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When US Navy Seals raided Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden’s Abbotabad compound last May, they seized a treasure trove of documents. Some of these documents have since been released by the Combating Terrorism Centre of the US Military Academy. Most fascinating from a South African perspective… View the full article +
When US Navy Seals raided Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden’s Abbotabad compound last May, they seized a treasure trove of documents. Some of these documents have since been released by the Combating Terrorism Centre of the US Military Academy. Most fascinating from a South African perspective was that Bin Laden thought of South Africa as an open territory – an area where Al Qaeda operatives could target Americans. It is not clear whether Al Qaeda or allied groups tried to make good on its leader’s thoughts but what is known is that in September 2009 the US embassy in Pretoria and its consulates as well as the offices of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) were closed for almost a week on account of a “credible threat”.
The fact that Bin Laden thought of South Africa as an open territory and one in which his operatives could work relatively freely to strike at US targets should come as no surprise to those who have been following developments in the country. Porous borders, corruption in the Department of Home Affairs which allowed the fraudulent issuing of South African identity documents and passports to terror suspects, as well as a highly politicised intelligence services focused more on sectarian political battles within the ruling party all contribute to South Africa being seen as this “open territory”. As early as 1997, Al Qaeda had established a presence in South Africa. In October 1999, Khalfan Khamis Mohammed, part of the Al Qaeda cell which attacked the US embassy in Dar es Salaam in 1998 was arrested in Cape Town.
Not only was South Africa being used as a safe house by Al Qaeda but was central in the organisation’s fundraising efforts. The case of Yassin al-Qadi, a US-designated terrorist financier who invested US $3 million for a 12 percent interest in Global Diamond Resources that mined diamonds in South Africa is but one such example. He also controlled New Diamond Corporation, an offshore company that had mining interests in South Africa. The case of Abd al-Muhsin al-Libi, also known as Ibrahim Tantouche also points to how terrorists secure financing in South Africa. He set up two Al Qaeda financing fronts – the Afghan Support Committee and the Revival of Islamic Society. Both operated as charities that raised money for orphans; however, in reality the orphans were either dead or non-existent.
The issue of South Africa as an operational base and a transit and conduit for international terrorists to their target country also emerged in the case of a Tunisian Al Qaeda suspect Ihsan Garnaoui in 2004. Garnaoui was an explosives expert who trained in Afghanistan and was ‘promoted’ to being an Al Qaeda trainer. He held several South African passports in different names (including in the names of Abram Shoman and Mallick Shoman) and traveled via South Africa to Europe where he was accused of planning bombings on American and Jewish targets. According to Dutch counter-terrorism expert Ronald Sandee, most of Garnaoui’s preparation for these attacks took place in South Africa where he purchased sophisticated military grade binoculars with an integrated digital camera, diagrams and instructions for the assembly of detonators, as well as setting up networks in Berlin whilst still in South Africa.
Bin Laden was correct to characterise South Africa as an “open territory”. Indeed in one way, with the ongoing politicisation and dearth of professionalism in the country’s intelligence services, it may be more of an open territory than when Bin Laden wrote about it. The Al Qaeda leader’s designation of South Africa as an open territory should be of concern to South African policy makers. They need to take the terrorist threat seriously and act on it. Whether they will do so given the ongoing leadership tussle within the ruling party is the big question. What is clear from past experience is that politicians from the ruling African National Congress have always put personal ambition above national interest.
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Performative Revolution in Egypt by Jeffrey Alexander provides a sociological analysis of competing symbols and narratives in a chronicle of the uprising in Egypt through the lens of media reports and activist-generated accounts. Ryan Evans reviews the essay and finds that despite the… View the full article +
Performative Revolution in Egypt by Jeffrey Alexander provides a sociological analysis of competing symbols and narratives in a chronicle of the uprising in Egypt through the lens of media reports and activist-generated accounts. Ryan Evans reviews the essay and finds that despite the author’s explicit focus on the ‘performance’ of the revolution itself, it brings the dissonance between this performance and its deliverables to the fore.
Read the review at the London School of Economics Review of Books.
Posted by Ryan Evans on 14/05/12
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Following the Arab Spring which has so convulsed the Middle East, Islamists have emerged on top in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. Understandably there are fears in the West as to the rise of “the bearded ones”. There is good reason to fear. In Egypt, for instance, there has been a rise of… View the full article +
Following the Arab Spring which has so convulsed the Middle East, Islamists have emerged on top in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. Understandably there are fears in the West as to the rise of “the bearded ones”. There is good reason to fear. In Egypt, for instance, there has been a rise of attacks on Coptic Christians and the supply of gas to Israel has stopped. Islamists in Tunisia, have called for the death of the owner of an independent television channel which broadcast a film that they did not like. Tunisian President Moncef Marzouki rightly declared these Salafists as a “threat to democracy”. The calls for shari’ah law by Islamists also reinforces Western fears of the establishment of hardline Islamist regimes across the Middle East.
However the situation is far more nuanced than we may believe. In the first instance, as Graham Fuller has abundantly made clear – the Islamists themselves are deeply divided – between ultra-conservative Salafis, more moderate Muslim Brothers, a smaller segment of liberal Islamists – all in competition. Even this breakdown is problematic given the inter-generational conflicts amongst Islamists in the various countries.
Second, Islamists have rapidly come to understand the political game. In Egypt, for instance, ultra-conservative Salafis who vilify secularism have reached a political compromise with liberal parties to form a minority coalition against fellow Islamists in the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party in an effort to prevent them from having a near monopoly on power. In Tunisia similar calculations are at play. Rachid Ghannouchi, the leader of the Islamist Ennahda party recently stated, “When you want people to come together, you have to be in the centre”. Should the West not assist in a policy of critical engagement with the Ghannouchis’ to find the centre between liberalism and Islamism as opposed to a dead-end policy of fear-mongering?
Increasingly the Ennahda leader is displaying statesmanship of the highest degree. Following a call by an Islamist cleric for the murder of Tunisian Jews, Ghannounchi immediately distanced his organization from the call and made a public show of meeting with Jewish leaders. Another example of Ghannounchi’s statesmanship was where he supported excluding Islamic law from Tunisia’s constitution. In my view, I believe this also to be an Islamic position, especially when one considers the Quranic verse 2:98 which states that there can be no coercion in religious affairs. After all, if one uses coercion to get people into mosques or compel citizens to fast during the holy month of Ramadan one is undermining faith. Faith arises from a willing submission to the will of the Almighty.
Third, whilst there have been fears of what constitutes shar’iah law, Ziya Meral cogently argues, “... that there is no inherent reason to think that the principles of shar’iah set out in the Quran and the life of the prophet contradict today’s legal and political ideals. The dynamic evolution of laws and regulations across Muslim-majority countries over the last 30 years attest that Shar’iah is highly adaptable and capable of meeting modern legal, social and economic needs. New interpretations and applications of Shar’iah are enabling Muslims to live freely according to their consciences within the realities of this century”. What is problematic is not shar’iah itself but its interpretation by leaders to achieve power with claims of being Islam’s sole standard-bearers. Again, a strategy of engagement as opposed to disengagement is needed – an engagement which would strengthen more inclusive conceptions of shar’iah which would be compatible with liberal democracy.
Fourth, there is the politics of delivery. Islamists have been lucky to have a good reputation of criticizing the totalitarian despots in power whilst engaging in socio-economic activities to alleviate the lot of the ordinary citizens through their welfare programmes. They did not have to shoulder the burden of office. This has now changed. Having been voted into office, Islamists are compelled to deal with daunting policy problems to fix their neglected societies. Anti-US or anti-Israeli rhetoric cannot replace policies and resources to fix problems of unemployment amongst the youth or the crumbling health services in their respective countries. Whilst Tunisia’s Salafists might well bemoan the scantily clad tourists visiting their beaches, they do need those tourists’ dollars. In other words, the Islamists would have to compromise and moderate their positions if they want to maintain popular support. In Egypt, too, signs of moderation are evident. Whilst the Muslim Brotherhood has vowed never to recognize Israel, its deputy chairman asserted: “We have announced clearly that we as Egyptians will abide by the commitments made by the Egyptian government ... They are all linked to institutions and not individuals”. Presumably this also includes the 1978 Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel.
Whilst there are certain dangers associated with critically engaging with these Islamist movements, the alternative is far more dangerous. Michael Hirsh forcefully makes this point when he noted that “... the United States will either have to deal constructively with organizations like the Muslim Brotherhood, or it will find itself increasingly marginalized and irrelevant in the region”.
Posted by Hussein Solomon on 09/05/12
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This is a round-up of the weeks major terrorism news stories by ICSR Research Intern, Henry MillardSix held in Antrim after Real IRA vow to continue their campaign of terrorA Real IRA rally at the Creggan cemetery in Derry commemorating the 1916 Easter Rising has seen 6 men arrested by the Police… View the full article +
This is a round-up of the weeks major terrorism news stories by ICSR Research Intern, Henry Millard
Six held in Antrim after Real IRA vow to continue their campaign of terror
A Real IRA rally at the Creggan cemetery in Derry commemorating the 1916 Easter Rising has seen 6 men arrested by the Police Service of Northern Ireland and taken to the Serious Crimes Suite of Antrim police station after the event was monitored by a PSNI helicopter.
Before the rally a small group of paramilitaries and several hundred supporters marched through the cemetery. During the wreath-laying ceremony a man in a balaclava wearing battle fatigues read a statement, on behalf of the Real IRA , which vowed that the dissident republicans would persist in acts of terrorism; "The IRA will continue to attack Crown Force personnel, their installations, as well as British interests and infrastructure," he said.
The Easter Monday event was organised by the 32 County Sovereignty Movement and comes a day after calls from Sinn Fein for a process of reconciliation and the perseverance of peace. The Real IRA is responsible for the murder of soldiers Mark Quinsey and Patrick Azimkar outside the Massereene Barracks in 2009.
Chief Inspector Gary Eaton and other PSNI spokesmen stated senior officers had taken the decision to action "a low-key operational response to the event", further adding the events would be “rigorously and thoroughly investigated”
Held in a cell or in a straight jacket? Fresh analysis of Breivik’s psychiatric state could see a custodial sentence after all
A new psychiatric examination has found that self-declared mass killer Anders Breivik is not criminally insane and is of sound mind. It conflicts a previous examination which concluded Breivik was psychotic at the time of the attacks and diagnosed him as a paranoid schizophrenic. The previous analysis may have meant Breivik’s detention within a psychiatric institution rather than the penal system , the most recent assessment re-establishes a custodial sentence as a distinct possibility.
The revelation comes just 6 days before the Norwegian's 10-week trial for terror charges is due to commence. The series of attacks orchestrated by Breivik in July saw a total of 77 people lose their lives in the Oslo bombing and subsequent Utoeya massacre. 34 of his victims were aged between 14 – 17.
Breivik’s previous psychotic diagnosis and calls for his commitment to a psychiatric care over prison received widespread criticism. Breivik insists he is mentally stable and has confessed to the attacks, but has denied criminal guilt and charges of terrorism calling rampage a necessary atrocity as part of his "crusade" against multi-culturalism and Islam and
Prosecutors originally reserved the right deviate from a sentence of compulsory psychiatric care, if new a diagnosis emerged regarding Breivik’s mental condition. Both reports will now be taken into consideration by the court when it decides whether he should be confined to a ward or a cell. If Breivik is found sane, it could result in a 21 year sentence with the potential for indefinite extensions to his imprisonment on the grounds of public protection.
Eye Wide Shut – Justice and Security green paper proposals receive cross-party condemnation
Former security adviser to David Cameron, Patrick Mercer MP is the latest to voice ‘grave’ concerns over proposals, found within the Justice and Security green paper , which seek to extend ‘Closed Material Procedures’ to allow more proceedings to be heard in secretly. The paper has also been condemned by the human rights campaigners Reprieve , .
In his statement today the Conservative’s security spokesman until 2007 seeks acknowledgment that free and open trials are an immensely important facet of the British criminal justice system. The erosion of which may amount to a major propaganda victory for violent extremists and may even bolster the perceived credibility of extremist narratives.
Under plans considered in the green paper , in some cases defendants may not be allowed to be present, know of, or challenge cases brought against them. In such incidents they would also be required to be represented by an advocate with security-clearance, rather than their solicitor. Parliament’s Human Rights Committee has produced a report criticising the plans as “inherently unfair and dangerous”. Mr Mercer remarked; “the point about terrorism and subversion is that it endeavours to change the way we live our lives and the tenets upon which we base our justice… by imposing these changes upon ourselves, we are doing the subversives’ jobs for them.”
Further issues have been raised regarding accountability , as current proposals seek a ban on Norwich Pharmacal, the legal principle which addresses issues of disclosure, explanation, and complicity in wrongdoing. All of which are particularly pertinent when investigating allegations of abuse and/or misconduct of detainees at the hands of the security services. Parallels have been drawn with the Diplock courts of Northern Ireland, where the juryless courts, whilst ensuring short term convictions, led to accusations of injustice, encroachment of civil liberties and imperialist authoritarianism.According to the Telegraph , the Government faces a revolt and “senior figures from all parties have condemned the move”. The Special Advocates’ response to the consultation offers a comprehensive summary of these concerns.
Posted by ICSR on 13/04/12
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The appearance of the hip-hop artist Common at the White House last May reopened some old wounds from the 1970s. In his music, Common has praised Assata Shakur (formerly Joanne Chesimard), convicted for the 1973 murder of a New York State trooper, who was shot in the back of the head with his own… View the full article +
The appearance of the hip-hop artist Common at the White House last May reopened some old wounds from the 1970s. In his music, Common has praised Assata Shakur (formerly Joanne Chesimard), convicted for the 1973 murder of a New York State trooper, who was shot in the back of the head with his own service revolver. After escaping from prison in 1979, Shakur fled to Cuba, where she remains a guest of the Castro government. Police organisations in New Jersey denounced the Obama administration’s invitation, which the White House declined to withdraw.
Shakur was a major terrorist figure in 1970s America—a decade of “indigenous American berserk” in the words of the novelist Philip Roth. During this period, the Weather Underground Organization (WUO), an offshoot of Students for a Democratic Society, bombed the Pentagon, New York police headquarters, corporate offices, and other symbolic targets. The violent escapades of Weather’s well-educated middle- and upper-class members radiated a kind of toxic glamour that continues to fascinate some younger political activists. During the 1970s, the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA), a tiny band of violent extremists led by a prison escapee turned “general field marshal” vaulted to international notoriety through one of the most audacious terrorist “spectaculars” of the era: the kidnapping of Patty Hearst, the newspaper heiress who under the nom de guerre “Tania” would go on to fight as an SLA “urban guerrilla.”
The Common contretemps brought some fresh attention to the Shakur case. But the terrorist group to which she belonged, the Black Liberation Army (BLA), remains largely forgotten. The BLA was loosely organised and small, never numbering more than 25 or 30 hardcore members. But it was far more lethal than the WUO or SLA. During the early 1970s, the BLA robbed banks (“revolutionary appropriations,” in the language of the day), kidnapped drug dealers, and killed a dozen policemen—“assassinations,” in the BLA’s parlance.
Historical amnesia about groups like the BLA is unfortunate. For many U.S. government officials, policy analysts, and academic specialists, terrorism effectively began on September 11, 2001. During the following ten years, the only domestic violent extremism that seemed to matter was the plots hatched by American Muslims. Lacking any historical perspective, policymakers have framed “homegrown” Islamic terrorism as uniquely dangerous and therefore requiring extraordinary countermeasures.
Re-examining the BLA reminds us of the obvious but often overlooked point that terrorism is a tactic that isn’t confined to Muslims. Moreover, the successful campaign against the BLA reinforces the idea that at least in some cases relatively conventional means such as persistent police work, criminal prosecutions, and prison sentences can be highly effective counterterrorism tools.
What was to become known as the Black Liberation Army emerged from the Black Panther Party, the pre-eminent “Black Power” organisation of the late 1960s. From its founding in Oakland, California in 1966, a clandestine wing existed inside the party. (Maintaining revolutionary discipline among underground cadres was not always easy, according to one former member, who felt the need to remind his fellow revolutionaries that “our struggle was a class struggle, not an ass struggle.”) But the BLA did not emerge as a separate entity until 1971, when the West Coast central committee expelled the New York Panthers. Banished party members went on to form the nucleus of an independent BLA.
The group made its violent debut in June 1971 with a machine-gun attack on two New York policemen guarding the Manhattan district attorney’s apartment. Two days later, two police officers were shot to death while on patrol in Harlem. In a letter delivered to local media, the BLA announced that “the armed goons of this racist government will again meet the guns of oppressed Third World Peoples as long as they occupy our community and murder our brothers and sisters in the name of American law and order.”
Throughout is existence, the BLA framed its violent attacks on police as a legitimate response to the forces of colonial occupation in the nation’s ghettos. As Shakur declared, “[o]ur backs are against the wall [and] now more than ever we need an army to defend ourselves and fight for our liberation.” During the next three years, the BLA wounded or murdered policemen in New York, New Haven, Philadelphia, Atlanta and St. Louis. The BLA’s area of operations extended as far as San Francisco. In August 1971, members carried out a string of bank robberies, attempted to murder a policeman, and mounted a nine-person attack on a precinct house that left a police officer dead.
The BLA described its attacks on dope peddlers as another form of self-defense and as resistance to what it claimed was a government conspiracy to flood communities with heroin and anaesthetise restless ghetto denizens. In an undated communiqué, the BLA issued a general warning to social undesirables, including “pimps, ho’s [sic], howalkers, trickwalkers, bodyguards, tricks, dope pushers, and owners/operators of trick houses. Anyone found guilty . . .would be dealt with.”
Although the BLA’s reach extended across the country, New York was the center of BLA operations. Attacks on the police fostered a climate of fear within the ranks of the NY Police Department. As one patrolman said in early 1972, “I’m carrying my police special plus two non-reg weapons and I’m still scared shitless to walk on my beat.” As far as the New York police were concerned, the BLA was a criminal, cop-killing enterprise—despite whatever revolutionary rhetoric it chose to spout.
The FBI saw things differently. The BLA was criminal, to be sure, but it was not a gang of ordinary lawbreakers. In the bureau’s view, the BLA was a national security threat, primarily domestic in nature, but with possible links to hostile governments in the Middle East. The FBI seldom used the term “terrorist” to describe the BLA. In a July 1973 bulletin, the bureau drew a distinction between terrorists, who sought to “focus attention on a particular grievance,” and guerrillas, who are “working toward revolution.” In the opinion of a senior FBI official, the BLA clearly was in the latter category: “[the] avowed aim of the BLA is revolution.” To thwart such subversion, the FBI undertook what it termed “full penetrative investigations” which relied heavily on informants who were close to the BLA.Although the FBI did apprehend some BLA fugitives, local police in New York, San Francisco, and New Jersey were responsible for capturing (or in some cases killing in shootouts) most of the individuals responsible for BLA violence. One ex-BLA member, writing in 2003, claimed that “techniques of ‘low intensity warfare,’ of counterinsurgency, of terrorism . . .were perfected over a period of time and were used in very effective ways against the Black liberation movement.” In reality, the BLA was taken apart by persistent police work, manhunts, and long prison terms. By the mid-1970s, the BLA was defunct, with most of its members dead or behind bars. However, according to a 1983 FBI memo, various “black and white ‘revolutionaries’ of several radical/terroristic groups” continued to invoke the BLA’s name, which apparently retained some vestigial incantatory power.
Ironically, the BLA received its greatest notoriety after it effectively ceased to exist. BLA alumni (and one alumna) participated in two more major violent episodes. In November 1979, ex-BLA members sprang Shakur from a New Jersey prison where she was serving a life sentence for murder. Former BLA members also took part in a botched Brinks armored truck robbery in upstate New York in October 1981 that left two policemen and one guard dead. The group responsible for the failed heist (the “Revolutionary Armed Task Force” in a subsequent communiqué, but among themselves, the “Family”) included ex-BLA members as well as stars of the 1970s terrorist firmament, including Kathy Boudin, Judith Clark, Susan Rosenberg, David Gilbert, (all former WUO members) and Marilyn Buck, who the press described as “the chief gunrunner and the only white member of the BLA.”
The case of the BLA does not offer any tidy counterterrorism lessons. But it does help us remember that homegrown U.S. terrorism did not begin on 9/11. Moreover, the BLA reminds us that domestic violent extremism is not confined to individuals or groups who identify themselves as Muslims. Finally, the campaign against the BLA shows that even extremely violent terrorist groups can be dismantled by relatively mundane counterterrorism tools like police investigations, aggressive prosecutions, and long prison sentences—in other words, by treating terrorists like dangerous criminals.
Posted by William Rosenau (Guest) on 12/04/12
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When Captain Amadou Sanogo staged his coup on 22nd Marchagainst Malian President Toure, one of the reasons he gave for his actions wasthat Toure did not supply the Malian armed forces with sufficient heavy and newweapons to take on the Tuareg rebellion in the north. Tuareg rebels, however,made use… View the full article +
When Captain Amadou Sanogo staged his coup on 22nd March
against Malian President Toure, one of the reasons he gave for his actions was
that Toure did not supply the Malian armed forces with sufficient heavy and new
weapons to take on the Tuareg rebellion in the north. Tuareg rebels, however,
made use of the chaos of the coup in Bamako to stake their claim to a large
swathes of territory in northern Mali which they called Azawad which in
addition to including the historic city of Timbuktu also includes the important
towns of Gao and Kidal.The initial assault on government towns by Tuareg rebels were led by the
Azawad National Liberation Movement or MNLA and led by Mohammed Ag Najim, a
former officer in Gaddafi’s army. Indeed, the bulk of Najim’s fighters were
Malian Tuaregs who fought in Gaddafi’s forces. As Gaddafi’s star faded, these
fighters crossed into Mali with large amounts of sophisticated weapons from
Libya’s arsenals. The aim of the MNLA seems more nationalist than religious –
the creation of an independent Tuareg homeland.Since then however two other, more malevolent, actors have appeared in
the unfolding tragedy in Northern Mali. The first of these is the Islamist
Ansar al Din led by Iyad Ag Ghali. He has been deeply influenced by Pakistani
preachers and his ideological affinity is towards Al Qaeda. Thus, observers
were hardly surprised when Ghali arrived in Timbuktu with three senior emirs of
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) – Abou Zeid, Mokhtar Ben Mokhtar, and
Abou Hamame. Western security analysts have expressed concern about Africa’s
ungoverned spaces and weak states for years from a counter-terrorism
perspective. Developments in Mali together with other developments in northern
Nigeria and Somalia proved their case. Islamists were making use of genuine
Tuareg grievances in order to advance their cause. The second malevolent actor
is the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa or MUJAO. This grouping
split off from AQIM in order to focus on the jihad in West Africa as opposed to
the Maghreb or Sahel regions. Interestingly, among their number in Gao are 100
Boko Haram fighters from northern Nigeria. Moreover, training camps have
already been established for more West Africans to train for the great jihad.All this raises the question of what is to be done? First, the chaos in
Bamako has to end and legitimate authority has to be re-established. Much
progress has already occurred on this front. President Toure has formally
resigned, whilst Captain Sanogo has said that he will step down. Also, the
Constitutional Court is expected swear in the current parliamentary speaker,
Dioncounda Traore, to serve as interim president whilst fresh elections are
held. These are positive steps towards re-establishing political authority, but
the military balance in the country is not favouring the Malian armed forces
which were so decisively trounced by the Tuareg rebels.This leads us to the second component of our response. A regional
grouping known as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has
already placed some 3,000 troops on standby to prevent the rebellion from
spreading to the south of the country as some Islamists have declared. These troops
would need to be properly armed and provided with intelligence by the West.Two factors militate against the rebels continuing to hold northern
Mali. First, with amputations, forcing people into mosques to pray five times a
day, looting property and the rape of young women, the rebels have already lost
the hearts and minds of the local populace. In other words, the rebels, by
their actions, have lost popular legitimacy. Second, the rebels are deeply
divided. The secular vision of the MNLA and the Islamist vision of Ansar al Din
are irreconcilable and the two forces have already come to blows in Timbuktu.
For this reason, I support French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe’s position that
legitimate Tuareg territorial claims could be addressed through the mechanism
of a Malian national dialogue leading to a form of regional autonomy. In this
way, MNLA forces could support ECOWAS troops in the fight against the
Islamists. Third, despite their common Islamist platform, there is no love lost
between MUJAO and Ansar al Din. One of the reasons for the MUJAO split from
AQIM was because Africans felt that they had occupied subordinate positions to
Arabs within the organisation. With more West Africans like Boko Haram rallying
to MUJAO and as Ansar al Din comes under the influence of AQIM, this divide
will be further reinforced.Posted by Hussein Solomon on 11/04/12
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Beyond the body count following a fresh terrorist atrocity on the streets of Baghdad or Bali or a US predator drone attacking another target in Waziristan, the struggle against global terrorism is truly a contest between competing ideologies. After all before a suicide bomber detonates his or her… View the full article +
Beyond the body count following a fresh terrorist atrocity on the streets of Baghdad or Bali or a US predator drone attacking another target in Waziristan, the struggle against global terrorism is truly a contest between competing ideologies. After all before a suicide bomber detonates his or her vest they must be ideologically indoctrinated to believe that they are doing the “right” thing – both in terms of the act and the target. Moreover, such an act exists within a social milieu in which such acts are not only condoned but also lauded.
Most of the twentieth century witnessed an ideological struggle between freedom and democracy. Democracy won that struggle whilst Nazism, Fascism and Communism have been largely confined to the dustbin of history. However the ideological struggle between freedom and authoritarianism is far from over. The spawn of this twentieth century authoritarianism, Islamism, is alive and well in the twenty-first century. Thus we witness a clash of two competing ideologies from Johannesburg to Jakarta, from Londonistan to Lahore, and from Toulouse to Tripoli. One ideology calls for democracy and greater human rights, whilst the other calls for global jihad and is fundamentally totalitarian in nature. As Walid Phares makes clear, this War of Ideas is raging relentlessly behind the War on Terror. The outcome of the second is ineluctably conditioned by the consequences of the first. Phares is emphatic in his conclusion that if democratic forces do not win the War of Ideas quickly, then the War on Terror will be expanded into the next generation.
My current research is largely focused on the rise of Islamism in Africa but even here, the battle of ideas rages on. Pan-Islamic organisations operate on the continent and these undermine not only communal harmony as we see in the rise of sectarian strife between Muslims and Christians, but also seek to internationalise national struggles, most notably the Palestinian cause. One such Pan-Islamic body is The Islam in Africa Organization whose preamble to its charter speaks of, “forging a common front to unite the Ummah with a view to facing the common enemies – secularization, illiteracy, poverty and degradation and to rediscover and reinstate Africa’s glorious Islamic past”. Should we then be surprised when Boko Haram moves from local northern Nigerian grievances to linking its own struggle with Afghanistan, Iraq or Palestine? Should we be surprised when Boko Haram moves from targeting local policemen and soldiers to the United Nations offices in Abuja? Given the uncompromising Islamist philosophy at its totalitarian core, it is not only the proverbial “other” which is targeted but also those Muslims who do not subscribe to their world view. Those Muslim clerics (ulema) in Nigeria who oppose totalitarian Islamism are targeted and killed by the likes of Boko Haram,
Whilst media reports surface that Washington is assisting the Nigerian armed forces with counter-insurgency training to combat Boko Haram, the real battle is being lost for the hearts and minds of ordinary Muslims in Africa’s most populous country. Nigerian Islamists have been quite good at finding themselves positioned in key places of learning from universities to madrassahs in order to recruit a new generation of radicals. They have been proven quite adept at using the new media like blogging in order to get their message out. Of course, they are greatly assisted in this with funds emanating from Saudi Arabia and Iran.
At the same time, how has the West countered this Islamist discourse? They have not. The West’s response of beefing up the state security apparatus at a time when the very idea of Nigeria is losing its currency amongst ordinary Nigerians who view their state as cruel and corrupt run by a venal political elite seems counter-intuitive at best.
More importantly, in the recent past the idea of the West with its secular liberal democracy and its market economies creating prosperous societies was a powerful antidote to Islamist discourses. However, in recent years the idea of the West has increasingly lost is allure. Secularism is under threat in the United States as we see the power of the Christian right especially in the current Republican primaries. Democracy is facing challenges too, with the rise of fascism across Europe and xenophobia (around immigration) in the United States. The free market, meanwhile, seems to lead to sub-prime mortgage crises in the US and the ongoing economic meltdown in the Eurozone countries.
It therefore seems to me that at the very time when Islamists are flexing their muscle as a result of the Arab Spring, the most powerful antidote to their totalitarian discourse – that of the idea of the West with its secular freedoms, its liberalism and its’ market economies – is in doubt.
Posted by Hussein Solomon on 05/04/12
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For some years Islamists in Northern Nigeria had been lobbying for the implementation of shar’iah law. By the end of the 1990s a propitious set of circumstances brought their demand to reality. Military rule came to an end in Nigeria, but with the advent of civilian rule and the concomitant… View the full article +
For some years Islamists in Northern Nigeria had been lobbying for the implementation of shar’iah law. By the end of the 1990s a propitious set of circumstances brought their demand to reality. Military rule came to an end in Nigeria, but with the advent of civilian rule and the concomitant ending of 15 years of martial law there was fear amongst Nigerian citizens that criminality would rise. Shar’iah law, in this context, held the promise of curbing crime. Given the domination of the Nigerian armed forces by northerners, the ending of military rule also witnessed the diminution of political power of northern political elites within the Federal Republic of Nigeria. As such, these now feared that their traditional political fiefdoms in the north were threatened by southerners. Northern political elites then elected to support shari’ah law in their respective states to serve as a bulwark against southern influence.
Consequently, as a result of Islamist lobbying, fear of rising crime levels amongst the general populace and the political concerns of northern elites, 12 states in northern Nigeria implemented the shar’iah between 1999 and 2003. Despite the promise of shar’iah it soon proved to be a dismal failure. It led to the formation of local groups (Yan Hisba) and the implement the shar’iah regulation. Instead these were nothing more than vigilante groups settling old scores in neighbourhoods under the cover of implementing the shari’ah. Defendants in shar’iah courts had to contend with poorly trained judges who accepted confessions extracted under torture. In addition, defendants did not have access to legal representation. Moreover, almost all those convicted in shar’iah courts were poor and female – the most vulnerable groups in society. As in Nigerian secular courts, the rich could literally get away with murder. Even at the most basic level, that of curbing immorality, shar’ia has been a failure. Males in a shar’ia state now simply visit prostitutes in non-shar’ia states or acquire Christian identity cards in order to drink alcohol. As a result, the many Muslims in northern Nigeria have become disillusioned with shari’ah.
The failure of shar’iah in northern Nigeria to provide justice and curb crime and immorality must be seen as a major failure of political Islam and the entire Islamist project. Shar’iah lies at the core of the Islamist project to ensure that Islam is implemented as a comprehensive way of life.
Recognising that the failure of shari’ah constitutes a major failure for the Islamist political project, Boko Haram has made the “reinvigoration and comprehensive implementation of shar’iah” the centrepiece of its demands.Posted by Hussein Solomon on 28/03/12
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Michael O'Hanlon and Bruce Riedel insisted in an op-ed last week that the United States must stay in Afghanistan "until the job is done." While they are wise to warn against making rash decisions based on the particularly tragic events of the last few weeks, they never convincingly… View the full article +
Michael O'Hanlon and Bruce Riedel insisted in an op-ed last week that the United States must stay in Afghanistan "until the job is done." While they are wise to warn against making rash decisions based on the particularly tragic events of the last few weeks, they never convincingly explain when the job should end and how we can expect to accomplish it in the next few years if we - to borrow a phrase from the last war - stay the course. The mission and objectives O'Hanlon and Riedel envision are of the never-ending variety: creating a viable, stable nation where none has previously existed. They also ignore their former, wiser caution on the future of the war.
Read the rest at Foreign Policy’s AFPAK Channel
Posted by Ryan Evans on 20/03/12
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Over on his new blog, Abu Susu, aka Yassin Mubarash has provided a brief write-up of a series of alleged al Qaeda documents that have come to light as part of a terrorism trial in Germany, alongside a challenge for people to discuss the implications of the information if true. At around the same… View the full article +
Over on his new blog, Abu Susu, aka Yassin Mubarash has provided a brief write-up of a series of alleged al Qaeda documents that have come to light as part of a terrorism trial in Germany, alongside a challenge for people to discuss the implications of the information if true. At around the same time or just before, another German journalist, Florian Flade, published a similar post on his site Jih@d, providing a slightly different description of the same documents.
The one that has most piqued my interest are the alleged British documents that are supposed to have been written by Rashid Rauf. From the understanding I have, the papers are essentially a post-operation report on the July 7, July 21, and Overt bomb plots (Overt was the codename for the 2006 attempt by Abdulla Ali and a bunch of his mates to bring down about eight planes as they made there way to America) and German intelligence seems pretty convinced that this was written by Rashid Rauf, the infamous British-Pakistani terrorist operator. This is apparently based on the detailed knowledge of the British plots and some biographical details that are mentioned.
Now I have to preface what comes next with the comment that I have not seen the documents, and so am basing my read-out on second hand analysis. But on the assumption that these are the real deal, this is fascinating as it confirms that al Qaeda in fact directed all three British plots, though to varying degrees of success. In his new book The Al Qaeda Factor, NYPD Director of Intelligence Mitchell Silber, identifies the three plots as having connections, but ends up concluding that while Overt was likely a directed plot, the 7/7 and the 21/7 plots were what he considers as “suggested/endorsed” by al Qaeda. In his assessment, there was clearly a connection, but it is uncertain that the group was directing the cells in London.
To deal with the plots in order – the confirmation that al Qaeda directed the July 7, 2005 atrocity on London’s underground is not surprising. The video in which al Qaeda claimed it and included the will of leader Mohammed Siddique Khan, “Will of the Knights of the London Raid”, featured Ayman al Zawahiri, demonstrating a high level connection. Khan was also on the periphery of the large network around the Crevice group, who had connections right up to the number three in al Qaeda at the time, Abdul Hadi al Iraqi. Furthermore, as we saw during the Coroner’s Inquest into the incident, Khan was in contact with a number in Pakistan a great deal in the run-up to his attack, and a same number in Pakistan tried to call his phone after he had carried his bombing.
That the connection might flow through Rauf in some way is also not that surprising: when Khan went to Pakistan in mid-2001 to train, he and his young protégé Waheed Ali, went to a Harakat-ul-Mujahedeen (HuM) training camp. When Rauf went to Pakistan after fleeing police in the wake of the murder of his uncle in Birmingham in 2002, he seems to have connected quite quickly with Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), a slightly different Kashmir oriented group (like HuM) that JeM’s leader Maulana Masood Azhar (a former leader in HuM) had founded after he was released from prison alongside another British jihadist Omar Saeed Sheikh (who later became famous for the murder of reporter Daniel Pearl and who also first found jihad in South Asia through HuM). HuM and JeM are parallel groups with some cross-pollination and so that Khan and Rauf’s networks intersected is unsurprising. Consequently, that Khan would have connected with Rauf on one of his later trips to Pakistan – either in 2003 when he attended a training camp with the Crevice cell, or in 2004 when he went back again expecting to die fighting in Afghanistan is not entirely surprising. It has long been believed that Rauf was involved in the July 7 plot in some way, this new information seems to confirm that.
The news of a stronger connection to the July 21, 2005 attempt on London’s underground is much more surprising and interesting. In this case, we have very little solid information on the connection to al Qaeda. The belief is that Muktar Said Ibrahim may have trained with the group in late 2004 when he Mohammed Siddique Khan and Shehzad Tanweer (of the July 7 group) and Abdulla Ali (of the Overt plot) were all in Pakistan at the same time learning how to make remarkably similar bombs. Ibrahim had initially headed out with two others from his circle of friends from London’s radical community in London to Pakistan to fight in Afghanistan (the two men’s passports were allegedly found in a house of Rauf’s in Bahawalpur). A man who was later identified as a key point of contact for the Overt group and as Rashid Rauf’s key man on the ground with the Overt cell allegedly sent them to Pakistan (or at least helped them with the contacts). And finally, Muktar Said Ibrahim called numbers linked to Abdulla Ali (the leader on the ground of Overt), and some dodgy numbers in Pakistan, while his co-conspirator Yassin Omar contacted a number linked to Rangzieb Ahmed, an admitted HuM fighter who is currently in jail for being a director of al Qaeda.
But it remained unclear to what degree the group had been directed by al Qaeda. Little information has been put into the public domain about Muktar Said Ibrahim’s time in Pakistan, beyond certain statements by security services that he had trained alongside the other cells, highlighting the surprising use of hydrogen peroxide in all three devices, something never seen before in the United Kingdom. Now it seems as though the group was in fact in contact with al Qaeda core, but managed to lose contact with their handler and as a result were unable to correct the crucial flaw in their devices that meant they harmlessly popped on London’s underground system. According to Abu Susu’s read-out, the group tried to reach out but was unable to contact their handler and as a result was unable to correct their mistake in mixing their devices. So the attempt failed.
This raises a number of questions: first, did the July 7 and July 21 groups have the same handlers? It seems unlikely that this would be the case, if for no other reason than the different way in which they were managed. Khan was in regular contact with someone in Pakistan who was helping him along. Presumably, the same handler would have done the same thing with Ibrahim if he was the manager of the contact and losing contact would be remarkably inept and quite a contrast. It would also have been quite lax operational security to have the same person handle the contacts with two cells that otherwise were kept so firmly apart. Having said this, it would not be the first time that this was done: the New York cell led by Najibullah Zazi became known to authorities because he reached out to the same email account that a cell in northern England had used in Pakistan to discuss their plot. An account linked to this one helped uncover another linked cell in Oslo. So such mistakes have been made. But in 2004/5 al Qaeda likely had much more freedom operating and as a result would probably have had more resources to deploy in managing the cells.
We already know a lot more about the final cell identified here, the Overt group were long known to have had a strong connection to al Qaeda core, and specifically Rashid Rauf. What is fascinating from the discovery of these documents is that we can now see how the contacts apparently evolved. With the July 2005 bombers, al Qaeda seems to have kept them on a relatively long leash. By the time we get to the Overt group, we have Rauf himself managing the connection, through phone calls and emails. But this was not enough, with him deciding to send a close confidant in to manage things on the ground and guarantee that things went off without a hitch. Having said that, it also seems as though this individual was in contact with other potential cells around the country, suggesting that his job was not solely to manage the Overt group.
So what can be drawn from this information?
Well, first of all, it is interesting the degree to which we see the groups requiring help in building their devices once back in the UK. Clearly, an inability to check with their bosses was the key flaw that stymied the 21/7 group. Khan needed a lot of handholding and it seems had faced a similar difficulty prior to his attempt, something he was able to resolve with his handler. For the Overt chaps, we can see from emails that have been released that they discussed in some detail their progress in developing a device.
Secondly, it is fascinating that by the end of 2004, al Qaeda was willing to have quite high level leaders meet with Briton’s on jihadi tourism in South Asia and then trust these individuals to go back home and build cells. In all three cases, we can see how the key ‘emir’ in the UK (Khan, Ibrahim and Ali) trained with al Qaeda and then came back to the UK where they were able to assemble quite substantial cells of individuals willing to offer themselves as suicide bombers without having had direct contact themselves with al Qaeda. This is a testament to the volume of radicals around in the UK at the time, and the confidence of these cell leaders to be able to transform their wider networks in the UK into teams of suicide bombers. The wider cell around the 7/7 is somewhat unclear, the 21/7 group was large and included a number of individuals around the Finsbury Park mosque, and the Overt cell was always most worrying because of the large number of individuals who had seemingly offered themselves as suicide bombers and the six who had recorded martyrdom videos.
And then there is a timing question. It is fascinating to now see that al Qaeda was indeed likely directing the three cells. They came after the Crevice group who seem to have been amongst the pathfinders in terms of building connections to al Qaeda’s broader network from the UK. But based on Mohammed Junaid Babar’s testimony and other bits in the public domain, the cell there was very eager to connect with al Qaeda core (and cell leader Omar Khyam was quite noisy about his supposed connection with Abdul Hadi al Iraqi), but it seems largely to have elected to go and do something back in the UK by themselves. Whether we can read anything into the lack of inclusion of the cell in the post-event reports is unclear, but certainly they were using a different type of device and it seems as though they found their bomb training from another source. Based on what information exists, it seems as though the Crevice lot were in fact a supply network in the first place that expressed eagerness to do something, rather than a tasked cell. What contact the group did have seems to have flowed though Salahuddin Amin who was their contact in Pakistan and whom they asked for details about how to build their device. But demonstrative maybe of how far from the core he was, Amin had to spent some days going to find the answer to the question from cell leader Omar Khyam, presumably unlike the handlers for the other British plots who were directly hardwired into al Qaeda core.
So one possibility is that after the failure of the Crevice cell, al Qaeda decided to try to actually redirect some of these Brits who were showing up to more useful activities rather than let them just die in Afghanistan or go back to concoct half-baked plots. They now believed that these Brits were dedicated to the cause and were willing to trust them both with high level contacts, but also with plans that would involve them going to recruit a high number of dedicated warriors in the UK who had never trained alongside the group. The point being that maybe it took until 2004 to realise that these foreigners were trustworthy and the real thing – something confirmed by the efforts of the Crevice cell and the growing presence of increasingly senior Brits in their ranks (Rashid Rauf and Omar Saeed Sheikh being just two).
There is a final point to touch upon. German authorities seem quite convinced that Rashid Rauf wrote these documents, but he has theoretically been dead for over three years now. Were these part of some electronic brain-trust of the organisation (maybe the mysterious Office of Services Abu Susu refers to?), or is he simply not dead? Or maybe these were multi-authored documents? The common belief is that Rauf was killed by drone strike in November 2008, but no tangible evidence has ever been produced and plots with his fingerprints have emerged a number of times since then. While quite logical explanations exist for this (his contacts were passed on to someone else), you have to wonder why his name keeps showing up.
Posted by Raff Pantucci on 19/03/12
Introduction
FREErad!cals is the ICSR blog. It's a forum for debate and fresh ideas on radicalisation and political violence. It features some of the most innovative, young thinkers, discussing radicals and radicalisation. They are looking at how the challenge has been understood, and how it should be addressed.
Contributors
Guest Contributors
Recommended Reading
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General
- The Long War Journal
- Global Terrorism Analysis – Jamestown Foundation
- MICROCON: A Micro Level Analysis of Violent Conflict
- University of Maryland, START Center
- Terrorism and Homeland Security – RAND
- Terrorism Answers – Council on Foreign Relations
- Institute for War & Peace Reporting
- The Jamestown Foundation
- Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty
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Blogs
- Jihadica
- The Cable
- Abu Muqawama
- Danger Room - What’s Next in International Security
- Jarret.Brachman.Phd
- Small Wars Journal Blog
- Kings of War
- Counterterrorism Blog
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Regional
- Ghosts of Alexander
- Registan
- The Pakistan Policy Blog
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Online Radicalisation
- Cyber Law Blog
- Ubiwar
- MetaSecurity Security of Virtual Worlds
- Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard University
Posted by Hussein Solomon on 15/05/12