the terms, ‘internet terrorism’ and ‘cyberterrorism’, or at least what they represent in public discourse.

'Internet terrorism' is used to describe many activities but generally refers to the use of the internet for the recruitment, radicalisation and mobilisation of individuals into extremism, and crucially involves the publication of propaganda that facilitates this, as well as the types of online fora in which interactions take place.  Most of this activity is geared to effecting kinetic terrorism in the physical world, although the 'e-jihad' is sanctioned as a legitimate branch of jihad in itself; participants are performing their duties to Allah even if not engaged in physical actions.

'Cyberterrorism', on the other hand, is the exploitation and subversion of computer networks themselves, for the purposes of facilitating or causing acts construed as terrorism.  Examples include the theft of intelligence data, the manipulation of SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) systems, disruptive hacking of government assets, etc; the list is long.  Although the risks of cyberterrorism are massively overhyped, the possibilities exist, and security planners are paying a great deal of attention to them.

Whilst there might be a good deal of overlap between the two―extremists might discuss hacking power networks openly on a forum, for example―they are quite different, even if often confused in newspaper reports, etc.  I don’t particularly like either term, and I’m only using them because they are illustrative of concepts.  I think of both as forms of terrorism, in terms of desired effects (material damage, publicity, human costs) and actors, although there are so many disputes and terminological debates in this field that one is liable to receive a bloody nose no matter what one says.

Perhaps more importantly, counter-strategies differ depending upon what it is we're talking about.  It could perhaps be said that ‘internet terrorism’ is better tackled at the ‘hearts and minds' level, although technical knowhow is obviously required when it comes to disrupting and interdicting particular elements of the techno-social world of the internet.  'Cyberterrorism' is a trickier beast to prevent, and probably relies as much on network defensive measures as it does on sorting out the root causes of why people might feel the need to put people’s lives at risk in these ways.  Both require legal clarity, political sensitivity, and social awareness, as well as an iron fist when really necessary.

The core difference is that 'internet terrorism' is about ideas and getting people to act upon them; 'cyberterrorism' is about control over resources and connectivity.  The former is more ideological, the latter logistical.  It's easier to punt ideas onto the internet than it is to take control of an enemy network.  The effects of either could be very serious indeed, although the likelihood of either resulting in human casualties is actually very low.  Neither is 'new' in the sense that war has always involved clashing ideologies, as much as it has been largely dependent on logistical superiority.  The modern vehicle of this particular conflict of wills―the internet―sometimes causes things to become slightly foggy, particularly linguistically.  We need to be clear what we’re talking about or we won’t find effective strategies for coping with it.



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Last week, US military psychiatrist Nidal Malik Hasan took the disastrous step of opening fire with a handgun on Army colleagues at Fort Hood, Texas, killing 13 and injuring 30 more.  Quite rightly, the world has been wondering how exactly this came to pass.  Was he, for example, a radicalised Islamist, or did he just ‘flip’ as a result of factors unrelated to the US 'war on terror'?  One issue that has inevitably arisen is whether the internet might have played a role in his decision-making prior to the shootings.

The day after the events at Fort Hood, Associated Press reported that Hasan was on law enforcement's radar six months ago as a result of internet postings that  'discussed suicide bombings and other threats'.  The Los Angeles Times reported that this comment―left on online document sharing site Scribd under the name 'NidalHasan' on 20 May 2009―could have been Maj. Hasan. 

As one of the other Scribd users comments, a quick Google reveals multiple Nidal Hasans on the internet, and there is no evidence they are one and the same.  What none of the news agencies reported is that 'NidalHasan' left this single comment in response to an Islamist tract on suicide bombing but that it elicited no other comments or discussion until after his death when, presumably, there were a lot of people Googling multiple variations of his name.  This user also did not upload documents to the site and cannot be considered―under that moniker at least―to have been very active at all.

The FBI (presumably) did not open a case on this or other 'Nidal Hasan' internet activity, so if he was 'under suspicion' it was probably a pretty thin file at that time.  After the events of 5 November, a preliminary forensic search of Hasan's computer showed that he 'visited Web sites promoting radical Islamic views, but investigators have not found any e-mail communications with outside facilitators or known terrorists.'  Officials therefore tentatively concluded that he was working alone.  Subsequent reports that he attended the same mosque as two of the 9/11 hijackers mean that the default theory will probably be that he was at least influenced, if not radicalised, as a result of exposure to individuals like this and the mosque's 'radical imam'.

Investigations are ongoing and it is far too early to tell what the role of the internet may have been in causing an ostensibly peaceable medical man to become a violent killer.  It seems likely that whatever his online activities in life, the internet will remember him in other ways. 

Researchers report that the jihadisphere has been alive with praise for the man, including an approving epitaph from radical Yemeni-American cleric Anwar al-Awlaki and support from al-Awlaki's followers.  More details will doubtless emerge of the pyjamahideen's predictable transformation of Hasan from American army officer to jihadi hero and, if found guilty, shahid.  In the meantime, it seems that Hasan's internet footprint will be substantially greater as a result of other people's online actions than his own.

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Last year, the US Department of Defense banned its personnel from using portable USB drives (thumb drives, memory sticks, insert jargon of choice), a decision it is on the verge of partially rescinding.  After a spate of incidents in which data was mislaid as a result of employee negligence, the DoD opted for this relatively simple measure in order to increase operational security (OPSEC).  Someone should have impressed upon Houria Chahed Chentouf the importance of keeping such devices safe and secure:

The court heard she accidentally dropped a memory stick containing the documents when she was being questioned at Liverpool John Lennon airport on October 16 last year after arriving on a flight from Amsterdam.  The memory stick, which had been concealed in her clothing, contained more than 7,000 files including an explosives manual for 'The Brothers of the Mujahadeen'.  The device had been tied to an inner sleeve of her burka, but fell out as she reached down to scratch her leg, prosecutor Simon Denison told the court.  The following day she was arrested at her home in Longsight [Manchester].

Subsequent searches of her home found a handwritten note extolling the virtues of suicide bombing and forensic digital evidence of her support for online shuhada.   The 41-year old was sentenced to two years in custody but freed immediately on account of serving over a year in remand.  The Guardian report suggests that a history of mental illness may have mitigated the sentence and the court accepted that she was unlikely to have been planning any terrorist acts off the back of her 'mini-encyclopaedia of weapons-making'.

You'd have to be slightly unhinged to attempt to smuggle a small electronic device on your person through an X-ray machine in the first place (it looks like a SanDisk Cruzer Micro 4GB, he says, with his geek hat on).  Unless there were some rare jihadi gems on the drive, why bother even transporting the data in this form?  We have internet in the UK, you know, assuming you don't live in Wales.  It's also mighty careless to let slip your device just as you're being questioned by security, unless you really wanted to be caught, of course.

As a result of Chentouf's naiveté, counterterrorism police were led to other computers in the UK and Netherlands, and spent 12000 man hours translating recovered documents from Dutch and Arabic.  Whether this resulted in further arrests is not stated but Detective Chief Superintendent Tony Porter had this rather flat assessment of the investigation:

We do know she has got known and established links to extremists abroad and that puts us on notice to be concerned.  She is on our radar and she will know she is on our radar so I think we are in a better position than we were a year ago.

No, I don't know what that actually means either.  Evidently, she was not part of any major plot, or a more canny co-conspirator would have told her about Google Docs or some other form of online document storage, and insisted she left the offending hardware at home.  Luckily for the average citizen not all wannabe jihadis are super-geniuses.

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A new report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, DC, casts further doubt on 'cyberterrorism' as a phenomenon with which states should be deeply concerned.  I agree.

We usually understand 'cyberterrorism' as attacks by non-state actors against computer networks and data.  These attacks are often presumed to result in civilian casualties and deaths, either as first-order effects ― plane crashes, industrial explosions ― or second-order consequences ― critical systems degradation, emergency service disruption.  Despite the continued attempts of a variety of actors to disrupt the assets of government, industry and individuals in this way, we have yet to witness a single death or major deleterious event as a result.

That we have not is in part due to the vigilance and sophistication of national and industrial defensive systems.  On the other hand, there are few indications that terrorists―howsoever we choose to construct that term―have managed to harness simultaneously the skill-sets and the intent to commit acts of this kind.

The CSIS report, and my upcoming op-ed in Congressional Quarterly Global Researcher, both point out that states should not be going off half-cocked about cyberterrorism.  The problem lies as much with the discourse, which often presents possibilities as reality: cyberterrorism as clear-and-present danger.   This does not mean that terrorists might not in future attempt directed assaults on critical infrastructures in this way, just that we need to be more careful about what terms we apply to phenomena, as this affects the ways we choose to respond.

If anyone doubts this―and hawkish commentators certainly do―we have abundant historical occurrences that might serve to illustrate this.  One egregious example is the political discourse immediately following 9/11, of which Adam Hodges and Chad Nilep wrote both 'formulates the questions and frames the responses'.  History will judge whether subsequent actions by the US and its allies were constructive but the prognostication is not good, I'm afraid.  Of course, 'getting tough' on cyberterrorism is unlikely to have the same international effect as the Global War on Terror but it may be even more thankless a task―particularly if it doesn't really exist in the way politicians and lobbyists would have us believe.

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In a recent post, I suggested that terrorist internet activity is not always as anonymous as its perpetrators assume.  This week, a leading security expert proposed that the only way to reduce cybercrime―which might also include terrorist use of the internet―is to force all internet users to be registered, such that anonymity no longer exists.

Eugene Kaspersky, co-founder and CEO of Kaspersky Lab, a leading player in the global computer security market, had this to say in an interview with ZDNet Asia:

Q: What's wrong with the design of the Internet?
A: There's anonymity.  Everyone should and must have an identification, or Internet passport.  The Internet was designed not for public use, but for American scientists and the U.S. military.  That was just a limited group of people―hundreds, or maybe thousands.  Then it was introduced to the public and it was wrong…to introduce it in the same way.  I'd like to change the design of the Internet by introducing regulation―Internet passports, Internet police and international agreement―about following Internet standards.  And if some countries don't agree with or don't pay attention to the agreement, just cut them off.

At present, it is often difficult to ascribe individuals to IP addresses―the codes that identify individual machines on the network, and which are often the first major leads in investigations of online activity.   To avoid the use of fake registrations of domain names, broadband contracts, etc, Kaspersky would like to introduce … more layers of registration and identification.  It's not clear how this would work but we can probably assume that Kaspersky and his company might just be able to produce some prototype technology to demonstrate this concept.  Technology, of course, that will itself be amenable to hacking.

It’s a terrible idea.  Governments are having enough problems regulating online activity, catching the bad guys, and introducing physical identification methods as it is.  Whilst Kaspersky's idea might be music to the ears of many governments (authoritarian or otherwise), what value is there in creating a whole new layer of intrusive technology that will only fuel further accusations of ‘Big Brother'-ness?  We have in the last few days read about the problems of putting whole communities under suspicion on the basis of counterterrorism and national security.  Importantly, if you treat your citizens as potential criminals, will they push back against the very policies ostensibly meant to protect them?  I have yet to find a strong case for internet regulation of this type, nor for ID cards, let alone a technology that is itself secure enough to deliver their promised benefits.

It's too early to tell if Kaspersky's ideas will have any traction beyond a single interview.  Kaspersky has upwards of 90% of the Russian internet security market, and the Russian government has not been backward in restricting freedom of expression where it can, so his comments may have been aimed at domestic ears.  I doubt that, as Kaspersky is very much a global company, and Kaspersky notes the transnational nature of the internet in the interview.  Regardless of Kaspersky's motivations, the 'internet passport' is a non-starter in my opinion, and will do almost nothing to solve the problems it purports to address.  Instead, it may give rise to a whole host of civil liberties issues―just the sort of thing that any wise government would wish to avoid.

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It should be apparent by now but, in the broad and complex field that is the confluence of the internet and terrorism, what is good for the goose is nearly as good for the gander. 

The Canadian trial and conviction of Saïd Namouh on terrorism charges shows that evidence gleaned from internet use can counterbalance the terrible things that wannabe and actual jihadists are said to be doing online.

A lot has been written about online anonymity and whilst it's true that aliases can be used to mask identity, and various tools are available to hide one's physical location, there are very often cracks in one's system that can be exploited by investigative agencies to generate actionable intelligence and evidence admissible in many judicial systems. 

There are, of course, serious problems with both the gathering and consequent admissibility of this type of evidence, but neither we – nor terrorists – should assume that an individual's ability to evade detection is necessarily that great.

In Namouh's case, the National Post describes his internet use as revealed in court:

Hundreds of pages of transcribed conversations, retrieved from password-protected web sites and Namouh's computer, proved that he was an active member of the Global Islamic Media Front, a propaganda arm for al-Qaeda and smaller terrorist cells in Gaza and Somalia … he worked tirelessly to spread videos glorifying jihad and offering bomb-making tips.  He assured a colleague that he was free from the surveillance he might have attracted in a big city.

In March, 2007, he created Internet links to publicize a video warning the governments of Germany and Austria that they would suffer terror attacks if their troops were not withdrawn from Afghanistan.  Then, that May, he provided art for a communiqué by the Army of Islam, claiming responsibility for the kidnapping in Gaza of BBC reporter Alan Johnston and demanding the release of prisoners.

In August, 2007, authorities began to intercept Mr. Namouh's Internet chats, revealing plans to explode a truck bomb outside Canada.

'I have the information and experience for acquisition of explosives in a country and the way to have them easily,' he said at one point.  Later he discussed plans to travel to North Africa and said, 'Terrorism is in our blood, and with it we will drown the unjust.'  He said his dream was that he die a martyr and that his son in Morocco grow up to be a mujahedeen.  Namouh was arrested by the RCMP on Sept. 12, 2007, as he prepared his departure.

Namouh will be sentenced on 13 November, and will doubtless serve several years in jail, but the GIMF and many other organisations will continue to produce and disseminate propaganda on behalf of the jihad.  Other people will persist in plotting to commit violent acts in Canada and elsewhere.  Assuming that proper and consistent legal provisions are brought to bear on the use of the internet for planning terrorist acts, the Namouh conviction is another signal that violent extremists do not act with impunity in cyberspace.

 

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One of the thorny issues presented to modern states is the issue of how to regulate cyberspace without compromising the rights of citizens whom online security measures are meant to protect. 

It's no controversy to suggest that no state has yet to get the balance quite right―and some have failed miserably―such are the velocity and fluidity of information environments.  Two recent statements by leading international officials may herald the beginning of a period in which we will see rapidly how these difficulties scale globally.

Yesterday, Hamadoun Touré, head of the International Communication Union (ITU)―the United Nations' ICT agency―stated that by the end of 2010, the UN hoped to have in place 'a global agreement with every country to protect its citizens online, not to harbor cyberterrorists, and not to start an online attack'.  This is a complex undertaking, and one that I doubt will result in a single agreement, or at least not one with any teeth. 

The problems posed by internet fraud and the like are not the same as cyberterrorism, and are substantially different from the kind of inter-state warfare suggested by the banning of first cyber strikes.  Each field has its own peculiarities, and although the member nations could sign a protocol signalling global goodwill across the piece, any real action is going to require a much more granular, yet muscular, approach.

Having said that, in a speech to the UN General Assembly on 25 September, Estonian President Toomas Hendrik Ilves had this to say about securing the future of cyberspace:

Our long-term aim should be the creation of a universal cyber culture – a universally accessible, secure and safe environment for all.

This would seem to be exactly the sort of outcome on which the UN should remain focused when drafting the agreement(s) of which Touré spoke. 

There are probably too many constraints on the UN for them not to keep this is mind but in the current climate of panic and over-reaction to so-called 'cyber threats', a cool head is required. 

Keeping your eyes on the prize is one condition of being an effective broker in any situation and we can but hope that forthcoming UN initiatives are harnessed to a proper strategic vision.  Rather that than bowing to short-term tactical gains that result in long-term degradation of one of mankind's most valuable social and economic resources.

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The recent arrest of Hosam Maher Husein Smadi highlights a number of details about the Federal Bureau of Investigation's modus operandi in dealing with suspected terrorists inside the United States.  Smadi, a 19-year old Jordanian was arrested on 24 September in Dallas, Texas, after a sting operation that saw the FBI monitoring, amongst other things, Smadi’s internet use.

Security agencies, if confident of their ability to control a given situation, often allow plots to run as long as possible in an attempt to both garner additional intelligence, and to show that a subject demonstrates the intent and ability to commit an act of violence. 

The fact that Smadi was unable to achieve his aims was because the FBI were with him every step of the way.  This included supplying him with the sports utility vehicle loaded with fake explosives that Smadi attempted to detonate beneath Dallas's Fountain Place, an emblematic downtown office building.  A similar level of FBI involvement was seen in the Michael Finton case in Illinois and has also elicited accusations of entrapment―Finton was also arrested last week.

Further back the chain of investigation is the legwork that agents undertake in order to generate the intel that drives any criminal investigation.  Inevitably, this includes the internet and telephony, and the FBI were on to Smadi early.  His comments on an unnamed 'extremist' website first alerted the authorities to his views and possible future actions.  The FBI described Smadi as a blustering big talker who espoused anti-American jihadist sentiments over the Internet.: "I want to destroy...targets...everything that helps America on its war on Arabs will be targeted," he allegedly wrote.

The FBI continues to upgrade and update its surveillance capabilities, although suffers from an outdated IT infrastructure, and has recruited analysts who speak Arabic and other languages.  Another recent case―that of Najibullah Zazi―provides a closer look at how an FBI agent, Garrett Gambinner, was fully aware of Zazi's internet activity.  His affidavit to the Colorado court processing Zazi's case demonstrates how much the agent knew about Zazi's several email accounts and passwords, and presumably the contents thereof.

Time will tell if the prosecutions in these cases are successful.  In the meantime, questions continue to be raised over the legitimacy of electronic evidence in cases of this kind. 

Do investigative agencies have the right to perform this kind of surveillance across the board of potentially criminal activity, or should it be spurred only in specific cases by operational necessity?  What implications are there for the broader public, who are suspicious that such tools are 'dual-use'?  Where do human rights fit into the operational matrix?  Or do we just take a utilitarian approach and accept that, sometimes, the 'greater good for the greater number' legitimises intrusive surveillance?  Our job as a society is to decide where the lines are drawn.

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Back in June 2009, the UK launched its Cyber Security Strategy, which covered a wide range of topics but was in part intended to counter terrorist use of cyberspace, including radicalisation.  The reform it offered included the creation of two new bodies charged with responsibility in this field. 

The first, an Office of Cyber Security (OCS), would oversee the whole of the Government's cyber security strategy and foreign co-operation, working from within the Cabinet Office.  The second, a Cyber Security Operations Centre (CSOC), would be based at GCHQ in Cheltenham, hub of the UK's SIGINT capability.  This would monitor internet 'health', conduct attack analysis, and develop appropriate responses, as well as inform the public and industry about online security risks.  

Both were supposed to be established this month, in order to be operational by March 2010.  So, what's happened so far?  How are these two prongs of the UK's strengthened cyber policy coming along?

Anything from the Cabinet Office on its progress with the OCS?  Nope, not a word.  Not even a place-holding webpage.  Perhaps we shouldn't expect too much from GCHQ, but how are CSOC preparations coming along?  They're not saying.

In fact, try as I might, I can find no reliable information about either unit published after June 2009.  We've heard a little about MI5 hiring 'Asian teen hackers' to 'battle cyber terrorism' and why that approach is flawed. 

Yesterday, the Centre for Secure Information Studies (CSIT) was opened at Queen's University Belfast to lead the way in the UK's fight against cyber crime, but this initiative is separate from the Cyber Security Strategy.  Unless CSOC and OCS have changed their names, or have been buried for some reason, it seems as if the UK government just isn't interested in keeping us informed about them.

If the Cyber Security Strategy is partly intended as a form of public reassurance, which we should assume it is, surely government should be better communicating its progress in this area?  OK, so it's only been three months, but compare the British approach to that of the US, which has been very open about its operations in this field, even if you disagree with them. 

We presumably will hear about these units in time, but if government actually wants to be seen to be 'doing something', it should communicate its actions better to the public.

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Does anyone know what the following equation represents?:

                                                WP + SIOE = 573,710

Well, that's the traffic volume you get when you combine the free Wordpress blogging platform with the charming Stop the Islamisation of Europe group – it translates into 573k+ hits in the space of a couple of weeks.

The SIOE have leapt to relative fame as the new 'blackshirts', as the press reported the recent comments of Communities and Local Government John Denham.  The SIOE, of course, are completely guiltless of provoking violence at recent 'anti-Islamisation' demonstrations, and reject 'Dhimmi' Denham's criticisms of the SIOE and their ilk.  (For the record, Denham did not give the SIOE the credit of being even remotely as savvy or dangerous as Mosley's 1930s bootboys.)  The SIOE are also totally politically confused, and will undoubtedly disappear up their own behinds before too long, as most right-wing anti-everything groups tend to do.  

In the meantime, though, they are milking the opportunity afforded them by the combination of a free blogging platform, the 'oxygen of publicity', and the accessibility provided by Google.  Half-a-million hits is fair going for any bunch of part-time loonies, and the SIOE must be lapping up the attention.  I'm not going to link to anything in this post – far be it from me to give the SIOE any more hits; you can Google them if you like.

And since the SIOE are probably chronic self-Googlers, if they happen to end up on this site, I'd just like to say, "no, I don't think for a second that your blog should be banned." In fact, I think it's great that we can all read your public discussions about the crimes of selling 'ethnic clothes' in supermarkets (I kid ye not), how left-wing the British National Party are, and how Benjamin Zephaniah supports "Nazislamists who want to install sharia law with it hanging of homosexuals,  stoning of women and paedophilia." [sic]  The mind boggles.

All good stuff, I'm sure you'll agree.  With the likes of 'F*** Mohammad' and 'Anglo Saxon' beefing up the supporting cast of commenting bigots, the SIOE site is a real joy to surf.  I appreciate that this is far from an academic analysis of the impact and influence of a group like SIOE, but really – how can anyone take them in earnest?  As Oscar Wilde is alleged to have said, "It is a curious fact that people are never so trivial as when they take themselves seriously."

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As Amm Samm noted, eight years after 9/11 our elected leaders are still having problems deciding who we're actually fighting, or why.  There seems to be a similar lack of clarity in the murky world of jihadi internet forums, as Thomas Hegghammer reports at Jihadica:

 

Like last year, this year's 9/11 anniversary is the occasion of a major cyberbattle over jihadi forums.  At least three of the top jihadi discussion forums - Faloja, Shouraa, Shumukh – have been down for the past couple of days, and I bet my left arm they have been hacked for the occasion.  Other big forums such as Ana Muslim and Ansar were reportedly down for a while (though I didn't see it and they are back up again now).  Minor forums such as Tamkin, Madad al-Suyuf and al-Tahaddi seem to have been untouched.

Fighting each other, or fending off differently-motivated hackers, I don’t know, but it’s interesting to see that the 9/11 anniversary amongst the pyjamahideen is being marked with relative chaos and upheaval.  As Thomas has done, I've left the hyperlinks in for interested readers to explore these forums – report back if you like.  Thomas did so as a farewell gift to his readers – he's on a blogging sabbatical, so good luck Thomas, and see you on your return.

It's not all doom and gloom though, as Thomas and Internet Haganah both report on the re-emergence of forum granddaddy al-Ekhlaas.  Al-Ekhlaas – as well as al-Boraq and al-Firdaws – had been down since just before last year’s 9/11 celebrations.  All three are allegedly connected with al-Qaeda's media operation al-Fajr.  I wonder if a resurgent al-Ekhlaas will be pumping out media of AQ's new poster-boy, the achingly cool Sheikh Abu Yahya al-Libi?

 

Update:

Internet Haganah reports that al-Ekhlaas is down again. For good?

 

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Just in the last month or so, there has been a spate of reports illustrating the offensive use of the internet by politically or religiously motivated hackers.

In China, the Uighur 'Spy HackerZ' group is suspected of defacing a number of local government websites, leaving messages in support of Uighurs and Muslims.  Indonesian hackers claim to have attacked dozens of Malaysian websites on Malaysia's independence day, calling it payback for Malays 'stealing' their culture.

Islamist hackers are thought to be behind a more serious distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack on Kosavar newspaper, The Express, in response to the paper's coverage of the US trial of Hysen Sherifi, an ethnic Albanian accused of terrorism offences.  Disruptions to Armenian government and high-profile private websites have been blamed on Azeri and Turkish hackers, and are probably related to the long-running dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh.

Twitter and other social networking sites were laid low after hackers tried to drive Georgian blogger, CYXYMU, off the web. Shortly thereafter, the non-profit US Cyber Consequences Unit released a report heavily implicating Russian criminals in the cyberattacks against Georgia in 2008.

None of this is really 'new' to long-term internet-watchers, but it does show – once again – how important the internet is as a vehicle and focus of offensive actions by a wide range of political non-state actors. Strategic planners take this as read these days, although no-one has really come up with appropriate responses to this element of the transnational threat environment. Jailing a couple of Azeri bloggers for a talking donkey is hardly a well-considered counterstrategy. Securing your own systems properly might be.

As the technical tools of propaganda and persuasion become more widely distributed, and the barriers to entry lower, how will your government respond?

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In 2007, John Robb wrote a short book, Brave New War: The Next Stage of Terrorism and the End of Globalization (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons.), which has been largely ignored in mainstream terrorism literature.  Elsewhere, it has received a lot of attention, principally amongst students of fourth-generation warfare (4GW: 'networks against states) and fifth-generation warfare (5GW: 'networks against networks).  This includes a lot of military thinkers, particularly in the US.

At one point in the book, Robb talks about 'urban takedowns' (pp.108-110), in which he describes how cities―as the hubs of modern economies―operate effectively through market equilibria of costs and benefits.  If disruption occurs―such as in the form of terrorism―the costs may begin to outweigh the benefits, and the effect of this might be viewed as a form of tax (based on an idea by Harrigan & Martin):

A terrorism tax is an accumulation of excess costs inflicted on a city’s stakeholders by acts of terrorism.  These include direct costs inflicted on the city by terrorists (systems sabotage) and indirect costs because of the security, insurance, and policy changes needed to protect against attacks.  A terrorism tax above a certain level [c.10%] will force the city to transition to a lower market equilibrium (read: shrink).

Relationships between terrorism and insurance are not exactly new to 2009 but a recent story from Lloyds of London is the first public statement I've seen of the potential impact of 'cyber terrorism' on insurance premiums, along the trajectory Robb describes.

Cyberspace is a growing source of exposures for companies and governmental institutions and that includes cyber terrorism and cyber extortion, says Paul Bantick, professional liability underwriter at Lloyd's insurer Beazley.

'Contrary to popular belief, the people involved are not eccentric individuals but are more likely highly motivated, sophisticated and organised groups—whether criminal or political', he says.

'… domestic threats exist too and could be more of a danger.  Young, smart, tech-savvy groups could use cyberspace to make a political statement, [Beth Diamond of Beazley] warns.'These people could, for example, be local anti-capitalist groups targeting a financial institution or single issue extremists targeting a life sciences company.''

Some business sectors are ahead of others in their preparedness, according to Bantick, and that includes buying insurance.  ‘We find that financial institutions and life science companies in particular are very concerned about data breaches and the loss of confidential data’, he says.

'At the same time, these clients are concerned about cyber extortion, linked to activism, and our [insurance] coverage responds to that.'

I have nothing profound to offer in response to this.  I'd be amazed if actuaries weren't flicking their abaci around to generate income, particularly in a recession; I wonder if the premiums go down when the threat level does?  It's interesting to note that 'terrorism' is not considered the preserve of the jihad – it may have financial, as well as other political, drivers.  I think this is one of those 'watch this space' issues, and I'm sure John Robb has his eye on such things.

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The recent edition of the Jamestown Foundation's Terrorism Monitor [pdf] contains an article by Abdul Hameed Bakier, 'Jihadis Search for Intelligence Penetration on Jihadi Website Forums'.  Citing directly from members of the muslm.net forum, Bakier describes just how paranoid the pyjamahideen are about infiltration by a wide variety of intelligence agencies.

In the Arab world, almost everyone is apparently monitoring the forums for operational intelligence or for material they can exchange with Western countries 'waging war on Islam'.  Bizarrely, the Palestinian National Authority is accused of selling intel to the 'Zionists'.  There is also a surprisingly short list of non-Arab states: UK, US, Germany, France, Russia, Japan, China and, of course, Israel.

Forumite al-Taer al-Maymoon provides a handy checklist of telltale signs to identify infiltrating agents.  Agents exaggerate their praise of al-Qaeda, exalt the blameless characters of AQ ideologues, and 'often pose diverse questions on jihadi topics'.  That last alone tells us a lot about how narrow discourse is in these web fora.  A member of the hanein.info forum, Qotoz, lists the technical ways in which agents snare jihadis, and asserts that human methods include 'brainwashing' participants.

For the purposes of this post, it almost doesn't matter what intelligence agencies are up to on the forums, or what their levels of monitoring and infiltration are.  What matters is the degree of self-regulation that forum members impose upon themselves as a result.  This is not a new phenomenon, and is analogous to the self-censorship the Chinese government wishes to foster in its internet-using citizens: 30,000 internet police, comrades – you better be careful!

Intel aren't saying exactly what they're up to but plenty of non-governmental individuals and organisations are pretty open about their involvement.  Without trying, I can think of a dozen who spend many hours a day monitoring and reporting on various forums.  Only an idiot would think of actually doing much on a forum these days, let alone use a real name, or not mask their IP addresses (tragically, many don’t bother with the latter).  Of course, most of the real 'action' doesn't happen on the forums anyway, but it's interesting to note the levels of paranoia that exist, even if their concerns are based in fact.

[h/t Thoughts of a Technocrat]

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There’s a minor row brewing in Australia over radicalisation, terrorism and the internet. Oz telecom watchdogs, the Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) have declared that Hezbollah’s al-Manar television station does not contravene ACMA’s own anti-terrorism regulations.

It’s unclear from the coverage of this issue exactly how Australians are accessing al-Manar, but we must assume that the internet is the principal vehicle. Al-Manar also comes bundled with other obscure channels as part of subscription packages (by Indonesian provider, PT Indosat). It certainly isn’t available as standard.

The complaint of lobby groups and others is that in the same week as Australia came face-to-face with its own homegrown terrorists, ACMA found that a proscribed terrorist organisation’s ‘public service’ output did not fall foul of Australian media guidelines. In their opinion, the al-Manar programmes they sampled simply didn’t breach the standards ACMA have set as regards incitement to violence and racial hatred, attempted recruitment, and raising of finances. For others, al-Manar can only serve to radicalise disaffected Muslims – principally Somali, I would guess, judging by the possible role of al-Shabaab in the recent bomb plot.

It may be true that ACMA’s sample was too small. Al-Manar certainly has a record of terrorist propaganda, so it would be somewhat disingenuous to argue that it does not engage in such things. ACMA does not do this, so for the time being Australians should accept its ruling. Let’s also be clear about another point – ACMA has been at the heart of Australia’s push towards internet censorship of many different types of content, so can hardly be accused of being ‘soft’ on terrorism.

I’m not in favour of quangos determining what people can and cannot view. If this continues to be a live issue then it is up to the Australian government to intervene and either enforce the law as pertains to terrorist media, or to back ACMA’s findings in full. Subsequent investigations by ACMA may find differently, of course.

The recent terrorist plot has undoubtedly shocked Australians. Luckily, it did not occur as a down-under version of 9/11 or 7/7, but similar kneejerk reactions are to be expected, if not condoned, in its wake.  Censorship is rarely successful in practical or political terms and, in the case of the internet, is likely to be circumvented entirely. For the time being, let the ACMA ruling stand.

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The story came out a couple of weeks ago of a man known only as XC, detained early this year as part of the Operation Pathway counter-terrorism raids in Manchester.  The Crown Prosecution Service failed to bring charges against him due to a lack of evidence, but the Home Office is now seeking to deport him on the basis that he is a threat to national security.  At a bail hearing before the Special Immigration Appeals Commission, the following emerged:

Richard Hermer QC, for XC, criticised the case against his client and said it contained "not one jot of evidence" linking him to bomb-making. The Government's evidence file was made up of eight emails sent or received between December last year and April, markings on an A-Z, and observations of XC meeting with friends, he said.

Analysis by the Security Service (MI5) of the emails suggested the words "weak and difficult to convince" referred to a low-concentration explosive liquid, and "crystal clear" to other chemicals – despite being used in the context of a normal conversation about women, Mr Hermer said.

 

In putting such an interpretation on "entirely innocuous" emails, the Government was guilty of imposing a hidden meaning where there was none, Mr Hermer said.

 

"If you look for meaning and that's the purpose for which you do it, that's bias. What's missing is any consideration of the evidence as to whether there is a totally benign explanation for the messages."

Well, quite.  We have little way of knowing at this remove what else might have been informing the police and MI5’s interpretation of these emails.  Clearly, the press reports would seem to indicate that anything else ‘known’ was inadmissible to the court.  Conspiracy aside, if there’s no case against him, why on earth is facing deportation?

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LAS VEGAS, Nevada – The City of Lights is permanently bathed in a wash of flickering neon but over at the Riviera Hotel and Casino the air is charged with electronic transfers of a different kind, in an atmosphere the hosts gleefully describe as 'hostile'.

Welcome to DEFCON 17, the 2009 incarnation of the world's largest and most prestigious hackers' convention, running annually since 1993.  Your correspondent is no hacker, he freely admits.  My netbook remains locked away at my hotel, many blocks from the mischievous Riviera airwaves.  It was with some trepidation that I took my Blackberry through the gilt doors even.

At any given time there are probably several thousand hackers attending talks and giving demonstrations of the newest and best ways to exploit networked information systems and hardware.  As well as computer-based activities, talk is turning in the hacker community as to how to hack the human organism and biology in general.  On many levels, DEFCON – and conventions like it – represent one of the densest populations of innovation and experimentation on the planet.  The creative energy is palpable, and the enthusiasm infectious.

Yet hackers are often, in the political discourse underpinning cyber crime and fears of cyberspace in general, bracketed with terrorists and other criminals of entirely different stripes.  Curious then, that there should be such constructive dialogue between younger generations often branded miscreants and the agencies charged with protecting government and public cyberspace. 

But this is exactly the situation here.  In past years, there have been good-natured but pointed 'Spot the Fed' competitions; this year there was a 'Meet the Fed' panel, in which representatives of the FBI, NSA, NASA, DoD and many others delivered short recruitment pitches to a packed house of black-clad and occasionally oddly-coiffured geeks and nerds of decidedly anti-authoritarian bent.  And got a good reception too.  

The aims of the two communities are often very similar, in terms of securing communications channels for the greater good.  Whilst hackers may flag up vulnerabilities in systems, industry and government often react to close up those loopholes and exploits – exactly the aim of the hacker in the first place. 

The hacker always find ways into systems but will publish his, and increasingly her, results freely online.  As a symbiotic relationship it works well, and the end result is a more secure cyberspatial environment for us all.

Some terrorists may be hackers, and vice versa also, but generally there are far more differences than there are similarities. Most hackers do not do things for personal gain, although there are criminals within the community.  Most hackers are doing things for social benefit, a utopia-tinted view of a future cyberspace in which we can all develop and evolve.

How different then from the terrorists and cybercriminals in with whom they are often lumped.  Fears of an imminent al-Qaeda cyberwar on the UK are horribly overblown, for example.  Whilst terrorism groups must have some individuals of undoubted technical skill, I doubt their global number exceeds a few dozen that could match the majority of the DEFCON delegates. 

Simple tools are available to those who wish to create low-level attacks but I seriously doubt if those able to inflict substantial and lasting effects on critical infrastructure exist within most of the Islamist terror organisations operating today.

Both the US and the UK are seeking to bring on board 'hackers' to help with national and economic security problems, and many will join to add to the ones already there.  It feels as if the 'hacker' is being rehabilitated within mainstream cyber security.  Although many will wish to remain outside of it, they are still not necessarily criminals, let alone terrorists.  Indeed, it is their innovation out on the 'edge' that will continue to drive better attempts to understand and secure networks.

Throughout the convention, figures like Osama bin Laden cropped up in my mind several times.  What would he not give to have a crew of similarly talented people harnessed to his own bizarre ideology?  At present, it appears that this is not the case. 

Until he starts bringing on board his own 'naughty boys', and fulfilling their career and financial expectations, I think it will be a while yet before we seriously need to worry about anything approaching the damage that the DEFCON dudes could come up with, even in the unlikely event they would choose to.  I certainly slept soundly on the Strip this weekend. 

We need more hackers, not less, and they could in fact be a strong bastion – in or out of government – against the sorts of attacks that AQ and the like will one day surely attempt in concerted fashion.  DEFCON, the floor is yours.

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I was sitting in a Home Office seminar yesterday when someone mentioned in offhand fashion that the UK's terrorism threat level had changed.  MI5 and the cross-agency Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) have reduced the threat level from 'severe' – where an attack is deemed highly likely – to 'substantial', where an attack is considered a strong possibility. 

This might seem like linguistic tweaking but has evidently been the result of a significant intelligence assessment.  The 'severe' assessment is the lowest the national security footing has been at since 9/11 – the threat level has oscillated between severe and critical since August 2006, when it was first made public.

Alan Johnson, current Home Secretary, had this to say: 'The change in the threat level to substantial does not mean the overall threat has gone away – there remains a real and serious threat against the United Kingdom and I would ask that the public remain vigilant.' 

Some have suggested that the downgrade is a political ploy to convince an increasingly sceptical public that the war in Afghanistan is succeeding in reducing the domestic terrorism threat – this week's stated strategy. 

Apart from the fact that JTAC works independently of Whitehall and Westminster, I doubt this slightly conspiratorial assertion, although the timing of the announcement might, of course, work in government's favour.

The reduction has been signposted for a while, with both ex-Home Sec Jacqui Smith and now CT police chief John Yates hinting in recent months it was imminent. 

I agree with Paul Wilkinson, widely quoted across the news and intahwebs, who says it is a 'very cautious, very tentative reduction'.  It does sit slightly at odds with MI5 boss Jonathan Evans' statement in January that two thousand terrorism suspects were under constant surveillance.  Can we assume that the situation is now firmly in hand?

The question is a straw man.  The downgrading is not a cause for a general relaxation of vigilance, as Alan Johnson says.  It merely means that the likelihood of a terrorist attack tomorrow is marginally less than it was yesterday; it is no longer probable but possible. 

The whys and wherefores of this assessment are unknown, and neither MI5 nor JTAC can be expected to tell us.  Nevertheless, an interesting development. 

One can only hope that nothing serious does happen; it would be unfair to the intel services to cop more flak for another status downgrade ahead of an attack, as happened prior to 7/7.

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The Lift sends word of the G8's Declaration on Counter Terrorism [pdf] which contains the following passages on radicalisation and the internet:

An increase in radicalization leading to violence, especially among some vulnerable individuals in our communities, is a source of serious concern to us all.  The main goal of terrorists is not only to spread fear and sow the seeds of instability, but also to undermine the basic values of our societies.  Special attention must be paid to the abuses by terrorist organizations of both modern and more traditional means of public communication for propaganda and recruitment purposes.  In particular, the internet is widely exploited by terrorists to disseminate their radical messages and to plan and facilitate violent acts.  We must increase our understanding of the way in which terrorists use these methods of communication, and increase collaboration on countering such abuses.

Therefore, while we stress the fundamental importance of disrupting and prosecuting terrorists, we are convinced that in the long term the most effective response to their criminal strategy remains the promotion of democracy, human rights, the rule of law and equitable social conditions.  We are committed to continue promoting a culture of dialogue, inclusiveness, and full respect for diversity – particularly with younger generations – which represents the most effective response to counter those who incite hatred for their violent purposes [my italics].

I thought this was worth passing on given the positive noises coming out of Australia that I mentioned on Monday.

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The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) has released the transcripts from a May 2009 workshop it held in Perth on Countering Online Radicalisation in Australia.  In March, ASPI co-authored with the Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Countering Internet Radicalisation in Southeast Asia, the conclusions of which broadly agreed with our own research presented earlier this year.

Australia has been one of the most proactive democracies in the world in implementing network-level filtering of a variety of content types.  Although the Rudd government has stuck to its line in invoking child protection and 'offensive' material as the raison d’être for its widely-criticised policy, there is little doubt that, as we suggested would happen with such a system, the filtering techniques deployed in trials have blocked access to a lot of other types of material also.

It was therefore quite refreshing to read the ASPI transcripts and see that they suggest that filtering is not the way forward in interdicting access to 'extremist' material online.  They also recommend caution in adopting legalistic approaches, citing difficulties with human rights, and extant and problematic anti-terrorism laws.

ASPI argue that freedom of speech is a far more powerful tool in countering radicalisation than its suppression.  This not only defuses the anti-Muslim narratives perpetrated by extremist paranoiacs but also provides an intelligence dividend to security agencies.  As we demonstrated in our research process – by consulting commercial firms – ASPI also propose a closer working relationship between government and industry.

The ASPI workshop does not provide specific policy proposals as we did but it is good to see that there is a developing consensus amongst major nations as to how to address the issue of online radicalisation.  Policies should be based upon respect, freedom of expression, and human rights, not repressive legislation or divisive censorship regimes.  We can only hope that in the case of Australia the findings of groups like ASPI will help to reverse their government’s drift towards internet censorship.

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Two recent articles reflect upon the concept of 'cloud computing' and its relationship to terrorism and public protest.

Although the 'cloud' is a catch-all term for an amorphous assemblage of computing resources it essentially refers to the transfer of products and services from the desktop to the network.  In this model, your computer would effectively be a browser from which you access all the resources we usually associate with the desktop.  The logical extension of this is a computer with minimal processing power, used to access all the software and storage which is run from distant servers.  To deploy a common example: a home Outlook email client runs on your desktop as a stand-alone software package, whereas Gmail is accessed through your browser.  Gmail is in the cloud, Outlook is not.  Gmail is a good example of where the cloud might be heading – although the cloud will initially be distributed, commercial interests and practical considerations will probably lead to the formation of information hubs, like the Gmail servers.

In a post at Dark Reading, technology analyst Rob Enderle asks the question, Could The Cloud Lead To An Even Bigger 9/11?  

The Twin Towers, which were destroyed in the 9/11 attack, took down a major portion of the U.S. infrastructure at the same time. The capability and coverage of cloud-based mega-hubs would easily dwarf hundreds of Twin Tower-like operations. Although some redundancy would likely exist – hopefully located in places safe from disasters – should a hub be destroyed, it could likely take down a significant portion of the country it supported at the same time.

Security expert Bruce Schneier rightly criticises this assertion on the basis that 9/11 did not in fact render US infrastructure incapable.  It actually continued to function very well.  But the essential point is that these cloud datahubs could present attractive targets to terrorists wishing to disrupt critical infrastructure via kinetic or cloud-based attacks.  At present this is a speculative scenario but is undoubtedly one that designers will have to confront.

Over at the Small Wars Journal (if you don’t read SWJ, you should), blogging acquaintance Adam Elkus has an interesting article on the Information Counterrevolution.  Using the recent Twitter-mediated Iranian protests as his stepping-off point, Adam assesses how we deal with the information glut caused by the proliferation of microblogging services and other 'web 2.0' platforms. Many of these are already in the cloud and Adam suggests some positive aspects of these technologies, an unwitting counterpoint to Enderle's mild scaremongering.  In particular, Adam examines how users can themselves provide the sorts of filtering mechanisms required to make sense of mass information streams and criticises the 'infoenthusiasm' of some commentators.  It's a useful short essay which concludes in a fashion with which I wholeheartedly agree:

… it is likely that focusing on organizational, social, and political contexts rather than purely technological modes of discourse and change will best serve those seeking to build innovative technological systems and networks.  It is, after all, imperfect human beings in imperfect social and political institutions who end up using technology – a reality that tech-boosters often forget.

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On 1 July, Jeni Mitchell posted a piece here at FREErad!cals, On the Relevance of Fighting Online Radicalisation in Central Asia. In her post she challenges some of the assumptions regarding online radicalisation, in the specific context of central Asia. She makes two key points:

1. Internet penetration is so low in the countries of which she was talking (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) that models of internet radicalisation – and policies based thereupon – may be very different from those applied in countries with much higher levels of internet use.

2. That we don't really know how the internet is being used in these countries to spread extremist/radical literature and ideas.

Jeni is correct on both counts and I think it's important generally to keep these two concepts in mind when we attempt to transfer thinking to different cultural milieux. I'm reminded of one particular piece of work on a related issue that shows how insignificant the internet can be in propelling people towards the jihad.

In 2008, Clinton Watts of PJ Sage analysed the 'Sinjar' database of foreign fighters in Iraq [pdf].  His findings suggest that bottom-up internet radicalisation of Iraq-bound mujahideen is overstated and that, in fact, countries with greater internet access correlate to lower numbers of fighters. Despite this, 3.4% of foreign fighters did meet their coordinators through the internet. In addition, Al Qaeda did not seem to use the internet to recruit as part of any integrated or targeted campaign, as regards Iraq at least.

Watts concludes that 'the best recruiter of a foreign fighter is a veteran foreign fighter', who were responsible for 60-80% of recruitment. The lack of veterans acting as recruitment centres in the west may act as a barrier to recruitment, with potential recruits heading to the internet instead. Attempts to stem radicalisation should therefore be aimed at internet use in Western countries, and perhaps Saudi Arabia and Morocco. Elsewhere, it is social networks that fuel radicalisation, particularly in the 'flashpoint cities' of the Middle East.

Obviously, the Middle East is not central Asia but there are lessons to be learned along the lines Jeni proposes: the common sense consideration that we should not simply apply Western assumptions to non-Western situations.

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On Tuesday 24 June SecDef Gates announced the formation of Cybercom, the new US military command with responsibility for tracking and combating cyberthreats.  It's not the first time that DoD has attempted to set up something similar: USAF's Cyber Command has been around for a while, for example, and was accompanied by a rather alarming statement from USAF Col.Charles W. Williamson III, in which he advocated carpet-bombing cyberspace as a form of deterrence.

Bizarre, and all a bit General Ripper-like for my liking.

Over at Complex Terrain Lab, Eric Randolph wonders if the new command, with its military derivation, will impact on civilian cyberspace also. This is a valid concern. DARPA, for example – the Tefal-head boffins who brought us the internet back in the 1960s – have advanced plans for a 'cyber range'; this would be a huge server farm on which massive red team exercises can be played out.

I wrote elsewhere in January about how even the language used to describe this exercise was, again, a bit Cold War. Not only that but how can a closed system like a 'cyber range' – the language analogous to artillery ranges, etc – effectively model a more open system like t'internet?

Now, I'm not saying that DARPA, or whoever, can't learn from such an exercise – they can, and they will. The problem is that, even though the Pentagon can say of the new Cybercom that 'this is not about the militarization of cyber', it is almost a given that military activities will have to extend beyond just the military network in order to learn about the threats and attacks launched against it.

The very concept of intrusion, for example, implies that an intruder comes from outside. To deal with the attacker effectively you must therefore pursue him, unless of course you are merely following a defensive strategy. If you follow him you will be in civilian cyberspace, outside the military networks Cybercom is apparently set up to protect.

The defensive/offensive dilemma is at the heart of nascent cyber-strategy. There are legal, ethical, and rights considerations that have yet to be fully thought through, let alone tested in courts. Surveillance techniques such as wire-tapping, CCTV and the like are heavily regulated in many countries, not least in the US.

I'm as hooked on The Wire as the next infowallah but even they have to jump through some legal and constitutional hoops to eavesdrop Cheese's cellphone. Imagine what happens when you try and extend your cyber activities beyond the Baltimore city limits, out o'er the ramparts and into the gallantly streaming 'lines of light ranged in the nonspace of the mind'…

[Apologies to William Gibson and Francis Scott Key – and perhaps the entire American people – for the last line.]

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Since 2000 the Islamic Republic of Iran has put in place one of the most extensive media censorship regimes in the world. At least a hundred publications have been shut down by the judiciary at the behest of government, and dozens of people have been imprisoned for disseminating inappropriate material online.

The state has implemented complex and pervasive internet filtering systems, so much so that Iran is today considered one of the 'Big Three' of internet censorship, along with China and Saudi Arabia.

At the same time Iran has experienced massive uptake of internet services, more than any other country in the region.  The Farsi blogosphere is one of the largest language groups after English and its vibrancy and variety easily rivals that of similarly sophisticated nations across the globe.  The Iranian government has tried hard, and with some success, to restrict user access to a wide range of 'foreign' content, as well as cracking down on political expression within Iran itself.

Inevitably, the recent presidential campaign was in part played out online. Supporters and opponents of the two candidates wrote and argued robustly across a number of platforms, from Facebook to Twitter, and on blogs and forums. While the jury is still out on whether online activism translates into tangible political effect, there is little doubt that the internet has facilitated these forms of political expression, whether the government likes it or not.

Since the results were called last Friday internet activity relating to the elections has increased rather than decreased, reflecting the level of protests seen in Tehran and elsewhere.  Predictably dubbed the 'Twitter Revolution' by the press (a term used to describe earlier events in Moldova), the rampant micro-blogging platform is being used by both sides to mobilise support and organise demonstrations.

At the time of writing Mr. Mousavi's Facebook page has nearly 60,000 supporters, for example. Iranians 'tweet' live from demos and protests and thousands follow these feeds in Iran and the diaspora. The government has retaliated by blocking access to some social networking sites and users have simply evaded these measures with the usual ingenuity and inventiveness that characterises both Iranians and the wider internet-using public.

There's an awful lot more that could be written about the 'hows' and 'whats' of current events in Iran and on the internet. The real point though is that as every conflict, military or otherwise, occurs the use of the internet and other online tools ramps up around it. Think Gaza this past winter, or Estonia last summer.

Whilst I’m sceptical about whether the internet delivers democracy, as its most ardent supporters have prophesied for years, it does speak of political and politicised engagement with technology for playing out real-world issues in real time. It is highly unlikely that merely shouting loudly on the net produces real and lasting change, or even that any government will capitulate to tweeters and Facebook groups, but it does make life a lot harder for governments attempting to suppress dissent.

It’s very hard to filter dynamic environments effectively and the counterproductive aspects of censorship are very much on display. The key concept here is 'transparency'. Ahmadinejad is being told in no uncertain terms by Iranians, 'The world can see you, Mr. President. Better watch your step'.

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What, with all the fuss about that speech in Cairo last Thursday one could be forgiven for forgetting that President Obama made another significant statement of intent the previous Friday.  On 29 May the 44th president delivered his Remarks on Securing Our Nation’s Cyber Infrastructure to an invited audience in the East Room of the White House.

The speech launched the highly anticipated Cyberspace Policy Review: Assuring a Trusted and Resilient Information and Communications Infrastructure, a document with much to commend it. The US administration seems to have grasped the idea that security need not compromise human rights, a concept sorely lacking during the Bush years and, one might add, the New Labour years in the UK also. In particular, Obama had this to say:

Let me also be clear about what we will not do.  Our pursuit of cybersecurity will not – I repeat, will not include – monitoring private sector networks or Internet traffic.  We will preserve and protect the personal privacy and civil liberties that we cherish as Americans.  Indeed, I remain firmly committed to net neutrality so we can keep the Internet as it should be – open and free.

I applaud the sentiment but the internet, through a combination of political and commercial interests, is demonstrably not open or free. I also doubt whether the security services will relinquish their eavesdropping privileges although the American public is at least afforded constitutional protection in such issues.

Obama's tone was positive, well-intentioned and I have little doubt that here is a man who, at least in part, 'gets it'. However, there is a fundamental flaw in the administration's outlook. Take this passage in the speech:

It's long been said that the revolutions in communications and information technology have given birth to a virtual world.  But make no mistake:  This world – cyberspace – is a world that we depend on every single day.  It's our hardware and our software, our desktops and laptops and cell phones and Blackberries that have become woven into every aspect of our lives.

It's the broadband networks beneath us and the wireless signals around us, the local networks in our schools and hospitals and businesses, and the massive grids that power our nation.  It's the classified military and intelligence networks that keep us safe, and the World Wide Web that has made us more interconnected than at any time in human history.

So cyberspace is real.  And so are the risks that come with it.

Anyone spot what's missing from this long list of the constituents of cyberspace? Yup – people. I have argued consistently that cyberspace is not a purely technological construct. It is as much made of people and politics as it is of hardware and software. No technology is in and of itself a material entity, as all technologies require human interaction – they are socially constructed in both their use and abuse.

Any strategy that fails to properly address the role of people in technology is doomed from the outset, whether it’s small business 'fair use' computer policies or national security considerations. Institutional definitions of cyberspace have consistently failed to recognise that cyberspace is not simply a strategic 'domain' like the sea or the air.

 

Talk of 'cybercommands' and 'cyber strategy' are bound to be unfit for purpose until authorities recognise that you and I are as much part of cyberspace as our computers and the infrastructure that links them.

My problem with the new US policy is not in its recommendations. For example, our recent ICSR report pre-empted Obama by recommending a renewed commitment to critical media literacy.  It’s that its philosophical underpinning is deficient, not only in definition but also in perspective.

Whilst Obama refreshingly didn’t scaremonger about imminent Cybergeddon or an electronic 'Pearl Harbor', of which then Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre warned a congressional hearing in 1998, it is apparent that underlying Obama’s conciliatory rhetoric is an institutionalised discourse of 'cyberspace as threat'.  Whilst there are of course risks associated with any technology cyberspace itself is not the source of insecurity, people are.

It follows therefore that social problems should have primarily social solutions. Cybercrime is still a crime, and crime is human not technological. This does not mean that there are not technologies to be brought to bear on such issues, just that any countermeasures should not lose sight of the human element.

Cold War cybernetics did not result in society-wide man/machine interface and our globalised world similarly does not deserve the securitisation of the social worlds of cyberspace. I’m yet to be convinced that the new Cyberspace Policy Review is a bulwark against it.

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Welcome all readers to my corner of the new ICSR blog, Free Rad!cals.  By means of introduction, I’ll just say a few things about who I am and what I intend to bring to this new venture.

I’m Tim Stevens, Associate Fellow of the ISCR and graduate student in the Department of War Studies, King’s College London. 

My involvement with ICSR over the last year stems from my perpetual fascination with technology and its relationship with society.  This has evolved over the years into a more focused interest on information technologies, and the study of these informs my current research.

Information technologies matter.  Whether it’s the internet, global capital markets, urban surveillance networks, or drones over Pakistan, at some level all citizens are touched by the flow of 1s and 0s that constitute the lifeblood of international communications and control systems. 

Whilst most functions and uses of this global information grid are benign, like all technologies there are uses which, depending on your viewpoint, can be considered negative, anti-social, cynical, or downright dangerous.  For governments, cyberspace has become the focus of concern, regulation but, of course, opportunity too. 

Both state and non-state actors have a responsibility to ensure that the vast benefits of the ‘information revolution’ are not outweighed or overturned by fear and panic stemming from the actions of a few in a sea of many.  How we manage digital complexity is one of the great challenges of the 21st century. 

I will be writing about this challenge.  We need to understand what the ‘bad guys’ are up to in cyberspace before we can implement good policy or legislate effectively.  The role of information technologies in political violence is a subject worthy of study in its own right but so too is what states intend to do about it. 

Cyberspace is evolving rapidly and what governments do in the next few years is likely to impact on all of us for a lot longer. Here at Free Rad!cals I hope to encourage level-headed comment on these pertinent, and occasionally contentious, issues.  Most importantly, we want you to contribute your thoughts and ideas.  After all, it’s your cyberspace too.

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